Elsevier

Ad Hoc Networks

Volume 11, Issue 1, January 2013, Pages 288-297
Ad Hoc Networks

SHAKE: Single HAsh key establishment for resource constrained devices

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2012.05.013Get rights and content

Abstract

Pairwise secret key establishment leveraging properties of the wireless channel, is an effective security means in scenarios where no common secret or PKI is available. Related work has shown that secret bit streams can be extracted from, e.g., signal strength ratio measurement between two peers. However, they all require a considerable amount of computing resources by the two parties.

In this paper we present SHAKE, a novel algorithm to establish a key using the physical properties of the wireless channel.

SHAKE is particularly suitable for scenarios where the two peers have very diverse computational resources. For example, SHAKE can be used to establish a key between a sensor and the sink in a Wireless Sensor Network. We show that a secret key can be established shifting the computational burden on one peer while the other party only require one hash evaluation, what can be afforded by any resource constrained device.

We evaluate SHAKE through theoretical analysis and provide validation through real world measurements. According to our experiments, the proposed protocol generates high-entropy bit at remarkable rates and enjoys minimal computational complexity requirements at one of the two parties.

Introduction

The increasing ubiquity of wireless computing devices is calling for effective security measures, e.g., confidentiality and authentication to cite a few. Traditional methods to establish a confidential communication channel fall into two categories. On one side, symmetric key cryptography requires both communication endpoints (e.g., a laptop and an access point) to share a common secret key. In this context, researches have proposed probabilistic key distribution protocols [1], [2] or user-aided pairing protocols (in case of commodity devices, e.g., a smartphone and a bluetooth headset) [3], [4]. On the other side, public key cryptography [5] uses devices public keys and requires an ubiquitous Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to endorse key authenticity.

In scenarios where no common secret nor PKI is available, a secret key between wireless devices can be established leveraging the inherent randomness of the wireless communication channel [6]. Reciprocity and spatial variation of radio wave propagation guarantee that multipath properties of the radio channel (e.g., gains, phase shifts, and delays) are (1) identical on both directions of a link at any point in time and (2) unique to the location of the two endpoints.

If two devices, say Alice and Bob, exchange packets and sample their communication link (for, e.g., angle of arrival, phase, received signal strength, etc.), collected measurements can be used to agree on a secret key. Due to spatio-temporal uniqueness of the channel properties, any other party, say Eve, located at a reasonable distance from the two peers, will measure a different, uncorrelated radio channel and will not be able to learn the key. In reality, protocols for key establishment through sampling of the wireless channel must face a number of practical issues. As A and B cannot sample the channel at the same time, their respective measurements (hence, the key each of them will compute) might be slightly different. Moreover, if the environment is static, collected measurements might not have enough entropy to be used to bootstrap a good cryptographic key. Most protocols to establish a secret key leveraging the properties of the wireless channel, address measurement mismatches and low entropy in three steps:

  • Quantization is used to smooth the difference of the measurements at A and B.

  • Information Reconciliation guarantees that the two parties converge on each measurement. Most key establishment protocols use Cascade [7], an interactive, multiple-round mechanism.

  • Privacy Amplification is used to extract high entropy information from the collected measurements. Most key establishment protocols afford high entropy bits leveraging the “leftover hash lemma” [8].

In this paper we propose SHAKE, a novel key establishment protocol for wireless devices that leverages the properties of the wireless channel. Among the properties of the wireless channel that can be used to compute a key, we use the received signal strength (RSS) as it can be easily measured on a multitude of low-cost devices. We investigate the challenging scenario where one resource-constrained device needs to compute a pairwise key with a non-constrained peer (e.g., a sensor and a laptop).

Our protocol shifts the burden of key establishment on the non-constrained device; as a result, the constrained peer enjoys secret key establishment at the computational cost of one hash evaluation, what can be afforded by virtually any device.

Our protocol enjoys non-interactive Information Reconciliation. To guarantee that A and B agrees on a key, we use one of the simplest way of authentication. That is, B sends the hash of his key to A and the latter tries to find the pre-image of the received hash via bruteforcing. Bruteforcing might not be feasible if the search-space (i.e., the set of all possible inputs to the hash function) is large. Indeed, any security protocol that leverages the one-wayness property of hash functions requires a large search-space to guarantee that no malicious party can find the pre-image of the hash. However, we claim that, if the key computed by B is based on his channel measurements and if A leverages her measurements and statistical knowledge of the channel to sample the search-space, the complexity of bruteforcing is considerably reduced and A can eventually invert the hash (i.e., agree on B’s key). In other words, A’s measurements become a trapdoor that allow her to efficiently sample the search-space and invert the hash. As long as E ve sits reasonably far away from the two peers, her channel measurements will not allow her to efficiently sample the search-space, so she will not be able to learn the secret key.

Finally we do not require privacy amplification. We claim that if the environment is crowded and exhibit high mobility of people/objects (e.g., the canteen of our institute where all experiments were carried out) collected measurements show enough entropy to establish a good cryptographic key.

