Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results

doi:10.1016/0165-4896(82)90073-7

Mathematical Social Sciences

Volume 3, Issue 3, October 1982, Pages 243-257

https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90073-7 Get rights and content

Abstract

Strategic decentralization of collective decision-making is considered when the agents' behaviour is non-cooperative. Specifically they use dominant, maximin risk-avert or sophisticated strategies. The existing results applying these equilibrium concepts are reviewed in three familiar economically meaningful contexts: ordinal (as in voting), random (as in bargaining) and quasilinear (as in public goods problems).

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Cited by (4)

General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria
1986, Mathematical Social Sciences
This paper investigates the possibility of implementing social choice functions via protective equilibria — a refinement of maximin behavior. We describe a necessary condition, as well as a set of sufficient conditions for a social choice function to be implementable. The set of implementable functions is certainly not empty, and it contains interesting procedures, allowing for some agents to have some veto power. However, positional or Condorcet-type methods cannot be implemented via protective equilibrium. The connections and the differences between different notions of implementation are also discussed.
A crash course in implementation theory
2001, Social Choice and Welfare
A Characterization of Game-Theoretic Solutions Which Lead to Impossibility Theorems
1996, Review of Economic Studies
Probabilistic Majority Rule
1989, Kyklos

View full text

Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results

Abstract

J. Public Econom.

Econom. Lett.

J. Econom. Theory

J. Math. Econom.

J. Public Econom.

Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs

Implementability via protective equilibria

J. Math. Econom.

The Theory of Committees and Elections

On planning procedures which are locally strategy-proof

E.N.S.A.E.

Incentive compatibility and local simplicity

A game of fair division

Rev. Econom. Stud.

A procedure for generating pareto efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations

Econometrica

The implementation of social choice rules: Some general results on incentive compatibility

Rev. Econom. Stud.

Single peaked orders on a tree

Further results on voting by veto

Proc. Conf. on Collective Choice

Theory of Voting

The Theory of Social Choice

Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result

Econometrica

Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance

Econometrica

Straightforwardness of game forms with lotteries as outcomes

Econometrica

Incentives in public decision making

Dominance solvable voting schemes: A comment

Econometrica

Optimal allocations of public goods: A solution to the free-rider problem

Econometrica