Optimizing revenue for bandwidth auctions over networks with time reservations
Introduction
The possibility of auctioning bandwidth in real time has been considered by many authors [8], [10], [14], [17], [22], [23], with a variety of applications: diffserv, access control, 3G cellular access, VPNs, etc. Much of this work has focused on game-theoretic considerations, in particular on providing incentives for bidders to reveal their true utilities. The standard theory of auctions [13] provides these mechanisms for the auctioning of a single resource, but it is far more challenging to extend them to a general network topology. Most proposals in this regard require the user (or a broker entity acting on his/her behalf), to place separate bids for internal resources of the network. In particular, the Progressive Second Price (PSP) mechanism of [14] requires each player to coordinate bids at the different nodes on its route, so that each node may run an auction with the allocation and pricing rules of the single resource case. PSP has a long convergence phase, which is improved by a multibid method in [17]; however, the latter mechanism only applies to tree topologies. Another approach to bandwidth auctioning for multicast trees or VPNs is proposed in [8], based on Dutch auctions. The mechanism assumes that users interested in a path would try to reserve bandwidth by placing bids simultaneously for all constituent links.
In this paper we argue that to have practical impact, a bandwidth auction requires a simpler user interface: the consumer should submit a bid for an entire end-to-end service, oblivious of the internal topology. It is the operator’s problem to decide which of these bids to accept and how to accommodate the aggregate service within the available network capacity. Furthermore, a more natural objective than incentive compatibility is revenue maximization for the operator that offers this end-to-end service. As one possible deployment scenario to make the discussion concrete, consider the Service Overlay Network (SON) architecture [11], where an overlay operator has leased tunnels between a set of service gateways located in domain boundaries, and auctions a service of high-quality (e.g. video-on-demand) over this infrastructure, with the objective of obtaining revenue.
Another important aspect of the problem that has not been satisfactorily addressed in previous work are inter-temporal considerations. Most references cover a one-shot auction where bids for the entire duration are known initially. References for multi-period auctions (e.g. [22]) allow future bidders to compete with incumbent ones, albeit given the latter some advantage. This is not an attractive condition for our intended applications. Consider for example selling video-on-demand content about 100 min long, in auctions every 5 minutes. A consumer will not purchase the service if he/she faces the risk of losing the connection close to the end of the movie. In this paper we impose the condition that once bandwidth has been allocated in an auction, the successful bidder has a reservation for the duration of his/her connection. This means that the operator must assume the risk of future auctions, which makes the maximization of revenue a stochastic dynamic optimization problem.
Both of the above aspects (general network topology, time reservations) lead to optimization problems of high complexity, on top of which we add the requirement of a distributed solution. Rather than an exact solution, we develop in this paper a series of tractable methods that approximate the optimal revenue objective. We begin in Section 2 with auctions of a single resource (single link capacity) with time-reservations, a problem that we formulate as a Markov decision process (MDP) [1], [20]. We introduce a receding horizon approximation that is able to capture the dynamic component of the problem in a tractable way, and validate it by simulation. Next, we turn in Section 3 to the network aspect, formulating the allocation of a one-shot auction as an integer program; by recasting this problem in the language of Network Utility Maximization (NUM) [6], [12], we develop a natural relaxation that has a distributed solution; convergence is obtained through the application of a proximal optimization method [5], [15].
In Section 4 we combine the previous approaches to formulate a receding-horizon optimization of revenue for multi-period auctions over a distributed network, which again is formulated as a variant of a NUM problem, solved in relaxed form through a proximal method. We develop in this case a distributed implementation of the algorithm, and exhibit its performance in a series of simulation examples that progressively include more realistic situations. Finally, in Section 5 we consider multipath optimization, where end-to-end services can be offered through multiple routes inside the network; we show how to extend the methodology to this case. Conclusions are given in Section 6.
This article is an extension of our conference papers [2], [3]. One main enhancement included here is the proximal approximation method to ensure convergence of our distributed algorithms with non-strictly concave utilities. Also, the entirety of Section 5 on multipath auctions is new material.
