Intellectual property and price discrimination: a challenge for Australian competition law

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Abstract

Price discrimination usually requires a mechanism to prevent arbitrage. In respect of intellectual property, the mechanisms include bans on parallel importation in intellectual property legislation and licensing and distribution contracts that separate one group of users from another. A reasonable thesis would be to expose all market segmentation of intellectual property to the full force of competition law. Australian experience of the repeal of parallel import bans on CDs and the review of an intellectual-property specific provision in the competition legislation suggests otherwise.

Introduction

A firm proposing to charge different prices to different customers has to have a way of preventing arbitrage. Unless customers who acquire at the cheaper price can be prevented from dealing direct with the customers who are charged a higher price, any system of differential pricing will be undermined.

The ways in which the original supplier can prevent its customers from inter-trading take different legal forms. One is contract. If the supplier deals directly with its ultimate users, it can contract on terms that there is to be no re-supply to anyone.1 In other more common circumstances, the supplier supplies its product on terms that limit the re-supply of that product to a particular geographic territory or a particular class of users. A self-help method to the same effect as contract is to elect to supply only those customers who do not engage in arbitrage. In legal form this is an exercise of property rights. For some sorts of intellectual property, the intellectual property statutes bolster property rights by making it an infringement to import into the country products that could not legally have been made in the country unless the importation is done with the licence of the owner of the intellectual property.

This paper takes a lawyer's view of those rights and their exercise. One issue is how competition law addresses market division for the purpose of discriminatory pricing. In terms of the Australian Trade Practices Act [TPA] the issues are:

  • (a)

    Whether a firm that segments the market for its product can thereby “lessen competition”, and so be caught by sections 45 and 47 of the TPA.

  • (b)

    Whether market segmentation for the purpose of maximising income from the exploitation of the property might be a misuse of market power caught by s46.

  • (c)

    How s51(3), the TPA's recognition that intellectual property is somehow different, operates on market-segmenting conduct. As s51(3) is under review it is worth looking at how the provision operates now, how it would operate in the form proposed by the Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee (IPCRC, 2000), and also at the government's response.

  • (d)

    In respect of intellectual property statutes that make importation an infringement of the property right, whether a local intellectual property owner might nevertheless contravene the TPA by exercising its right to exclude imports. In Australia there has been long and passionate debate about whether the parallel importation provisions in the copyright legislation should be repealed. If a right- owner's refusal to licence importation is open to challenge under competition law, it may be that repeal of those provisions is of little significance.

Section snippets

Reasons for market division

Owners of intellectual property frequently licence their property on terms that limit the licensee's exploitation of the intellectual property to a particular sector of the downstream market. This phenomenon is not peculiar to intellectual property. Manufacturers of tangible goods do the same. From cars to ski boots to newspapers and street directories,

Maximising revenue in intellectual property – a view from inside national borders

Many markets in which intellectual property is exploited are global, rather than national.7 That a market extends beyond national boundaries would not affect the only meaningful competition policy question: “What is the cost to efficiency?” That question would be answered in the light of the whole market, not a subset of the market that happens to

The legal framework

The provisions of the Australian Trade Practices Act that might catch conduct that divides a downstream market for the purpose of extracting the full value of intellectual (or any other) property are sections 45, 46 and 47. Relevantly, s45 prohibits agreements that have the purpose, effect or likely effect of lessening competition. Section 47 prohibits some forms of vertical conduct (whether or not agreed to by the other party) that have the purpose, effect or likely effect of lessening

Discriminatory pricing under s46 of the Trade Practices Act

Section 46(1) prohibits a firm with substantial market power from taking advantage of that power for the purpose of (a) damaging one of its competitors, (b) preventing a person from entering a market, or (c) deterring someone from engaging in competitive conduct in a market.

Market power has been explained in the High Court as “the ability of a firm to raise prices above the supply cost without rivals taking away customers in due time, supply cost being the minimum cost an efficient firm would

The effect of parallel importation provisions in IP legislation (and their repeal)

The parallel import provisions in patents and copyright legislation were discussed at Section 3.1. A patentee's property right includes the right to import. In Australia, for copyright, parallel importation of copies for the purpose of trade is an infringement for all products except sound recordings, computer programs stored in an integrated circuit, labels, and books (subject a process set out in the Act). The IPCRC recommended complete repeal of the provisions in respect of copyright. The

Conclusion

Legislative changes proposed for both s51(3) of the TPA and the parallel import provisions of the Copyright Act are likely to have consequences that their designers did not intend.

The IPCRC's recommendation to replace s51(3)'s exemption of conditions in intellectual property contracts with a lessening of competition test would not achieve the committee's objective. The committee intended the TPA to catch only transactions that go beyond the market power the rights directly confer. It did not

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