Competitive carbon emission yields the possibility of global self-control

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Abstract

Despite many international climate meetings such as Copenhagen 2009, it is still unclear how annual global emissions can be reduced without requiring governments to micro-manage the emitting companies within their individual jurisdictions. Here we examine a simple, yet highly non-trivial, computer model of carbon emission which is consistent with recent activity in the European carbon markets. Our simulation results show that the ongoing daily competition to emit CO2 within a population of emitters, can lead to a form of collective self-control over the aggregated emissions. We identify regimes in which such a population spontaneously hits its emissions target with minimal fluctuations. We then focus on the emission dynamics induced by a governing body which chooses to actively manage the capping level. Finally we lay some formal stepping stones toward a complete analytic theory for carbon emissions fluctuations within this model framework – in so doing, we also connect this problem to more familiar theoretical terrain within computer science.

Introduction

Climate change, and the need to reduce carbon emissions, are seen as urgent global issues [1], [2]. Short of inventing some new technology, the most significant initiative for bringing about emissions reductions is the introduction of carbon markets [2]. These markets tend to be so-called ‘cap and trade’ markets in which an emissions cap is established and a quantity of emissions credits up to this cap then assigned to the population of emitters. These credits can then be traded among the market participants. Such schemes have already been adopted by the European Union (EU), which claims that emissions trading is a cheap way to reduce emissions since reduction is made at source, and also a clear way to ensure that the cap is lowered; but others argue that enforcing the reductions is an expensive process because each emitter will need to be individually micro-managed [2].

Here we use computer simulations to explore a complex systems model of a simple carbon market, in which a group of adaptive companies compete to emit in a market with minimal global control. We show that within the basic constraints of the model, companies are able to organise themselves to hit their collective monthly emissions target, with minimal fluctuations in the aggregated emissions each month, and in the absence of any external regulator controlling the market. We also study for the first time, the effects of allowing a government to have dynamic control over their emissions cap, such that they can change its value during the year. We find that companies react quickly to changes in the monthly emission limit, and that there is limited difference between this behavioural change for both an incremental and a sudden cap reduction. This provides insight into the most efficient method for reducing the emissions cap within the carbon market, in real time, during a given year.

Given the complexity of this dynamical, multi-agent problem, the ultimate future goal is to derive full analytic expressions which produce quantitative agreement with the simulations. We finish the paper by taking several steps toward solving this open challenge. In particular, we provide a formal analysis of the model, and a derivation of explicit expressions for the fluctuation size, in the simplified case where the emissions cap L is approximately half the number of emitting entities, and the memory of each emitting entity is relatively small. Though not a general solution, this analysis provides a strong platform for future analytic extensions. Just as importantly, by mapping the emissions problem to a binary system we are able to connect up to more familiar topics in the computational science field, e.g. strategies as look-up tables, differences in strategies in terms of Hamming distances, and the global information and individual emitting entity memory as finite length bit-strings. This formal association should enable computer science researchers to apply known computer science measures and techniques to deepen the understanding of the system. More generally, it provides a novel link between the topic of carbon emissions and more formal topics within the fields of computer science and information theory.

Section snippets

Description of our model emissions market

The schematic in Fig. 1 shows the structure of our model carbon emissions market. Our model is derived from Brian Arthur’s bar attendance model [3], in which agents decide whether to attend a bar with a limited seating capacity, the Minority Game, in which agents repeatedly compete to be in the minority group [4], and the Minority Game with arbitrary cut-offs [5], [6]. Previously, such models had perhaps been seen as too academic – however there is recent evidence which suggests that human

Overview of output from model

We have explored the effect of varying the emission limits L, time periods T and strategies per company s for a market composed of N=101 major industrial companies (i.e. N agents) whose impact on national emissions levels is potentially significant. Each possesses S=6 strategies: while this particular value is not crucial to the results, it ensures that companies will have a reasonable choice when selecting a strategy, reflecting the fact that they are supposed to represent major industry

Dynamical control of emissions caps

We now consider the effects of changing the cap in real time (e.g. through government intervention). We begin by considering the situation in which the cap is instantaneously halved. We begin by letting the market evolve for 5000 months with a monthly limit of L=1800, exactly as described in the previous section. After 5000 months, the emission limit is suddenly reduced to L=900. This corresponds to an average daily limit of L¯=30. The market is then allowed to evolve for a further 5000 months.

Practical consequences of cap adjustments

Having reviewed our general findings in the previous section, we now look in more detail at the practical consequences of a governing institution (e.g. a national government) adjusting its emissions cap L (e.g. national emissions quota) in real time. We first focus on instantaneous limit reductions, before turning to incremental ones. Fig. 6, Fig. 7 show the emissions volatility and the mean and maximum emissions for markets in which the monthly emissions limit is instantaneously halved midway

Formal analysis of our emissions model

It remains a fascinating and important practical challenge to produce analytic expressions in close quantitative agreement with the preceeding plots. However, we provide in this section a formal platform on which such analytic expressions can be built. In particular, this section serves to (1) formalize the underlying model structure, connecting it to well-known ideas in computational science such as Hamming distances and binary look-up tables, and (2) develop analytic expressions for the

Conclusions

Our analysis suggests a potential alternative structure for a carbon market in which companies compete with each other for emission capacity, but do not communicate directly to make their emission decisions; instead they infer the best action from global market information. Despite the limited communication, the companies are able to organise themselves to consistently reach their collective emissions target. Our results also suggest that companies are able to rapidly respond to changes in

Acknowledgements

N.F.J. is grateful for conversations with Dr. Brian Tivnan of MITRE Corporation. One of us (PMH) acknowledges the support from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong SAR Government under Grant No. CUHK-401109.

Daniel Fenn is a 3rd year D.Phil. student at the University of Oxford, in the Mathematical and Computational Finance Group, supervised by Sam Howison, Nick Jones, Mason Porter, and Neil Johnson. His research focuses on investigating the dynamics of the foreign exchange market by representing the correlations between time-series of exchange rates as time-dependent networks.

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Daniel Fenn is a 3rd year D.Phil. student at the University of Oxford, in the Mathematical and Computational Finance Group, supervised by Sam Howison, Nick Jones, Mason Porter, and Neil Johnson. His research focuses on investigating the dynamics of the foreign exchange market by representing the correlations between time-series of exchange rates as time-dependent networks.

Zhenyuan Zhao is working toward his Ph.D. in the Department of Physics, University of Miami, Florida. His doctoral research is in the field of complex systems, focusing on agent-based modeling, the dynamics of groups, and complex dynamical networks. He is supervised by Neil Johnson.

Pak Ming Hui is Professor in the Department of Physics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong. His Ph.D. in Physics is from Ohio State University. His expertise lies in statistical physics and complex systems, in particular disordered systems in both physical and interdisciplinary social systems.

Neil Johnson is Professor of Physics at University of Miami, Florida. His research is in Complex Systems: from the physical, biological and medical domains through to social and financial domains. Until summer 2007, Neil was Professor of Physics at Oxford University (U.K.). He has a Ph.D. from Harvard University.

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