Implementing strategies for digital pay television in Europe: The case of Greece

https://doi.org/10.1016/S0736-5853(99)00025-8Get rights and content

Abstract

This article examines the relationship between public policy-making institutions and market forces active in the advanced communications technology sectors. More particularly it focuses on the attempts made by a national government (Greek), which is a member-state to the European Union, to deploy a National Strategy in view of the challenges set by the global and the European `Information Economy' framework. It follows up the policy process and the decision-making phases that, in spite of aiming at a broader strategy in the general interest, resulted in a precipitate legislation on digital subscription television services alone. In this way the policy-maker, acting under unbearable national and international market pressures, accommodated its policy to narrow and largely extraterritorial market interests.

Introduction

This study looks at the difficulties which the government of a relatively small European country faced when trying to implement a strategy in the field of communication technology policy and specifically on digital pay television (“pay-TV”). It asks whether any effective national regulatory strategy can be formulated and implemented under the enormous constraints imposed on the one hand by market forces in their inexorable search for profit and on the other by the legal, policy and regulatory framework of the EU and of the global system.

Digitisation was advancing spectacularly, and, particularly when the revolution of digital bandwidth compression was achieved, the stakes became excessively high in the fight for control of pay-TV services markets. Control of the encoding and decoding systems which the new digital technology entailed meant control of access to a whole new generation of media formats and potentially huge profits. What cards could be played by the administration of a country without significant media production, in a game where multinational media giants were jostling for market shares in markets where the incumbents were largely public service natural monopolies? How could national governments position themselves in favour of the general interest but at the same time follow the generally deregulatory guidelines laid down by the EU Action Plan ‘Europe’s Way to the Information Society’ (APEWIS)?1

The Greek government launched its National Strategy for the Development of Digital Satellite Television and Multimedia2 services as late as March 1998. Predictably, however, its possibilities for regulation of the information economy proved a lot more limited and thorny than anticipated. The ‘National Strategy’ on the development and exploitation of digital technology not only got off to a late start but had also to face an aggressive and decided reaction by market players. The latter’s moves ambushed the government and deviated its strategy. Before entering into the analysis of the policy process the Greek media environment will be introduced. This presents a lot of sui generis characteristics and a background knowledge which will outline: (1) the legal framework since 1989, (2) the political economy of the key market players, and (3) the evolved relation between the mediatic system, on the one hand, and, the government, the polity and society, on the other, is deemed indispensable.

Section snippets

The Greek media scene

Greece awakened late to the idea of an ‘information society’ as conceived by the elite of the EU. Namely at the beginning of 1997, OTE, the Greek PTT, which was by then partly liberalised,3

Globalisation and the EU framework

The failure of the European high definition television project at the beginning of the 1990s and the corresponding U-turn in the EU strategy were expressed in the two Council Resolutions of 1993, 1994,20 in the adoption of the Action Plan

The policy process at the national level

Given the ‘killer’ mentality and strategy of businesses which fought for viability and nothing less than a dominant position, individual European governments had to make swift, intelligent and unhesitating moves if they were to achieve some equilibrium between competing interests in the market place and in society but also some coherence in their respective strategies. In the circumstances policy-makers aspiring to serve the general good had an almost impossible task before them. Difficult

The policy preparatory phase: governmental plans and intentions

The Greek ‘National Strategy’ on the development and exploitation of digital technology was designed belatedly, considering the fast technological innovations in this sector and the very swift moves made by market players. In regard of the early preparatory phase it appeared that apart from the government, OTE was the only other agent demonstrating a potential and a genuine interest in new technology projects. It seemed to be the only agent with a reliable, independent and proactive stance in

The tug-of-war about digital subscription services

If ‘equal access’ could endanger the coveted position of monopoly control, a protracted policy process was no less ominous for the key players. In a volatile and ferocious market environment it could strip them from their de facto comparative advantage of monopoly control over the key technology: the encoding/decoding mechanism. Thus the timing of decision-making became a crucial ground for controversy.

The main opposition party, the conservative New Democracy (ND), immediately launched a

The law on subscription television services

Thus Parliamentary Act No. 2644/98,50 on “the supply of subscription radio and television services and relevant provisions” after a long and bitter battle was eventually passed on 13 October 1998 by 16 MPs, 15 of the government party and one independent (Act of the Government of the Hellenic Republic, 1998). It is fraught with paradoxes and contradictions

The post-legislative phase

The Act provides that a single ‘National Digital Platform’ would be set up to secure “equal access” to coded services by all players at the upper level and all consumers at the lower level.61

Conclusions

This study has followed up the declared intentions of the Greek government to deploy and implement a ‘National Strategy’ for advanced digital services on its way to the Information Society. It has analysed the actual policy process and the outcome that resulted from the actions of the government itself but also of a variety of other actors. Certain features stand out:

  • 1.

    The government aimed for a comprehensive National Strategy but delivered a meagre policy limited to subscription TV services.

  • 2.

    It

References (18)

  • Act of the Government of the Hellenic Republic, No 2644/98, of 13 October 1998. On the provision of subscription radio...
  • P. Bachrach et al.

    Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice

    (1970)
  • R. Collins et al.

    New Media, New Policies

    (1996)
  • Daremas, G., 1999. Communication and power: structures of governance of the communication system. In: G. Psicharis...
  • C. Ham et al.

    The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State

    (1984)
  • Igoumenidi, T., 1998. OTE’s subscription channel will transmit over Satellite’, Exousia, 14.05.1997:5/33,...
  • Iosifidis, P., 1998. International (1998/99) Journal (electronic) of Communications Law and Policy (2), Winter...
  • Kaitatzi-Whitlock, S., 1997. The privatising of conditional access control in the European Union’ communications and...
  • Kaitatzi-Whitlock, S., 1998a. HDTV and Standardisation Policy-making in Europe, in Dupagne & Seele, ‘HDTV: A Global...
There are more references available in the full text version of this article.

Cited by (3)

View full text