Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.005

Journal of Economic Theory

Volume 117, Issue 1, July 2004, Pages 29-54

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.005 Get rights and content

Abstract

Dutta et al. (Econometrica 69 (2001) 1013) (Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton—DJLeB) initiate the study of manipulation of voting procedures by a candidate who withdraws from the election. A voting procedure is candidate stable if this is never possible. We extend the DJLeB framework by allowing: (a) the outcome of the procedure to be a set of candidates; (b) some or all of the voters to have weak preference orderings of the candidates. When there are at least three candidates, any strongly candidate stable voting selection satisfying a weak unanimity condition is characterized by a serial dictatorship. This result generalizes Theorem 4 of DJLeB.

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Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures

Abstract

Inform. Sci.

Econ. Lett.

J. Econ. Theory

J. Econ. Theory

J. Econ. Theory

J. Econ. Theory

Econ. Lett.

J. Econ. Theory

J. Econ. Theory

Hierarchical arrow social welfare functions

Econ. Theory

The manipulation of social choice mechanisms that do not leave ‘too much’ to chance

Econometrica

Voting by committees

Econometrica

Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted

J. Econ. Theory

An economic model of representative democracy

Quart. J. Econ.

Social choice with interpersonal utility comparisonsa diagrammatic introduction

Int. Econ. Rev.

Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules

Soc. Choice Welfare

Scheduling with opting outimproving upon random priority

Oper. Res.

Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefsGibbard–Satterthwaite generalized

Soc. Choice Welfare

Strategic candidacy and voting procedures

Econometrica