Are incentives against economic justice?
References (31)
Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint
Games Econ. Behav.
(2008)Misrepresentation of utilities in bargaining: Pure exchange and public good economies
Games Econ. Behav.
(2002)- et al.
Equilibrium of Walras and preference games
J. Econ. Theory
(1982) Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
J. Econ. Theory
(2002)Manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism
Games Econ. Behav.
(2001)- et al.
Games of fair division
Games Econ. Behav.
(1995) Divide-and-permute
Games Econ. Behav.
(2005)Equity, envy, and efficiency
J. Econ. Theory
(1974)- et al.
Room assignment rent division: A market approach
Soc. Choice Welfare
(2004) Monotonicity and envyfree assignments
Econ. Theory
(1994)
Fair allocation of indivisible goods and criteria of justice
Econometrica
A derivation of the money Rawlsian solution
Soc. Choice Welfare
Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods
Int. J. Game Theory
Competitive fair division
J. Polit. Economy
Resource allocation and the public sector
Yale Econ. Essays
Cited by (18)
Equitable rent division on a soft budget
2023, Games and Economic BehaviorDivide and compromise
2017, Mathematical Social SciencesCitation Excerpt :Even though the set of equal-income market allocations generically has a continuum of allocations, none of the popular axioms of solidarity, monotonicity, and consistency has produced any focal selection from the set. Due to this indeterminacy several authors have proposed selections from this set based on intuitive criteria (e.g., Tadenuma and Thomson, 1995b; Aragones, 1995; Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2004; Velez, 2011). Our balanced market allocation is indeed the allocation selected by the “equal-compensation solution” of Tadenuma and Thomson (1995b).
The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems
2016, Games and Economic BehaviorMaximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
2015, Journal of Economic TheoryCitation Excerpt :According to Theorem 2, we obtain the following corollary on Nash implementation. Previous studies have generated similar implementation results for the models with multiple objects by restricting the domain to the quasi-linear domain (Āzacis, 2008; Beviá, 2010) or by restricting solutions to a class of generalized money Rawlsian envy-free solutions (Velez, 2011). In contrast, our result allows individuals to have non-quasi-linear preferences and it covers the class of all envy-free solutions satisfying extended non-discrimination.
Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
2015, Journal of Economic TheoryCitation Excerpt :References [13,15–18] uniformly concluded, for different non-cooperative predictions than ours, that when all agents are strategic and manipulate an eic-scf, they coordinate on the set of eic allocations for true preferences. This is even so when preferences are not quasi-linear [15,17,18]. We confirm that this basic result holds when preferences are quasi-linear and one considers limit Nash equilibria.
Rental harmony with roommates
2014, Journal of Economic TheoryCitation Excerpt :While we proved existence of envy-free allocations, we did not study whether such allocations can be implemented when agents' preferences are their private information. This aspect of the problem has been analyzed under the type of preferences allowed in the previous literature – see for example [25] and the references therein. It would be interesting to see which of the results obtained in that literature apply in our set-up as well.
- 1
I am grateful to William Thomson for his generous advice and his detailed comments on previous drafts of this paper. I would like to thank the editor Christian Hellwig, three anonymous referees, Paulo Barelli, John Duggan, Gabor Virag, seminar participants at Rochester, Texas A&M, the 20th International Conference on Game Theory at Stony Brook, and the 10th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare for useful comments. This paper is based on the third chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Rochester. All errors are my own.