Elsevier

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume 49, Issue 2, November 2004, Pages 288-312
Games and Economic Behavior

A model of the origins of basic property rights

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.008Get rights and content

Abstract

This paper studies the origins of one of the most basic of property rights, namely, the right of an individual or an organization to the fruits of its labour. My objective is to address the questions of why, when and how this property right can emerge and be made secure. I develop a model of the strategic interaction between two players in the state-of-nature, which is an environment characterized by the absence of any laws and institutions (including property rights and the state). My analysis explores, in particular, the roles of the players' fighting and productive skills on the emergence and security (or otherwise) of this property right.

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