Elsevier

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume 121, May 2020, Pages 169-189
Games and Economic Behavior

Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.007Get rights and content
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Abstract

This paper formalizes common belief among players with no underlying assumption on their individual beliefs. Especially, players may not be logically omniscient, i.e., they may not believe logical consequences of their beliefs. The key idea is to use a novel concept of a common basis: it is an event such that, whenever it is true, every player believes its logical consequences. The common belief in an event obtains when a common basis implies the mutual belief in that event. If players' beliefs are assumed to be true, then common belief reduces to common knowledge. The formalization nests previous axiomatizations of common belief and common knowledge which have assumed players' logical monotonic reasoning. Under this formalization, unlike others, if players have common belief in rationality then their actions survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions even if their beliefs are not monotonic.

JEL classification

C70
D83

Keywords

Common belief
Common knowledge
Logical omniscience
Non-monotonic reasoning
Common bases
Strict dominance

Cited by (0)

This paper is based on part of the first chapter of my Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of California at Berkeley. I would like to thank David Ahn, William Fuchs, and Chris Shannon for their encouragement, support, and guidance. I would also like to thank Pierpaolo Battigalli, Giacomo Bonanno, Wiebe van der Hoek, the conference and seminar audiences at LOFT 13 and Rochester, and the three anonymous referees.