Intention superiority effect: A context-switching account

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Abstract

Intention superiority effect [J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 19 (1993) 1211; J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 24 (1998) 350] is the finding that the times to retrieve memory items related to uncompleted or partially completed intentions are faster than for those with no associated intentions. However, this relationship reverses when the intended tasks are completed [J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 24 (1998) 350; Mem. Cogn. 27 (1999) 320]. That is, the times to retrieve memory items related to completed intentions are slower than for those with no associated intentions. In this paper, we present a computational account of the intention superiority effect using the ACT-R cognitive architecture [Atomic components of thought. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998]. Our modeling approach is based on the idea that uncompleted or partially completed intentions are available as context in the current goal, and they prime related memory items while inhibiting unrelated memory items. However, once the intended tasks are completed, they are removed from the current goal, which produces an inhibitory effect on memory items associated with them. We describe an ACT-R model that is able to reproduce all of the effects reported in Marsh et al. [J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 24 (1998) 350].

Introduction

Prospective memory refers to remembering future tasks, whereas retrospective memory refers to remembering past events (Neisser, 1982). Examples of people using prospective memory abound in everyday life, from a child intending to meet her friends after school to a parent intending to stop by the store to pick up milk after work. While the use of prospective memory is a crucial aspect of human cognition, memory researchers have mostly focused on retrospective memory. Only recently have they turned their attention to prospective memory (Brandimonte, Einstein, & McDaniel, 1996). The first international conference on the subject was held in July 2000 at the University of Hertfordshire.

Unfortunately, while interest in prospective memory has been increasing, the progress in understanding it has been rather slow. One of the main reasons for this has been the lack of ‘integrative theoretical frameworks for organizing the empirical findings’ (Goschke & Kuhl, 1996, p. 53). We believe that the ACT-R theory (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998) is uniquely qualified to provide such an integrative theoretical framework. ACT-R is a unified theory of cognition with deep roots in human memory (e.g. Anderson & Bower, 1973), and it has been successfully applied to a wide range of empirical phenomena in psychology including memory, learning and problem solving, decision making, and perception and action (cf. Anderson & Lebiere, 1998). As such, ACT-R must endeavor to account for the empirical findings from prospective memory research.

To begin the task of understanding prospective memory from the ACT-R theoretical framework, we decided to focus on the intention superiority effect (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993, Marsh et al., 1998, Marsh et al., 1999), because it is one of the few empirical results in prospective memory that has been studied under carefully controlled experimental conditions.

Section snippets

Intention superiority effect

Intention superiority effect is the finding that the times to retrieve memory items related to uncompleted or partially completed intentions are faster than for those with no associated intentions (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993, Marsh et al., 1998). However, this relationship reverses when the intentions have been completed. That is, the times to retrieve memory items related to completed intentions are slower than for those with no associated intentions (Marsh et al., 1998, Marsh et al., 1999). This

Symbolic level

At the symbolic level, the ACT-R model of the intention superiority effect, or more specifically of the lexical decision task, is straightforward. There is only one type of declarative knowledge, contained in chunks of type lexicon. Those chunks contain three slots: word, which holds a word, spelling, which holds its spelling, and context, which holds the context in which the word occurred. The goal to perform the LDT is also of type lexicon. When a goal is completed, it either becomes a new

Assumptions and results

The basic assumption of this model lies in the composition of the current goal, which determines the identity of the sources of activation. As previously described, in addition to the essential components of the lexical decision task, namely the spelling and the word to be accessed, the goal also includes a slot that encodes the current context or the task to be accomplished. First of all, at the symbolic level, the context slot provides a way to organize together knowledge associated with the

Discussion

Goschke and Kuhl (1993) and Marsh et al. (1998) interpreted their findings in terms of the ACT* cognitive theory (Anderson, 1983), a predecessor of the ACT-R theory, and concluded that their results were entirely consistent with it. They suggested that intentions were represented as goal nodes, which conferred them additional activation, which quickly dissipated when the goal was popped off the stack and replaced by another. Marsh et al. moreover suggested that after completing a task, people

Conclusion

The main contribution of this paper is to present a simple yet precise model of the intention superiority effect. The model hinges on the fundamental assumption that a task that is or will be accomplished in the near future is kept in the goal as a source of activation, leading to faster access to related lexical items and inhibition of items related to other, competing contexts. However, once the task is completed, it is removed from the goal and attention is switched to a different context,

Acknowledgements

The research reported in this paper was partly supported by a grant from the Office of Naval Research under contract number N000014-96-1-0491.

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