NoteCharacterization of the von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter☆
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Cited by (19)
Sequential referenda with sophisticated voters
2022, Journal of Public EconomicsStable cores in information graph games
2022, Games and Economic BehaviorCitation Excerpt :Stable sets have been found on several classes of games, such as assignment games (Núñez and Rafels, 2013), linear production games (Rosenmüller and Shitovitz, 2000, 2010), pillage games (MacKenzie et al., 2015), patent licensing games (Hirai and Watanabe, 2018), matching problems (Herings et al., 2017), tournaments (Brandt, 2011), voting games (Talamàs, 2018), and exchange economies (Graziano et al., 2015, 2017). Non-cooperative foundations of stable sets have been shown by Anesi (2010); Diermeier and Fong (2012). More farsighted notions of stable sets have been related to the core by Einy (1996); Bhattacharya and Brosi (2011); Ray and Vohra (2015); Hirai et al. (2019).
Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players
2017, Games and Economic BehaviorCitation Excerpt :We apply our analysis of ergodic properties of equilibria to show that all equilibria are essentially pure, and we again obtain the equivalence between equilibrium absorbing points and von Neumann–Morgenstern solutions. Thus, we extend Theorem 1 of Diermeier and Fong (2012) by generalizing the quota rules to an arbitrary voting rule and by removing the restriction to pure strategy equilibria. Noncooperative foundations for von Neumann–Morgenstern solutions in political economy have been investigated in several different institutional settings, including electoral competition (Anesi, 2012) and committee voting (Anesi and Seidmann, 2014).
Who Controls the Agenda Controls the Legislature
2023, American Economic Review