Abstract
The paper consists of three parts. In the first part five kinds of defeasibility are distinguished that is ontological, conceptual, epistemic, justification and logical defeasibility. In the second part it is argued that from these, justification defeat is the phenomenon that plays a role in legal reasoning. In the third part, the view is defended that non-monotonic logics are not necessary to model justification defeat, but that they are so to speak the natural way to model this phenomenon.
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Hage, J. Law and Defeasibility. Artificial Intelligence and Law 11, 221–243 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ARTI.0000046011.13621.08
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ARTI.0000046011.13621.08