Dynamics in tree formation games
Highlights
► We consider network formation game with prohibitive cost of redundant links. ► The Price of Anarchy (PoA) in the static game is shown to be unbounded. ► The PoA of a network selected by best-response (BR) dynamics is also unbounded. ► We introduce a local two-stage BR dynamics that select networks with bounded PoA. ► Convergence rate of these dynamics is polynomial for two subfamilies of models.
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Cited by (8)
On network formation games with heterogeneous players and basic network creation games
2018, Theoretical Computer ScienceCitation Excerpt :Àlvarez et al. [2] consider a setting where players sign contracts in order to exchange traffic and, among other results, provide a characterization of topologies that are pairwise stable for a given traffic matrix. Arcaute et al. [5] as well as Lenzner [16] focus on game dynamics of network formation and creation games, while very recently, Chauhan et al. [9] studied a variant of network formation games under a setting of random edge failures. Finally, we remark that this classification of nodes into “core” and “periphery” has been also studied in different settings, see e.g., [6,7], while several papers have recently considered the price of anarchy for games played by a large number of players, see e.g., [13].
FLUID LIMIT OF A PS-QUEUE WITH MULTISTAGE SERVICE
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This research was conducted when the author was at the Institute for Computational and Mathematical Engineering at Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA.