NotesRevenue ranking of first-price auctions with resale☆
References (5)
- et al.
First price auctions with resale
Econ. Letters
(1999) Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities
J. Econ. Theory
(2003)
Cited by (7)
Auctions with bid credits and resale
2017, International Journal of Industrial OrganizationCitation Excerpt :To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to relate resale to auctions that are inefficient because of bid credits. Two of the most closely related papers are Hafalir and Krishna (2008) and Lebrun (2010b), which analyze auctions with resale. We adapt Lebrun’s (2010b) representation of the resale game of Hafalir and Krishna (2008), in which the winner makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the loser with some probability and the loser makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer with the complementary probability.
Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation
2017, International Journal of Industrial OrganizationCitation Excerpt :New bidders or more information to existing bidders may arrive between the initial auction and the resale stage (Bikhchandani and Huang, 1989; Haile, 1996; 2003; Bose and Deltas, 2006). Bidder asymmetries may also cause inefficiencies in first-price auctions (Gupta and Lebrun, 1999; Hafalir and Krishna, 2008; Cheng and Tan, 2010; Lebrun, 2010a; Virág, 2013) and in optimal auctions maximizing the seller’s revenue (Zheng, 2002).5 In second-price and English auctions, even when resale is allowed, (use) value-bidding remains to be an equilibrium (see, for example, Haile (1996)).
Advances in Auctions
2015, Handbook of Game Theory with Economic ApplicationsCitation Excerpt :In Haile (2003), the reason motivating a resale is not the inefficiency in the primary auction but rather information gained afterwards. Additional contributions of note are Bose and Deltas (2007), Pagnozzi (2007 2009), Harfalir and Krishna (2009), Cheng and Tan (2010), Lebrun (2010a, 2010b), Cheng (2011), Che et al. (2013), Virág (2013), and Xu et al. (2013). Finally, we note new work on an environment in which the seller cannot commit to not reattempt to sell the object if he fails to do so in the auction (see Vartiainen, 2013, and Skreta, 2013).
Resale in second-price auctions with private entry
2023, Managerial and Decision EconomicsMaking Auctions Robust to Aftermarkets
2023, Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcsMaking Auctions Robust to Aftermarkets
2021, arXiv
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The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada provided financial support for this research.