Differential cryptanalysis of eight-round SEED
Research highlights
► We suggest a new seven-round differential characteristic. ► We analyze eight-round SEED with this seven-round differential characteristic. ► This is the best-known attack on a reduced version of SEED so far.
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2014, Information Processing LettersCitation Excerpt :We use the following notation. In this section, we first describe the 7-round differentials owing to Sung [15], and then present two 7-round differentials with a probability of trivially larger than Sungʼs best 7-round differential, and seventeen 7-round differentials with a probability of trivially larger than Sungʼs second best 7-round differential. In this subsection we describe two time–memory trade-offs to the above attack and compute the success probabilities of Yanami and Shimoyamaʼs 7-round attack and Sungʼs 8-round attack.
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