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REMARKS ON NAIVE SET THEORY BASED ON LP

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2015

HITOSHI OMORI
HITOSHI OMORI*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, City University of New York
*
*DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY THE GRADUATE CENTER CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK NEW YORK, USA E-mail:hitoshiomori@gmail.com
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Abstract

Dialetheism is the metaphysical claim that there are true contradictions. And based on this view, Graham Priest and his collaborators have been suggesting solutions to a number of paradoxes. Those paradoxes include Russell’s paradox in naive set theory. For the purpose of dealing with this paradox, Priest is known to have argued against the presence of classical negation in the underlying logic of naive set theory. The aim of the present paper is to challenge this view by showing that there is a way to handle classical negation.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 8 , Issue 2 , June 2015 , pp. 279 - 295
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2015 

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