Section snippets
Periodic auctions of a single resource with time reservations
We consider first an auction for the capacity of a single resource, the bandwidth of one link, postponing the consideration of network topology. The focus here is the temporal dimension: auctions are held periodically, based on bids collected for a period of time of duration T. When each auction closes, the provider decides which bidders are allocated capacity, which is subsequently reserved for a service duration that may exceed T. In particular, when the next auction occurs, new bidders are
Distributed one-shot auctions over a network
We turn now to auctioning bandwidth over a general network topology. We seek methods to optimize revenue of the allocated bids, that can be computed in a distributed way across a network. This section focuses on a single auction of available capacity; later on we will return to the temporal considerations associated with reservations.
We begin by extending our notation to the network case. The network is composed of a set of links indexed by l, and a set of end-to-end routes indexed by r. R
Periodic auctions in the network case
Having considered two sub-problems in the previous sections, we now take on the problem of optimizing revenue for periodic bandwidth auctions with time reservations over a general network topology. More specifically: assume that a set of services is defined over a network, each characterized by a route and bandwidth requirement as in Section 3; every time T, a set of bids is collected for each service, and the network must make an allocation decision among all services, within the capacity
Extension to multipath routing
This section considers a generalization of the previous setting, where each end-to-end service can be supported through multiple routes across the network. Therefore, for each s, instead of a single route we will allow a set of routes . As before a broker at the edge will receive bids for each service class s, but now the allocation decision involves choosing the rates admitted in each route, for a total service rate per classWe now generalize the receding horizon
Conclusions
In this work we proposed a mechanism for allocating network capacity through periodic auctions. We formulated the problem of maximizing operator revenue under the following constraints: the solution must be fully distributed, the network has an arbitrary topology, and the resources allocated in a given auction are reserved for the entire duration of the connection.
We formulated near-optimal policies for this problem in terms of convex optimization, through a receding-horizon version of the
Acknowledgment
This work was partially supported by ANII-Uruguay, project PR-FCE-2009-1-2158.
Pablo Belzarena was born in November 1963 in Montevideo, Uruguay. He has a PhD in Electrical Engineering (Telecommunications). He is Aggregate Professor at the Electrical Engineering Department (IIE), Facultad de Ingenierı´a, Universidad de la República. He is the Director of the Electrical Engineering Department. He is particularly working on performance modeling, evaluation and dimension of communication networks.
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Pablo Belzarena was born in November 1963 in Montevideo, Uruguay. He has a PhD in Electrical Engineering (Telecommunications). He is Aggregate Professor at the Electrical Engineering Department (IIE), Facultad de Ingenierı´a, Universidad de la República. He is the Director of the Electrical Engineering Department. He is particularly working on performance modeling, evaluation and dimension of communication networks.
Fernando Paganini received his Electrical Engineering and Mathematics degrees from the Universidad de la Republica, Montevideo, Uruguay, in 1990, and his M.S. and PhD degrees in Electrical Engineering from the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, in 1992 and 1996 respectively. From 1996 to 1997 he was a postdoctoral associate at MIT. Between 1997 and 2005 he was on the faculty the Electrical Engineering Department at UCLA, reaching the rank of Associate Professor. Since 2005 he is Professor of Electrical and Telecommunications Engineering at Universidad ORT, Uruguay. Dr. Paganini is the recipient of the 1994 O. Hugo Schuck best paper award at the American Control Conference, the Wilts and Clauser Prizes for outstanding PhD Thesis at Caltech in 1996, the 1999 NSF CAREER Award and the 1999 Packard Fellowship, and the 2004 George S. Axelby Award from the IEEE Control Systems Society. His research interests are control and networks.
Andrés Ferragut obtained his degree in Electrical Engineering (Telecommunications) at Universidad de la República, Uruguay (2004). He has held teaching and research positions at the Mathematics and Electrical Engineering Depts. at Univ. de la República (2000 to 2009) and since 2007 at the School of Engineering, Universidad ORT, Uruguay where he is currently affiliated with the Mathematics Applied to Telecommunications (MATE) research group. He is a PhD Candidate in Electrical Engineering, having spent two years (2004–2006) of graduate work at École Nationale Supérieure de Télécommunications, Paris, France. His research interests are in mathematical modeling applied to telecommunication networks.