The paper is organized as follow. Section 2 surveys related work, while Section 3 provides an high-level view of the proposed solution. Section 4 presents the measurement scenario and the adversarial model, while Section 5 depicts the details of our protocol. Section 6 Security analysis, 7 Performance analysis show the security analysis and the performance of the proposed approach. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 8.

Section snippets

Related work

In this paper we study how to extract secret bits from the wireless channel using commodity wireless-enabled hardware. For this reason, we do not survey related work based on special hardware, e.g., accelerometers [9], UWB transceiver [10] or electronically steerable antennas [11].

Authors in [12] present a key establishment algorithm that leverages multiple channels in order to maximize the bit-stream entropy. In fact, their key-generation scheme is based on using frequency-hopping as a source

Our solution in brief

Our key establishment protocol uses the power associated to each received packet, i.e. received signal strength (RSS), collected by A and B when exchanging packets.1 Once “enough” measurements have been collected, their hash is computed by B and sent to A. Without any auxiliary information, A should perform an

Scenario and adversarial model

We assume that A is a non-constrained computing device such as a laptop while B has both limited memory and computational power (e.g., a sensor). Both devices are equipped with 802.15.4 compliant radio.

We set up several experiments in the canteen of our institute: measurements were taken during lunch-time, in order to guarantee a crowded environment and benefit from high-entropy measurements. Experiments were carried out using 802.15.4 compliant Iris sensor motes [20] and a laptop computer.

SHAKE

In this section we provide details of the proposed key establishment protocol and the rationale behind our design. Table 1 summarizes the notation used throughout the paper. As shown below, a preliminary communication phase maps raw RSS measurements into a sequence of “symbols” and is used to smooth the differences of the measurements at A and B. Sequences of symbols collected at the two endpoints are expected to have only a few differences and with very low probability. Hence, B hashes his

Security analysis

The envisioned adversary, E, is a global eavesdropper. She can estimates the RSS values for the packets transmitted by both A and B. Moreover, E is aware of the key establishment protocol and the parameters used within it, i.e., w, bw, and M.

Our goal is to design a protocol that is at least as secure as the encryption scheme that will use the established key for further communication. If the encryption scheme is secure and bruteforcing the key is the only viable strategy, we consider

Performance analysis

Smart sampling algorithm. Recall from Section 5.3 that A agrees on SB with probability PK(M,R,t) if she starts with SA and performs TK(M,R,t) trials.

Fig. 8 shows the performance of the smart sampling algorithm, plotting the sequence agreement probability versus the number of trials. Errorbars in Fig. 8 show quantile 5, 50 and 95 of the experimental results when the protocol is run with sequences of M=18 symbols. The dot-dashed line represents the performance of a bruteforcing algorithm that

Conclusions

In this paper we have presented a novel key establishment protocol based on physical properties of the wireless channel. Our protocol is particularly suited to establish a secret key between devices with very diverse computational resources. In particular, one of the devices enjoys secret key establishment at the cost of one hash computation and a few hundreds of transmissions, what can be afforded by any resource constrained device. The other device can tune the amount of committed resources

Acknowledgements

Paolo Barsocchi has been supported by EU FP7 universAAL project (contract no. 247950). Gabriele Oligeri has been supported by the project "Autonomous security", sponsored by the Italian Ministry of Research under the PRIN 2008 Programme. The authors would like to thank Antonio De Maglio for his valuable help during the measurement campaign.

Paolo Barsocchi received his MSc and PhD degrees in Information Engineering from the University of Pisa, Italy, in 2003 and 2007, respectively. Since 2003 he is Assistent Researcher at the ISTI/CNR Institute. He has coauthored more than 40 papers published on international journals and conference proceedings and he has been member of international program committees of conferences. His research interests are also related to wireless mobile systems and architectures, wireless channel modeling,

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    Paolo Barsocchi received his MSc and PhD degrees in Information Engineering from the University of Pisa, Italy, in 2003 and 2007, respectively. Since 2003 he is Assistent Researcher at the ISTI/CNR Institute. He has coauthored more than 40 papers published on international journals and conference proceedings and he has been member of international program committees of conferences. His research interests are also related to wireless mobile systems and architectures, wireless channel modeling, indoor localization in AAL environment and multimedia communications and services in terrestrial wireless networks.

    Gabriele Oligeri is a Postdoctoral researcher at Department of Information Engineering and Computer Science of the University of Trento. He received the Master Thesis degree and the PhD in Computer Engineering from the University of Pisa (Italy) in 2005 and 2010, respectively. He was with the Wireless Network Laboratory at the Italian National Research Council (ISTI-CNR) from 2005 to 2011. His research focuses mainly on privacy and security in wireless networks.

    Claudio Soriente holds a Ph.D. in Networked Systems from the University of California at Irvine. He is currently a post-doctoral researcher at ETH Zurich. His research interests include security and privacy of distributed systems.

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