Abstract:
We consider the provision of non-excludable public goods on a network of interdependent strategic users. We study three different equilibria of these games, namely the Na...Show MoreMetadata
Abstract:
We consider the provision of non-excludable public goods on a network of interdependent strategic users. We study three different equilibria of these games, namely the Nash equilibrium, socially optimal, and exit equilibrium profiles. We identify properties of the interdependence graph that guarantee the existence and uniqueness of these equilibria. We further establish a connection between users' centralities in their interdependence network, and their efforts at different interior equilibria of these games. These characterizations separate the effects of incoming and outgoing dependencies, as well as the influence of paths of different length, on users' effort levels. We discuss some conceptual and practical implications of this centrality-effort connection.
Published in: 2015 53rd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton)
Date of Conference: 29 September 2015 - 02 October 2015
Date Added to IEEE Xplore: 07 April 2016
ISBN Information: