A preemptive truthful VMs allocation online mechanism in private cloud

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jocs.2016.05.006Get rights and content

Highlights

  • An online mechanism for truthful pre-emptive VMs allocation.

  • An analysis of the relationship between performance and resource capacity.

  • A set of experiments that reveal a good competitive ratio of proposed technique.

Abstract

During the last decade, cloud-technology has presented considerable opportunities for high-performance computing (HPC). In addition, technical computing data centers have been able to maximize their return on investment (ROI). HPC system managers can leverage the benefits of a cloud model for their traditional HPC environments to improve scalability, simplify service access, accelerate collaboration or funding, enable pay-for-use, and improve efficiency. Many HPC clouds assume the form of private Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). In practice, private cloud users may strategically misreport task values in order to achieve a high profit, and thus cloud providers cannot simply maximize the sum of allocated users’ value, which is called social welfare. For this reason, designing a mechanism that reveals the truthful value of users with a concern for both random arrival tasks and maximizing social welfare is necessary. In this study, a model of an online mechanism for virtual machines allocation is built, a preemptive online mechanism is proposed, the truthfulness is proved, a competitive ratio is given, and several simulations are conducted using real tasks from a data center. The total values and completed tasks are compared to the online and offline allocations, respectively, according to different capacity. The simulations reveal that our mechanism is more efficient than the offline mechanism.

Introduction

Cloud computing has been employed by HPC and technical computing data centers to maximize return on investment (ROI). HPC system managers can leverage the benefits of a cloud model for their traditional HPC environments in order to improve scalability, simplify service access, accelerate collaboration or funding, enable pay-for-use, and improve efficiency. Many HPC clouds assume the form of private Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). In private clouds, fixed price is easy to understand and primarily employed, but it is not economically efficient. By contrast, auction-based mechanisms are feasible solutions for virtual machines (VMs) allocation in clouds. An example of an auction-based VMs allocation mechanism is spot instances in Amazon EC2 [1]. This study focuses on auction-based mechanisms for cloud VMs allocation.

Most research has focused on resource allocation in offline situations, which do not consider the users’ random arrival and departure at any time over a long period. Users often arrive randomly and must leave at a particular moment, which can be described as the users’ lifetime. If sufficient cloud resources are allocated to the users in their lifetime, they can obtain a value that expresses payoff when a task is completed. This value is a user's private information. Our online mechanism is an appropriate response to the aforementioned situations. Designing a VMs allocation mechanism in a private cloud that maximizes the total value of the users is our primary challenge because of self-interested users and their random arrival.

In this study, we present a truthful preemptive VMs allocation online mechanism, and compare our mechanism with the optimal offline mechanism through experiments. Results reveal a good actual competitive ratio. In addition, we analyze the relationship between the performance and resource capacity. Our main contributions are the following: our online mechanism addresses the actual situation of a private cloud; truthfulness, which is the most important property, is satisfied; and the social welfare is high by the real data simulations.

This study is organized as follows. Related studies are described in Section 2. Section 3 describes our modeling of the preemptive VMs allocation online mechanism in cloud. Section 4 describes our online mechanism, for which we prove its truthfulness. In addition, allocation and payment algorithms are described. Section 5 describes the numerical experiments conducted to evaluate the performance of our online mechanism. We conclude this study in Section 6.

Section snippets

Related work

A mechanism comprises a group of rules used for an aggregative outcome in which the participants are self-interested with the private information about their preferences. Mechanism design aims to identify the good system-wide means to obtain true participant preferences regarding outcomes. A mechanism is mainly used in the field of microeconomics and resource allocation. It is also used in distributed artificial intelligence and communication networks. In [2], a VCG-Kelly mechanism for

VMs allocation online mechanism model

Providers of cloud computing provision VMs to users and aspire to maximizing revenue, utilizing resources, social welfare, and/or other objectives. Social welfare refers to the sum of value obtained by each user under a certain allocation. Private clouds are constructed by certain enterprises, institutions, and organizations. The users are limited in the internal members. Private clouds have the advantages such as rapid deployment and resources customization because the same principle applies

Mechanism description

A mechanism includes two rules: allocation and payment. Based on the VMs allocation online mechanism model, our mechanism M is given by the following rules:

Allocation rule: compute every effective user's priority valuegit=viliλeit,λ[0,1]where eit is the implemented length of user i's task up to t and λ is a constant between 0 to 1 in a certain mechanism. All git are sorted in descending order, the first C users are each allocated one VM respectively at unit t. If several git are equal, user i

Performance evaluation

To the best of our knowledge, publicly available cloud computing workloads are not currently available. Our simulation data were obtained from [28]. These included many workload logs from large scale parallel systems from various countries throughout the world. We used the RICC-2010 log, which derives from the RIKEN integrated cluster of clusters (RICC) that has operated since August, 2009. RIKEN is an independent scientific research and technology institution of the Japanese government.

