Ascriptional and ‘genuine’ autonomy

Abstract

Knowing that human judgment can be fallible, we propose to distinguish the subjective ascription of a property, such as autonomy, from the genuine fact that an entity is characterised by a certain property, i.e., it is autonomous. In this paper, we take a closer look at this distinction and what it is grounded on, taking a constructivist stance that sees the scientist as an observing subject. We arrive at a notion of fortified ascription, in which knowledge and scientific study of generative mechanisms play an important role, and look at some models of autonomy in the light of this distinction.

Introduction

Maturana points out that “everything said is said by an observer” (Maturana, 1978). The well-known example of a skilful submarine pilot (Maturana and Varela, 1987), who manoeuvres a submarine relying just on the readings of different kinds of meters, on the basis of which he decides which levers to pull, will help us illustrate this phrase. Maturana and Varela argue that this submarine pilot, who supposedly never in his life has left the submarine, can skilfully master the passage through a reef full of obstacles. However, he would not know what an obstacle is, or a reef, or even a submarine. These concepts can be used to describe and perceive the situation from the outside, for example by an observer standing on the seashore. The concepts the pilot himself will use to describe and perceive the situation will be different, and will probably rely on meter readings and levers, not on reefs and submarines. Maturana and Varela invoke this metaphor to illustrate how, in the scientific study of life, the biologist's point of view differs from the organism's point of view. It expresses a deep constructivist belief, which rejects the idea of an objective world out there, with a pre-given ontology of events, objects and facts that the organism aspires to represent. It is the organism that creates its objects and their meaning, in accordance with its needs, desires and the history of its sensorimotor engagement with the world.

Science, as an activity exercised by human organisms, is therefore not about real objects that exist in an observer-independent reality either. Maturana and Varela are not actually themselves adopting the organism's point of view, it is their very point that the view from within another organism is not attainable for an observer. A scientist's experiential world is a product of his own conceptual space and the distinctions he decides to undertake, and they will necessarily impact on the results from and interpretation of scientific activity. This is immediately and obviously true for the operational distinction between the ascription of autonomy and the genuine reality of a system's autonomy in the scientific study of autonomy. In this light, it seems justified to raise the question of the nature of this distinction. The recognition of our status as observers transforms our conceptual world in a way that blurs the boundaries of what we normally consider a belief and what we consider a fact. How to taxonomise judgments into mere ascriptions and recognitions of genuine truths seems problematic, or at least unclear, if the idea of the observer is taken seriously.

Basically, in this paper we argue that this distinction can indeed not be maintained in its strict sense. However, recognising that matters are not quite what they seem to be does not automatically imply that the distinction under investigation is not a useful distinction to be made. Acknowledging that, in many cases, it has served well to clarify matters, even just as a first approximation, we investigate what is at its core, and carefully try to set it onto new feet, in agreement with the idea of an observer science. In doing so, we will consider empirical evidence from experiments in minimal perceptual crossing and different approaches to explaining life, to closely examine the role that underlying mechanisms play for this distinction. Our analysis will be discussed as regards implications for the study of autonomy through artificial means and an observer science in general.