Realizations and LP

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Abstract

LP can be seen as a logic of knowledge with justifications. See [S. Artemov, The logic of justification, The Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (4) (2008) 477–513] for a recent comprehensive survey of justification logics generally. Artemov’s Realization Theorem says justifications can be extracted from validities in the more conventional Hintikka-style logic of knowledge S4, in which they are not explicitly present. Justifications, however, are far from unique. There are many ways of realizing each theorem of S4 in the logic LP. If the machinery of justifications is to be applied to artificial intelligence, or better yet, to everyday reasoning, we will need to work with whatever justifications we may have at hand—one version may not be interchangeable with another, even though they realize the same S4 formula. In this paper we begin the process of providing tools for reasoning about justifications directly. The tools are somewhat complex, but in retrospect this should not be surprising. Among other things, we provide machinery for combining two realizations of the same formula, and for replacing subformulas by equivalent subformulas. (The second of these is actually weaker than just stated, but this is not the place for a detailed formulation.) The results are algorithmic in nature—semantics for LP plays no role. We apply our results to provide a new algorithmic proof of Artemov’s Realization Theorem itself. This paper is a much extended version of [M.C. Fitting, Realizations and LP, in: S. Artemov, A. Nerode (Eds.), Logical Foundations of Computer Science—New York ’07, in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4514, Springer-Verlag, 2007, pp. 212–223].

MSC

03B45
03B60
03F07
03F45

Keywords

Logic of proofs
Justification logic
Logic of knowledge
Modal logic
Realization theorem

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