Partial exposure in large games☆
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Cited by (15)
A Bayesian nonatomic game and its applicability to finite-player situations
2022, Journal of Mathematical EconomicsCitation Excerpt :For a similar conclusion while allowing correlated signals, Cartwright and Wooders (2009) worked with a finite signal space and a countable action space. More generalizations concerning robustness were achieved, for instance, by Gradwohl and Reingold (2010), Carmona and Podczeck (2012), and Deb and Kalai (2015). There have been works dealing with both an infinite number of players and incomplete information.
Pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games and their relationship to non-atomic games
2020, Journal of Economic TheoryStability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players
2015, Journal of Economic TheoryCitation Excerpt :In particular, robust equilibria perform better in systems that involve asynchronous communications (see Kalai [16]), and in protocols that involve faulty behavior (see Gradwohl and Reingold [11]). Related current work on equilibrium robustness in large games includes Gradwohl and Reingold [12], who study robustness of Bayesian equilibria in games that allow certain correlations between players' types.4 Carmona and Podczeck [6] present a result on approximate ex-post stability of Bayesian equilibria in large games with infinite type and action spaces but, unlike us, they assume anonymity.
Fault tolerance in large games
2014, Games and Economic BehaviorCitation Excerpt :In particular, the Nash equilibria of such games are ex post Nash: A player's strategy remains a best response even after he sees the chosen actions of all the other players. In an attempt to generalize the work of Kalai, we (Gradwohl and Reingold, 2010) introduced the notion of partial exposure. In that paper we show that in any large game, players' Nash strategies remain nearly optimal even after they are exposed to the chosen actions of some of the other players.
Ex-post stability of Bayes-Nash equilibria of large games
2012, Games and Economic BehaviorThe Lipschitz constant of perturbed anonymous games
2022, International Journal of Game Theory
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We would like to thank Ehud Kalai and Yaron Azrieli for interesting and useful conversations. We are grateful to Ariel Yadin and Amir Yehudayoff for helpful discussions throughout the course of this research. We also thank seminar participants at Northwestern University and at the Technion. Finally, we are grateful to the anonymous referees for valuable input.
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Work done while the author was a student at the Department of Computer Science and Applied Mathematics, The Weizmann Institute of Science.
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Research supported by US–Israel Binational Science Foundation Grants 2002246 and 2006060.