Your browser does not support JavaScript!
http://iet.metastore.ingenta.com
1887

Relay assignment and cooperation maintenance in wireless networks: a game theoretical approach

Relay assignment and cooperation maintenance in wireless networks: a game theoretical approach

For access to this article, please select a purchase option:

Buy article PDF
£12.50
(plus tax if applicable)
Add to cart
Buy Knowledge Pack
10 articles for £75.00
(plus taxes if applicable)
Add to cart

IET members benefit from discounts to all IET publications and free access to E&T Magazine. If you are an IET member, log in to your account and the discounts will automatically be applied.

Learn more about IET membership 

Recommend Title Publication to library

You must fill out fields marked with: *

Librarian details
Name:*
Email:*
Your details
Name:*
Email:*
Department:*
Why are you recommending this title?
Select reason:
 
 
 
 
 
IET Communications — Recommend this title to your library

Thank you

Your recommendation has been sent to your librarian.

  • Author(s): D. Li 1 ; Y. Xu 1, 2 ; J. Liu 1 ; J. Zhang 2
    • View affiliations
    • Affiliations: 1: Wireless Institute of Technology, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, People's Republic of China
      2: Institute of Communication Engineering, PLA University of Science Technology, Nanjing, People's Republic of China
  • Source: Volume 4, Issue 17, 26 November 2010, p. 2133 – 2144
    DOI:  10.1049/iet-com.2009.0648 , Print ISSN 1751-8628, Online ISSN 1751-8636
© The Institution of Engineering and Technology
Published

In this study, the authors study the relays assignment problem in cooperative wireless networks with self-interested nodes. The authors propose a cooperation mechanism which includes the cooperative relationship formation stage and cooperation maintenance stage. The cooperative relationship among the nodes can be modelled as an exchange market game where nodes trade transmission power between each other to obtain diversity gain. The exchange games have a basic assumption that each node conforms to trade agreement so that each agent has the option to trade its good to obtain a better one. In such a game, strict core is considered as individual rational, Pareto optimal and relationship-stable solution. A cooperation cycle formation (CCF) algorithm is proposed to obtain the strict core solution. However, in networks, some deviated nodes may break the cooperation agreement to obtain more utility gain. Such deviated behaviours in the cooperation cycles can totally destroy the cooperation relationship. However, the data transmissions in networks have the repeated element. Hence, based on the cooperative cycle formed by CCF, the authors introduce a repeated game model for cooperation maintenance in the second stage. A dynamic punishment and recover mechanism is proposed to punish the deviated behaviours and recover cooperation.

Inspec keywords: radio networks; game theory; Pareto optimisation

Other keywords: wireless network; cooperation cycle formation algorithm; cooperation maintenance stage; dynamic punishment; Pareto optimal; relationship-stable solution; game theory; self-interested nodes; repeated game model; relay assignment; data transmissions; exchange games; cooperative relationship formation stage; recover mechanism

Subjects: Radio links and equipment; Game theory; Optimisation techniques

References

    1. 1)
      • Sadeghi, B., Kanodia, V., Sabharwal, A., Knightly, E.: `Opportunistic media access for multi-rate ad hoc networks', Proc. ACM MobiCom, September 2002, Atlanta, Georgia, USA, p. 24–35.
    2. 2)
      • J. Lian , Y. Liu , K. Naik , L. Chen . Virtual surrounding face geocasting with guaranteed message delivery for ad hoc and sensor networks. IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw. (TON) , 1 , 200 - 211
    3. 3)
    4. 4)
      • Saad, W., Han, Z., Debbah, M.: `A distributed merge and split algorithm for fair cooperation in wireless networks', Proc. IEEE ICC, 2008.
    5. 5)
      • S.P. Fekete , S. Martin , J.W. Gerhard . The complexity of economic equilibria for house allocation markets. Inf. Process Lett. , 5 , 219 - 223
    6. 6)
      • Z. Han , H. Vincent Poor . Coalition games with cooperative transmission: a cure for the curse of boundary nodes in selfish packet-forwarding wireless networks. IEEE Trans. Commun. , 1 , 203 - 213
    7. 7)
      • L. Gao , X. Wang , Y. Xu . Multi-radio channel allocation in multi-hop wireless networks. IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. , 11 , 1454 - 1468
    8. 8)
      • Beres, E., Adve, R.: `Cooperation and routing in multi-hop networks', Proc. IEEE ICC, 2007, p. 4767–4772.
    9. 9)
    10. 10)
    11. 11)
      • Saad, W., Han, Z., Debbah, M.: `Coalitional games for distributed collaborative spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks', Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2009.
    12. 12)
      • Gao, L., Wang, X.: `A game approach for multi-channel allocation in multi-hop wireless networks', Proc. ACM MobiHoc 2008, May 2008, Hong Kong.
    13. 13)
      • J. Ma . Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities. Int. J. Game Theory , 1 , 75 - 83
    14. 14)
    15. 15)
      • Y. Wu , B. Wang , K.J.R. Liu , T.C. Clancy . Repeated open spectrum sharing game with cheat-proof strategies. IEEE Trans. Wirel. Commun. , 4 , 1922 - 1933
    16. 16)
      • Z. Ji , W. Yu , K.J.R. Liu . A game theoretical framework for dynamic pricing-based routing in self-organized MANETs. IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. , 7 , 1204 - 1217
    17. 17)
      • L. Shapley , H. Scarf . On cores and indivisibility. J. Math. Econ. , 1 , 23 - 27
    18. 18)
      • S. Mathur , L. Sankar , N.B. Mandayam . Coalitions in cooperative wireless networks. IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. , 7 , 1104 - 1115
    19. 19)
      • Li, D., Xu, Y., Liu, J., Wang, X.: `Relay assignment and cooperation maintenance in wireless networks', Proc. IEEE WCNC, April 2010, Sydney, Australia.
    20. 20)
      • A.E. Roth , P. Andrew . Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods. J. Math. Econ. , 2 , 131 - 137
    21. 21)
      • C. Pandana , Z. Han , K.J.R. Liu . Cooperation enforcement and learning for optimizing packet forwarding in autonomous wireless networks. IEEE Trans. Wirel. Commun. , 8 , 3150 - 3163
    22. 22)
      • X. Wang , Z. Li , P. Xu . Spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks – an auction based approach. IEEE Trans. Syst. Man Cybern. – Part B: Cybernetics , 6 , 587 - 596
    23. 23)
      • D. Fudenber , M. Kahneman . The Folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information. Econometrica , 3 , 533 - 554
    24. 24)
      • Z. Han , Z. Ji , K.J.R. Liu . A cartel maintenance framework to enforce cooperation in wireless networks with selfish users. IEEE Trans. Wirel. Commun. , 5 , 1889 - 1899
    25. 25)
    26. 26)
      • Xi, Y., Yeh, E.M.: `Pricing, competition, and routing for selfish and strategic nodes in multi-hop relay networks', Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2008, p. 1463–1471.
http://iet.metastore.ingenta.com/content/journals/10.1049/iet-com.2009.0648
Loading

Related content

content/journals/10.1049/iet-com.2009.0648
pub_keyword,iet_inspecKeyword,pub_concept
6
6
Loading
Print this page
This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address