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Conclusions

HPC on cloud often employs pay-for-use as a resource strategy. Thus, an auction-based VMs allocation online mechanism is a promising solution for HPC cloud resource allocation-related problems, which are based on the randomly arriving and self-interested users. Promoting social welfare in private cloud is a reasonable goal, but user private information must be revealed. Therefore, in this study we proposed a novel truthful preemptive online mechanism for VMs allocation. We compared our

Acknowledgments

The workload log from the RICC cluster was graciously provided by Motoyoshi Kurokawa. This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 61170029, 61472240, and 61373032, and the Zhejiang Provincial Science and Technology Plan of China under Grant No. 2013C31097.

Dr. Yonggen Gu received the Ph.D. and Master degree in computer science from Shanghai Jiao Tong University in 2006 and 1996. He received the Bachelor degree in mathematics from Hangzhou University in 1990. He is currently a professor in School of Information Engineering, Huzhou University. His current research interests include game theory, mechanism design and cloud computing.

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      The purpose of resource allocation mechanism is to solve optimization problems of infrastructure utilization. For examples, Gu et al. [51] proposed a preemptive virtual machine allocation mechanism for system optimization. Balis et al. [52] also shared their views on how to use the partition tree for satisfying the computing performance in cloud resource allocation.

    Dr. Yonggen Gu received the Ph.D. and Master degree in computer science from Shanghai Jiao Tong University in 2006 and 1996. He received the Bachelor degree in mathematics from Hangzhou University in 1990. He is currently a professor in School of Information Engineering, Huzhou University. His current research interests include game theory, mechanism design and cloud computing.

    Jie Tao received the Master degree in information and communication engineering from Fudan University in 2007. He received the Bachelor degree in Electronic Engineering from Hangzhou University in 1997. He is currently an associate professor in School of Information Engineering, Huzhou University. His current research interests include game theory, mechanism design and cloud computing.

    Dr. Guoqiang Li received the B.S., M.S., and Ph.D. degrees from Taiyuan University of Technology, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, and Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology in 2001, 2005, and 2008, respectively. He worked as a postdoctoral research fellow in the graduate school of information science, Nagoya University, Japan, during 2008–2009, as an assistant professor in the school of software, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, during 2009–2013, and as an academic visitor in the department of computer science, University of Oxford during 2015–2016. He is now an associate professor in school of software, Shanghai Jiao Tong University. His research interests include formal verification, programming language theory and computational learning theory.

    Daniel W. Sun received his Ph.D. in Information Science from Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (JAIST) in 2008. From 2008 to 2012, he was an assistant research manager in NEC central laboratories in Japan. From 2013, he has been working for National ICT Australia as a researcher. He is also a conjoint lecturer in School of Computer Science and Engineering, the University of New South Wales, Australia. His current research interests include big data, cloud computing, cybersecurity, system reliability, and data mining.

    Xiaohong Wu received the Master and Bachelor degree in information engineering from Zhejiang University of Technology in 2004 and 1996. She is currently an associate professor in School of Information Engineering Huzhou University and a Ph.D. candidate in Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. Her current research interests include game theory, mechanism design and cloud computing.

    Prem Prakash Jayaraman received the Ph.D. degree in computer science from Monash Univeristy, Melbourne, Australia, in 2011. He is currently a Research Fellow with RMIT University, Melbourne, Vic., Australia. He was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow with CSIRO Digital Productivity Flagship, North Ryde N.S.W., Australia, from 2012 to 2015. Prior to that, he worked as a Research Fellow and Lecturer with the Centre for Distributed Systems and Software Engineering, Monash University, Melbourne, Vic., Australia. His research interests include Internet of Things, cloud computing, mobile computing, sensor network middleware, and semantic Internet of Things.

    Rajiv Ranjan received the PhD degree. He has been a reader (associate professor) of computing science at Newcastle University since September 1, 2015. He is an internationally renowned researcher in the areas of cloud computing, Internet of Things (IoT), and big data. By applying ground-breaking combination of well-founded formal models from four domains (Operations Research, Computational Statistics, Peer-to-Peer Networking, and Performance Engineering) of computer science, he has developed novel algorithmic techniques and distributed system architectures that facilitate service level agreement (SLA) driven autonomic provisioning of multimedia (e.g., content delivery networks), eScience (e.g., scientific work- flows), and IoT big data applications (e.g., remote sensing, smart homes, smart cities, etc.) applications over multiple private and public cloud data centres. He has authored approximately 150 scientific publications, including publications in the IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems (ERA A*), IEEE Transactions on Computers (ERA A*), Journal of Computer and System Sciences (ERA A*), and IEEE/ ACM World Wide Web conference (CORE A+). He is widely recognised by his peers through citations (5,500+ Google Scholar citations—https://goo.gl/7FONZN and 730+ Web of Science citations—http://goo.gl/St567J).

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