Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information
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2020, Mathematical Social SciencesCooperative game with nondeterministic returns
2020, Journal of Mathematical EconomicsCitation Excerpt :Contention profile, our notion formalizing the restriction of alternative allocations that could participate in blocking an incumbent allocation, can accommodate information asymmetry among players. Though not specifically targeted by us, information asymmetry has been tackled; see, e.g., Wilson (1978), Allen and Yannelis (2001), Forges et al. (2002), and Myerson (2007). For market-based games in which coalitions’ returns are decomposable into individual players’ contributions, nondeterministic returns have been subjected to studies that were geared toward understanding the emerge of competitive market prices.
Cooperative equilibria of finite games with incomplete information
2014, Journal of Mathematical EconomicsCitation Excerpt :In this paper we take for granted the so-called Harsanyi doctrine, asserting the existence of a consistent common prior whereby an I-game can be transformed into a so-called C-game, effectively a normal-form game, in which the players evaluate their ex-ante expected payoffs. Since the aim of this paper is to show that the methods in Scarf (1971) and Kajii (1992) work in our context as well, we do not address the information issues raised by Myerson (2007) and others pertaining to I-games, in which players may have different information right from the outset of the games. Observe that the above formulation transforms a finite game with incomplete information into one in normal form, and thereby suppresses the incomplete information aspects of the original game.
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