Abstract:
We consider finite populations of interacting players with different types and finite action set per type. Under suitable conditions we derive the mean field game dynamic...Show MoreMetadata
Abstract:
We consider finite populations of interacting players with different types and finite action set per type. Under suitable conditions we derive the mean field game dynamics which can be deterministic or stochastic depending on how the system behave with the time-scales. Connection between mean field game dynamics and evolutionary game dynamics are established. Considering different revision protocols for each player, we derive an hybrid mean field game dynamics which offers the possibility of elimination of non-Nash rest points and give nice convergence properties in potential games and stable games.
Published in: Proceedings of the 2011 American Control Conference
Date of Conference: 29 June 2011 - 01 July 2011
Date Added to IEEE Xplore: 18 August 2011
ISBN Information: