References
Barwise, J. and Perry, J. (1981), ‘Semantic innocence and uncompromising situations’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy VI, pp. 387–403.
Brooks, R. (1987), ‘Planning is just a way of avoiding figuring out what to do next’, MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory Working Paper 103.
Burge, T. (l986), ‘Individualism and psychology’, Philosophical Review 95, pp. 3–45.
Davies, M. (1992), ‘Perceptual content and local supervenience’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92, pp. 21–45.
Dinsmore, J. (1991), Partitioned representations, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Fauconnier, G. (1985), Mental spaces, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lakoff, G. (1987), Women, fire and dangerous things, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
Gärdenfors, P. (1996), ‘Mental representations, conceptual spaces and metaphors’, Synthese 106, pp. 21–47.
Martins, J.P. and Shapiro, S.C. (1988), ‘A model for belief revision’, Artificial Intelligence 35, pp. 25–79.
McGinn, C. (1989), Mental Content, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Mozer, M. and Smolensky, P. (1989), ‘Using relevance to reduce network size automatically’, Connection Science 1, pp. 3–17.
Olson, K. (1987), An essay on facts. Stanford: CSLI/Univ. of Chicago Press.
Putnam, H. (1975), Mind, language and reality: Philosophical papers, Vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Putnam, H. (1981), Reason, truth and history, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pylyshyn, Z.W. (1973), ‘What the mind's eye tells the mind's brain’, Psychological Bulletin 80, pp. 1–24.
Shapiro, S.C. and Rapaport, W.J. (1987), ‘SnePS considered as a fully intensional propositional semantic network’, in N. Cercone and G. McCalla (eds.) The knowledge frontier: Essays in the representation of knowledge, New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 262–315.
Shapiro, S.C. and Rapaport, W.J. (1991), ‘Models and Minds: Knowledge representation for natural-language competence’, in R. Cummins and J. Pollock (eds.) Philosophy and AI: Essays at the interface, Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 215–259.
Stenning, K. and Oberlander, J. (1994), ‘Spatial inclusion as an analogy for set membership: a case study of analogy at work’, in K. Holyoak and J. Barnden (eds.) Analogical Connections, Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, pp. 446–486.
Stenning, K. and Oberlander, J. (1995), ‘A cognitive theory of graphical and linguistic reasoning: logic and implementation’, Cognitive Science 19, pp. 97–140.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Indurkhya, B. Andy Clark, Jesús Ezquerro, and Jesús M. Larrazabal (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Catergories, Consciousness, and Reasoning. Minds and Machines 10, 430–435 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026413511596
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026413511596