Attitudes to ambiguity in one-shot normal-form games: An experimental study
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To mitigate or to adapt: How to deal with optimism, pessimism and strategic ambiguity?
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2021, Journal of Economic Behavior and OrganizationDo people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-k comparison
2020, Games and Economic BehaviorCitation Excerpt :At the beginning of the experiment, the computer randomly assigned subjects to the roles of either a row player or a column player, and those roles were maintained throughout the experiment. Since we were mainly interested in the decisions of row players, only two subjects were assigned to the role of column player in each session, and we focused on the behavior of row players (see, e.g., Ivanov, 2011, for the same approach). Both roles were visualized from the row player's perspective, so no player had information about the role to which they were assigned.
Social and strategic ambiguity versus betrayal aversion
2020, Games and Economic BehaviorCitation Excerpt :Empirical studies began to appear only recently. These include Calford (2020), Chark and Chew (2015), Dominiak and Duersch (2019), Eichberger and Kelsey (2011), Ivanov (2011), and Kelsey and le Roux (2015, 2018). Traditionally, ambiguity attitudes were measured using artificial events such as Ellsberg urns with compositions kept secret or experimenter-specified probability intervals where the exact probability was kept secret.
Uncertainty aversion in game theory: Experimental evidence
2020, Journal of Economic Behavior and OrganizationCitation Excerpt :Li et al. (2019) apply an insight from Baillon et al. (2018) to separate ambiguity attitudes from (non-additive) beliefs, and find that both ambiguity preferences and beliefs are correlated with behavior in a trust game. Ivanov (2011) estimates ambiguity preferences from behavior in games (rather than eliciting preferences and then studying behavior in games as is the case here). Both Li et al. (2019) and Ivanov (2011) elicit beliefs over opponent’s strategies, in contrast to the current paper which induces beliefs over opponent’s preferences.
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I would like to thank Dan Levin and John Kagel for their advice and financial support. I would also like to thank Stephen Cosslett, David Harless, Oleg Korenok, Muriel Niederle, James Peck, and Susan Rose for their help and valuable suggestions. Last, but not least, I thank an Advisory Editor and two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions. This material is based upon work supported by the NSF under doctoral dissertation grant SES-0609744. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the NSF.