Vulnerability analysis of process plants subject to domino effects

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2016.06.004Get rights and content

Highlights

  • Graph theory is a reliable tool for vulnerability analysis of chemical plants as to domino effects.

  • All-closeness centrality score can be used to identify most vulnerable installations.

  • As for complex chemical plants, the methodology outperforms Bayesian network.

Abstract

In the context of domino effects, vulnerability analysis of chemical and process plants aims to identify and protect installations which are relatively more susceptible to damage and thus contribute more to the initiation or propagation of domino effects. In the present study, we have developed a methodology based on graph theory for domino vulnerability analysis of hazardous installations within process plants, where owning to the large number of installations or complex interdependencies, the application of sophisticated reasoning approaches such as Bayesian network is limited. We have taken advantage of a hypothetical chemical storage plant to develop the methodology and validated the results using a dynamic Bayesian network approach. The efficacy and out-performance of the developed methodology have been demonstrated via a real-life complex case study.

Introduction

Severity of consequences of potential hazards in a system is a function of both the magnitude of hazards and the vulnerability of the system. In other words, exposed to the same level of hazard a system with higher vulnerability is susceptible to larger damages and thus suffering higher levels of risk. Johansson et al. [1] use the term vulnerability to address the inability of a system to withstand the failures. In the context of domino effect modeling, Khakzad and Reniers [2] defined the domino effect vulnerability as the capability of a plant to escalate a primary accident (fire or explosion) to higher order accidents (e.g., secondary fires and explosions). For the purpose of the present study, we adopt the definition by Khakzad and Reniers [2] and define domino vulnerability as the susceptability of a plant which allows a primary accident to spread throughout the plant via cascading effects, triggering secondary accidents, and so on. Compared to traditional risk analysis which is aimed at identification of hazards and estimation of the system failure probabilities, vulnerability analysis is usually performed to pinpoint the system components the failures of which contribute most to the cascading of failures not only within the system of interest but also across other interdependent systems. As such, the emphasis of vulnerability analysis is more on the extent of failures rather than the probabilities thereof although the incorporation of the vulnerability analysis in the probabilistic risk analysis can address both.

Over the past two decades, the issue of cascading effects in complex and interdependent systems such as water distribution networks [3], power grids [4], [5], and process plants [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15] has drawn much attention. The increasing trend in modeling and risk analysis of cascading effects – better known as domino effects in hazardous industries such as process plants – mainly lies in the fact that such cascading failures, although rare, can result in catastrophic consequences. Compared to other infrastructures, however, the potential consequences of domino effects in process plants1 can be much more severe owing to the presence of hazardous materials such as flammable, explosive, and toxic substances. For example, a series of explosions in a LPG2 storage plant in Mexico in November 1984 left around 600 deaths and 7000 severe injuries; similarly, a series of fires and explosions in Buncefield oil storage depot in the U.K in December 2005 led to the largest fire in peace time Europe, leaving 43 injuries and incredible property damages.

Compared to long-established methods for accident modeling and risk analysis of domino effects in process plants, relevant work in the field of vulnerability analysis has been relatively few [13], [15], [16]. In most previous work, however, either a full simulation of potential domino effects has been performed to identify the units contributing the most to the vulnerability of the plant or an iterative deterministic analysis has been carried out with one failure at a time to evaluate the extent of the failure cascade. Regardless of which aforementioned approaches is used, simulations can turn out too time-consuming and even intractable in case of large process plants containing many process installations and equipment.

Many infrastructures such as water distribution networks, power grids, process plants, and communication networks can be displayed as graphs in an abstract form, where the components of the infrastructure are represented as nodes, and the flows of materials, energy, or information among the nodes are denoted as edges. Accordingly, some graph metrics have been suggested to infer about the attributes of the graph (infrastructure) under consideration. In this regard, graph metrics have been used to investigate the robustness of (single) communication networks with regard to technological errors or man-made attacks [17], vulnerability of (joint) interdependent networks (power network and Internet communication network) to the cascading effect of random node failures [18], vulnerability analysis of water distribution networks [19], and vulnerability analysis of process plants in the context of domino effects triggered by terrorist attacks [20] or random failures [2].

Following the work of Khakzad and Reniers [2], in the present study we examine the reliability and efficacy of graph theory (graph metrics) in domino vulnerability analysis of process plants under multiple accident scenarios and varying environmental conditions. We validate the results obtained from graph theory using a dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) methodology developed by Khakzad [15]. The efficacy of the developed methodology is demonstrated via a real case study. To this end, a short review of Bayesian networks is given in Section 2. The graph theory and graph metrics are presented in Section 3, while the development, validation, and application of the methodology are demonstrated in Section 4. The main conclusions drawn from this work are presented in Section 5.

Section snippets

Ordinary Bayesian networks

Bayesian network (BN) is a probabilistic tool for reasoning under uncertainty, where the nodes represent random variables and directed arcs imply local conditional dependencies between parent and child nodes [21], [22]. The type and strength of such conditional dependencies are defined by means of conditional probabilities assigned to the nodes. Those parent nodes which are not children of other parent nodes – so-called root nodes – are assigned marginal probabilities. satisfying the Markov

Graph theory

A mathematical graph is an ordered pair G=(V,E) where V={v1,v2,,vn} and E={e1,e2,,em} denote sets of n vertices (nodes) and m edges (directed or undirected), respectively. In a weighted graph, a set of numerical values can also be assigned to either the nodes or edges of the graph. In this case, the weighted graph can be presented as G=(V,E,WV,WE) where WV and WE are weight vectors allocated to the vertices and edges, respectively.

In a directed graph, a walk from the node vi to vj is a

An example

In this section, we take advantage of a simple example to develop and verify the methodology. To analyze the domino vulnerability of process installations, consider a hypothetical chemical storage plant as shown in Fig. 4, comprising four atmospheric storage tanks T1–T4. The characteristics of the storage tanks are listed in Table 1. Considering a major leak with a probability of 1.0 E−04 for the atmospheric storage tanks [25], probable accident scenarios can be determined using an event tree

Conclusion

In the present study we demonstrated the applicability and efficacy of graph theory in domino vulnerability analysis of chemical plants. We illustrated that graph centrality metrics, in particular all-closeness score, can reliably and effectively be employed to identify the most vulnerbale installations within a chemical plant during domino effects and under multiple accident scenarios and varying atmospheric conditions. In this study a dynamic Bayesian network methodology was employed to

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