Elsevier

Fuzzy Sets and Systems

Volume 139, Issue 2, 16 October 2003, Pages 283-296
Fuzzy Sets and Systems

On characterization of equilibrium strategy of two-person zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs

https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-0114(02)00509-2Get rights and content

Abstract

In this paper, we consider fuzzy matrix games, namely, two-person zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs. Based on fuzzy max order, for such games, we define three kinds of concepts of minimax equilibrium strategies and investigate their properties. First, we shall show that these equilibrium strategies are characterized as Nash equilibrium strategies of a family of parametric bi-matrix games with crisp payoffs. Second, we investigate properties of values of fuzzy matrix games by means of possibility and necessity measures. In addition, we give a numerical example to illustrate utility of our approaches.

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