Abstract
This work presents an open-source benchmark suite of synthesizable behavioral descriptions with different types of hardware Trojan. A repository of RT-level benchmarks with different types of Hardware Trojan is available at the Trust-hub (https://www.trust-hub.org/resources/benchmarks). Unfortunately, this benchmark suite misses completely the behavioral abstraction level. This work aims at bridging this gap by providing the first behavioral synthesis benchmark suite in a common language supported by all major HLS vendors (SystemC) which cover most of the hardware Trojan types. The designs have been created in such a way that the hardware Trojan cannot be found using standard software profiling techniques (i.e., 100% code coverage in most of the cases). This work also presents the obfuscated version of the benchmarks which makes it even hard to detect the hardware Trojans using the traditional verification approaches.
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Veeranna, N., Schafer, B. S3CBench: Synthesizable Security SystemC Benchmarks for High-Level Synthesis. J Hardw Syst Secur 1, 103–113 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41635-017-0014-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41635-017-0014-1