Engineering of markets and artifacts
Introduction
A recent New York Times column by Hal Varian headlined, “Avoiding the pitfalls when shifting from science to engineering,” reviewed a paper by Alvin Roth entitled, “The Economist as an Engineer” [19], [27]. Why do we suddenly see economists, purists in their claim to science, starting to see that engineering is an integral part of economics? Is it a startling return to often-forgotten Thorstein Veblen’s view of economists as engineers of the price system? Is it a renunciation of the claim that economics is a pure science? Science without experimentation is no science at all for all the mathematical devices are not enough to guarantee the validity of the theory if it is not tested in practice; it is here engineering becomes very important. While these are fascinating questions, this paper will focus on a much narrower question. This paper takes as its starting point that the development and use of a market is as much a socially designed mechanism as any other artifact [5]. We take up this perspective – from the engineering side – in what we hope will be a dialogue between economists and engineers about how the experience with engineering design of artifacts can help inform the discussion in economics’ new focus on design of markets. Here the lessons from testing from engineering become important. Perhaps more importantly, this debate between engineer and economist will change the status of designing of artifacts and markets themselves. While we are not economists, but more students of design of engineered artifacts, we want to view economics with the lens of engineering design.
Our goal is to show that understanding design and engineering can create insightful approaches to practical economics that have been brought to fore by the emergence of computing in economics, experimental economics and e-commerce [14], [17], [26], [29]. In these areas, the focus has shifted from being solely on mathematical elegance to also including as equally important, practical design, simulation and creation of markets. This shift in economics from purely analytical to explore various approaches to simulation through computing has been profound. In this shift, Simon and Von-Neumann have been most forceful in constructing a vision of economics as simulated Cyborg Science [14]. Of course, in this new context the issues of methodology of research in design of markets have raised questions that economists, until recently, have not asked themselves. We address some of these issues by staking the claim that design of markets has important similarities to design of engineered artifacts. We further argue that markets and the nature of engineered artifacts are more closely inter-related than most economists tend to acknowledge and engineers dare to state for fear of trespassing.
The paper has five sections. The next section is on the similarities between design of artifacts in engineering and markets in economics. Section 3 addresses the interdependence between market structure and structure of designed artifacts. Section 4 then turns to methodologies in modeling and testing for failures in engineering design and its relationship to design economics. Section 5 is an example of devising a test for excessive profits and testing it using a simple model of the electric power market. Section 6 concludes the paper with some discussions and conclusions on the relationship between design of markets and artifacts.
Section snippets
Markets and artifacts
“Economics is one of the Artificial Sciences” [21, p. 83].
Economics is part of the sciences of the artificial as Simon claims in his well-known paper on bounded rationality and his book on the sciences of the artificial [20], [21]. The mechanisms of economics, “markets (artifacts),” are designed to sustain a particular set of desired behaviors (e.g., to measure and keep time) through constraints on behavior of the participants (functional/structural parts) and on transactions (interactions)
Market design affects artifact design and artifact design affects market design
We will show two cases to illustrate these relationships. The first case is the history and emergence of the electric power industry in the US [10]. The electric power industry in the US was mainly a regulated monopoly until recently when efforts to introduce markets in this industry began. The original electric power industry in the US was decentralized with even small buildings having their own generators and with small companies supplying power to small but often disconnected sets of
Methodological experiences in designing engineered artifacts
The design of aerodynamic shape for aircraft provides an example of methodological approaches to testing a designed artifact with respect to a specified formulation. We draw this example from a case study of the design of Boeing 777 and the use of computing tools [3]. There are four types of methods used in the designing of tests. They are (a) analytical, (b) simulation (CFD), (c) scaled mock up (wind tunnel), and (d) flight tests. In characterizing these methods and their use the author
An example in devising a test for a market design using a simple model for power markets
In a recent paper, we proposed a test to identify market designs that are prone to excess prices and profits, whether from learning or capacity concentrations [25]. In devising a model for this test, we use computational models of agents that are evolutionary in terms of learning from experience, similar to those in the literature on computational economics, evolutionary economics and distributed agents. Even without an elaborate model of the electric power grid, a simple model of the market
Discussions and conclusions
The important message of this paper is that formulation of engineered artifact design problems and market design problems are contextual social processes involving multiple goals set by the actors. In the words of Roth, the importance viewing economics from a design perspective would be the following insight [19]:
“The largest lesson in all this is that design is important because markets don’t always grow like weeds – some of them are hothouse orchids. Time and place have to be established,
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Raghu Arunachalam for inviting and urging us to write this paper, and Ira Monarch, Robin King and Arthur Westerberg for discussions on this topic and comments.
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