Aspiration-based exit option in prisoners dilemma game can promote cooperation.
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In structured population, the intermediate aspiration level promotes cooperation, because defectors around the cooperative cluster exit the game, which weakens the exploitation of cooperators, and help the cooperators at the edge of the cooperative cluster to expand to inactive nodes or the defectors through network reciprocity.
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The combined effect of aspiration level and dilemma strength affects the active state of players.
Abstract
Cooperation is promoted in the structured population when individual has the exit option and it is found that aspiration driven updating rules can also promote cooperation to a certain extent. The right to exit gives individuals the opportunity to get rid of exploitation, and the aspiration is the self-evaluation of individuals. Stimulated by these, we study the effect of aspiration driven exit on cooperation in the spatial prisoner dilemma game. In the game, the aspiration level and payoff of interactive determine the individual’s state. When the individual gets more than aspiration level by interacting with other players, the individual will continue to participate in the game as an active player. On the contrary, when the payoff is lower than the aspiration level, individual exits the game as an inactive player. At the same time, inactive player who exits from the game will get random payoff and pay a certain cost. The promotion of cooperative behavior mainly depends on the aspiration level of players. An appropriate level of aspiration will lead to a high cooperation, which is based on the formation of cooperative clusters. These cooperators can get rid of the invasion of defectors, even if there is a great temptation of defection, this is because the inactive defectors who exit have cut off the interaction between the cooperative cluster and the defectors. Our research provides a feasible way to solve the social dilemma and will stimulate further application.
