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Negotiation on Data Allocation in Multi-Agent Environments

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Abstract

In this paper, we consider the problem of data allocation in environments of self-motivated servers, where information servers respond to queries from users. New data items arrive frequently and have to be allocated in the distributed system. The servers have no common interests, and each server is concerned with the exact location of each of the data items. There is also no central controller. We suggest using a negotiation framework which takes into account the passage of time during the negotiation process itself. Using this negotiation mechanism, the servers have simple and stable negotiation strategies that result in efficient agreements without delays. We provide heuristics for finding the details of the strategies which depend on the specific settings of the environment and which cannot be provided to the agents in advance. We demonstrate the quality of the heuristics, using simulations. We consider situations characterized by complete, as well as incomplete, information and prove that our methods yield better results than the static allocation policy currently used for data allocation for servers in distributed systems.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, 52900, Israel

    Rina Azoulay-Schwartz & Sarit Kraus

  2. Institute for Advanced Computer Studies, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 20742

    Sarit Kraus

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  1. Rina Azoulay-Schwartz
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  2. Sarit Kraus
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Azoulay-Schwartz, R., Kraus, S. Negotiation on Data Allocation in Multi-Agent Environments. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 5, 123–172 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1014838726454

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