Elsevier

Computers in Human Behavior

Volume 80, March 2018, Pages 295-302
Computers in Human Behavior

Full length article
Third person effects of fake news: Fake news regulation and media literacy interventions

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2017.11.034Get rights and content

Highlights

  • Individuals showed third-person perception concerning the influence of fake news.

  • Social undesirability, partisan identity, and efficacy were positive predictors of third-person perception.

  • Third-person perception leads to support for media literacy intervention to combat fake news.

  • Third-person perception leads to rejection of media regulation approach.

Abstract

Although the actual effect of fake news online on voters’ decisions is still unknown, concerns over the perceived effect of fake news online have prevailed in the US and other countries. Based on an analysis of survey responses from national samples (n = 1299) in the US, we found a strong tendency of the third-person perception. That is, individuals believed that fake news would have greater effects on out-group members than themselves or in-group members. Additionally, we proposed a theoretical path model, identifying the antecedents and consequences of the third-person perception. The results showed that partisan identity, social undesirability of content, and external political efficacy were positive predictors of the third-person perception. Interestingly, our findings revealed that third-person perception led to different ways of combating fake news online. Those with a greater level of third-person perception were more likely to support the media literacy approach but less likely to support the media regulation approach.

Introduction

Digital social networks have substantially facilitated the process of information sharing and knowledge construction (Hara and Sanfilippo, 2016, Park, 2017). Recent Pew research suggests that 62% of US citizens obtains news from social media (Gottfried & Shearer, 2016). However, this information system also comes with problems, one of which involves the spread of inaccurate information (Tambuscio, Ruffo, Flammini, & Menczer, 2015). Misinformation is more quickly disseminated through social media when there is high uncertainty and high demand for public information about the issues such as crisis (Spence, Lachlan, Edwards, & Edwards, 2016) and health concerns (Jang, McKeever, McKeever, & Kim, in press).

In particular, the unexpected outcome of the 2016 US presidential election sparked a renewed interest in the issue of fast-spreading false information, rumors, and memes, widely circulated on social media. Since the 2016 election, the term, ‘fake news,’ has come to represents an array of misleading news style stories that were fabricated and promoted on social media to deceive the public for ideological and/or financial gain (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017).

Although the real-world consequences of fake news have not yet been fully parsed, public concern regarding the effects of fake news prevails. A growing concern is that fake news may cause confusion in the fact-checking process and eventually undermine an informed citizenry. Interestingly, both Republicans and Democrats in the US have voiced concerns about fake news. While some Democrats claim that the election results were greatly influenced by fake news, some Republicans argue that mainstream news organizations (e.g., CNN) have published fake news stories to hurt Mr. Trump (Zaru, 2017). Although people display the varying perception of fake news effects, there has been an agreement upon the urgent need to fight fake news.

This study focuses on the beliefs surrounding the effects of fake news. Using the theoretical framework of the third-person effect, the study examines whether perceived effects of fake news are greater among other political groups than among themselves or their supporting political groups. Additionally, the study proposes a theoretical path model to examine the antecedents and consequences of the third-person perception. One of the important goals of this analysis is to investigate how the third-person perception leads to attitudes toward fake news regulation and media literacy intervention. To address these issues, this study collected and analyzed survey responses from US national samples (n = 1299).

Section snippets

Definition

Since Davison (1983) first introduced the third-person hypothesis, research findings have shown a consistent discrepancy between individuals’ perceptions of the media effects on themselves and on others (Sun, Pan, & Shen., 2008). While this perceptual component of the third person effect (i.e., third-person perception, TPP) refers to the perceptual gap whereby individuals perceive that others are more vulnerable to media effects than they are, the behavioral component refers to cognitive,

Participants

A national sample of US adults (n = 1299) participated in the survey online in exchange for a cash value reward in March 2017. The sample was obtained from a survey firm, Survey Sample International (SSI), which recruits and maintains a survey panel of more than 600,000 Internet users. Based on the stratified quota sampling method, participants were chosen from a sample frame that closely mirrors U.S. census data.

Descriptive statistics showed that respondents were 83.3% White, 6.4% African

Results

The first two hypotheses (H1 and H2) predicted TPP. Table 1 shows the raw scores of perceived effects of fake news on self and political group members. While Republicans believed that Democratic voters would be affected more by fake news than they would be, t(428) = 13.98, p < .001, Democrats believed Republican voters would be more affected, t(369) = 13.88, p < .001. Independents also displayed TPP, perceiving that fake news would have a greater effect on Republicans, t(499) = 19.39, p < .001

Discussion

In the context of the 2012 US presidential election, we tested voters’ TPP of fake news. In line with prior findings (Lim, 2017), we found that individuals regarded others as more susceptible than themselves to the potential harmful effects of fake news. As H1 and H2 hypothesized, Republican voters believed that the influence of fake news was greater among Democratic voters than for them or other Republican voters. Similarly, Democratic voters perceived that Republican voters were more

Conclusion

Donald Trump's largely unexpected victory in the 2016 presidential election quickly led to accusations that social media sites should monitor and curb the spread of ‘fake news,’ a term little known to the public until that point (Solon, 2016). A prevailing concern is that widespread fake news on social media will precipitate a crisis of democracy by undermining the assumption that members of the democratic society are informed and capable of making rational decisions (Merrill, 1974). Although

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