The beauty of “bigness”: On optimal design of multi-winner contests
References (21)
- et al.
The symmetric multiple-prize all-pay auction with complete information
Europ. J. Polit. Economy
(1998) Optimal contest design: Volume and timing of rent-seeking in contests
Europ. J. Polit. Economy
(1998)The measurement of urban travel demand
J. Public Econ.
(1974)- et al.
Contest architecture
J. Econ. Theory
(2006) - et al.
Incentive effects of second prizes
Europ. J. Polit. Economy
(2005) Distributional conflict and jurisdictional organization
J. Public Econ.
(1998)Replicating contests
Econ. Letters
(2001)- et al.
Rent-setting in multiple winner rent-seeking contests
Europ. J. Polit. Economy
(2001) Some results on rent-seeking contests with shortlisting
Public Choice
(2000)- et al.
Employers Large and Small
(1990)
There are more references available in the full text version of this article.
Cited by (61)
Promotion and demotion contests
2024, Journal of Economic Behavior and OrganizationBureaucracy and labor market inefficiency: A contest model
2023, European Journal of Political EconomyEffort discrimination and curvature of contest technology in conflict networks
2023, Games and Economic BehaviorComparative politics with intraparty candidate selection
2023, European Journal of Political EconomyWhen does division matter? Revisiting the optimal contest architecture
2023, Economics LettersOn equilibrium uniqueness in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests
2023, Games and Economic Behavior
Copyright © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.