Elsevier

Mathematical Social Sciences

Volume 3, Issue 2, September 1982, Pages 157-177
Mathematical Social Sciences

Scale changes and shared information in bargaining: An experimental study

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Abstract

This paper reports one of a series of experiments designed to test aspects of various game-theoretic models of bargaining. The results of this experiment consolidate those of previous experiments, which are first reviewed. The principal new result of this experiment is the observation, under conditions of partial information, of systematic violations of the axiom of independence of equivalent utility representations. The adequacy of various theories of bargaining to describe the observed data is also tested and discussed.

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This work has been supported by National Science Foundation Grants No. SOC 78-09928 and No. SES 79-15356 to the University of Illinois. It is also a pleasure to acknowledge valuable advice from R.M. Harstad and J.K. Murnigham.

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