Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games☆
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Prior research done in collaboration with James Cox influenced our thinking about experiments on learning in games. Timothy O'Neill developed the software for the experiment. John Joganic provided programming assistance for the maximum likelihood estimation. For helpful comments and suggestions we are grateful to Vincent Crawford, Mahmoud El Gamal, David Grether, James Jordan, Micheal Keane, Kathleen McGarry, Richard McKelvey, James Ratliff, Robert Rosenthal, Neil Wallace, John Wooders, and William Zame, and to many conference and seminar audiences.
Copyright © 2003 Published by Elsevier Inc.