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Cited by (4)
General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria
1986, Mathematical Social SciencesA crash course in implementation theory
2001, Social Choice and WelfareA Characterization of Game-Theoretic Solutions Which Lead to Impossibility Theorems
1996, Review of Economic StudiesProbabilistic Majority Rule
1989, Kyklos
Copyright © 1982 Published by Elsevier Inc.