Tension reduction by military power equalization: the USA‐USSR case

The purpose of this paper is to present another historical case that supports the theory that power equality – and not power inequality – reduces international tension and makes the world more peaceful.

The paper refers to two mathematical models that back this theory and focuses on the case of the American and Soviet military expenditures during the last 25 years of the superpowers' rivalry. Both datasets are adjusted for inflation and expressed in constant US dollars. The 25‐year interval is divided into two main subintervals into the basis of data characteristics, and four regression lines are determined.

The regression lines of the US and USSR military expenditures corresponding to the first‐time interval intersect in 1971, when the main decisions regarding the SALT Treaty were made. The same lines for the second interval intersect in 1989, when the Cold War ended. The USA decided to escalate the Vietnam War during the period in which their military expenditures were significantly higher than the Soviet ones. Similarly, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan when its military expenditures were considerably bigger than the American ones. Subsequently, it is possible to affirm that the 1976‐1991 US‐USSR arms race is another important empirical case that supports the theory asserting that power equalization reduces international tension.

By using three simple statistical techniques – adjustment for inflation, determination of the relevant regression lines, and calculation of intersection points – the paper shows that two sets of highly significant empirical data reinforce the theory that power equalization reduces international tension.