The selectope for games with partial cooperation☆

https://doi.org/10.1016/S0012-365X(99)00294-0Get rights and content
Under an Elsevier user license
open archive

Abstract

In this paper we define and study some solution concepts for games in which there does not have to be total cooperation between the players. In particular, we show the relations of these solution concepts with the selectope. In this way, we extend the work of Derks, Haller and Peters, METEOR Research Memorandum, Maastricht, RM/97/016 (revised version, 1998).

MSC

90C27
90D12

Keywords

Selectope
Core
Weber set
Convex geometry

Cited by (0)

☆

The authors are indebted to three anonymous referees, whose comments led to several improvements in the paper.

Copyright © 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.