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Sharing Nonconvex Costs

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Abstract

The paper analyzes cooperative games with side payments. Each player faces a possibly non-convex optimization problem, interpreted as production planning, constrained by his resources or technology. Coalitions can aggregate (or pool) members' contributions. We discuss instances where such aggregation eliminates or reduces the lack of convexity. Core solutions are computed or approximated via dual programs associated to the grand coalition.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Academy of Sciences of Russia, Central Economics and Mathematics Institute, Nakhimowsky 47, Moscow, 117418, Russia

    I.V. Evstigneev

  2. Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen University and, Bergen, 5007, Norway

    S.D. Flam

Authors
  1. I.V. Evstigneev
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  2. S.D. Flam
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Evstigneev, I., Flam, S. Sharing Nonconvex Costs. Journal of Global Optimization 20, 257–271 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017599310112

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017599310112

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