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FURTHER RESULTS ON THE INTRANSITIVITY OF EVIDENTIAL SUPPORT

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 November 2011

IGOR DOUVEN
IGOR DOUVEN*
Affiliation:
Institute of Philosophy, University of Leuven
*
*FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN. E-mail:i.e.j.douven@rug.nl
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Abstract

It is known that evidential support, on the Bayesian definition of this notion, is intransitive. According to some, however, the Bayesian definition is too weak to be materially adequate. This paper investigates whether evidential support is transitive on some plausible probabilistic strengthening of that definition. It is shown that the answer is negative. In fact, it will appear that even under conditions under which the Bayesian notion of evidential support is transitive, the most plausible candidate strengthenings are not.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 4 , Issue 4 , December 2011 , pp. 487 - 497
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2011

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