Elsevier

Journal of Economic Theory

Volume 136, Issue 1, September 2007, Pages 260-285
Journal of Economic Theory

Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.08.002Get rights and content

Abstract

The core is extended to games with incomplete information. The feasible set is characterized by incentive-compatible mechanisms. Blocking is organized at the interim stage by an incentive-compatible mediation plan. Membership of the blocking coalition itself may be determined randomly by the blocking mediator. Nonemptiness of an interim fine core is proven for games with a balanced structure, independent types, and sidepayments. An offer of severance payments may be needed to inhibit blocking. Core allocations are characterized in terms of virtual-utility scales that generalize the weighted-utility scales of the inner core. Mechanisms that achieve core allocations are coalitionally durable.

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