A model of the origins of basic property rights
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2020, Journal of Economic Behavior and OrganizationCitation Excerpt :A substantial theoretical literature demonstrates that by solving any one of these issues, conflict could be avoided. For instance, theoretical results suggest that conflicts can be avoided through communication (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Milgrom and Roberts, 1982), contracting and side-payments (Hirshleifer, 1995; Muthoo, 2004; Beviá and Corchón, 2010), centralization Grossman (2002), extensive armament (Schelling, 1960; Garfinkel, 1990; Grossman and Kim, 1995; Smith et al., 2014), and also through political systems that emphasize open, rule-governed competition (North et al., 2009). Many of the conflict avoidance mechanisms have been studied in the laboratory.
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2009, Journal of Mathematical EconomicsCitation Excerpt :Hirshleifer (1995) found the conditions under which Hobbesian anarchy is stable. Also, Hirshleifer (1991), Konrad and Skaperdas (1998), and Muthoo (2004) studied the situations in which property right is partially secured. These studies analyzed non-cooperative models in which the formation of coalitions is limited or not allowed.
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