Abstract
RGLis a version of the modal logic GLbased on the relevant logic R. It is shown that the class of RKframes that verify all theorems of RGLalso verify a scheme that we call (!). If RGLhas (!) as a theorem, however, it is not a relevant logic. I go on to show that not all instances of (!) are theorems of RGL, hence this logic is not complete over any class of RKframes.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
[1993] Boolos, G., The Logic of Provability, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[1990] Furhmann, A., ‘Models for relevant modal logics’, Studia Logica 49, 501–514.
[1996] Hughes, G. E., and M. J. Cresswell, A New Introduction to Modal Logic, London: Routledge.
[1992] Mares, E. D., ‘The semantic completeness of RK’, Reports on Mathematical Logic 26, 3–10.
[1972] Routley, F. R., and R. K. Meyer, ‘The semantics of entailment II’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 1, 53–73.
[1973] Routley, F. R., and R. K. Meyer, ‘The semantics of entailment’, in H. Leblanc (ed.), Truth, Syntax and Modality, Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 199–243.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Mares, E.D. The Incompleteness of RGL. Studia Logica 65, 315–322 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005283629842
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005283629842