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Abstract—The classic influence maximization problem finds a limited number of influential seed users in a social network such that the expected number of influenced users in the network, following an influence cascade model, is maximized. The problem has been studied in different settings, with further generalization of the graph structure, e.g., edge weights and polarities, target user categories, etc. In this paper, we introduce a unique influence diffusion scenario involving a population that split into two distinct groups, with opposing views. We aim at finding the top-kinfluential seed nodes so to simultaneously maximize the adoption of two distinct, antithetical opinions in the two groups, respectively. Efficiently finding such influential users is essential in a wide range of applications such as increasing voter engagement and turnout, steering public debates and discussions on societal issues with contentious opinions. We formulate this novel problem with the voter model to simulate opinion diffusion and dynamics, and then design a linear-time and exact algorithm COSiNeMax, while also investigating the long-term opinion characteristics in the network. Our experiments with several real-world datasets demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed algorithm, compared to various baselines.

I. INTRODUCTION

A central characteristic of social networks is that it facilitates rapid dissemination of information among large groups of individuals [7], [13]. Online social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Flickr, and Digg are used for spreading ideas and messages. Users' behaviors and opinions are highly affected by their friends in social networks, which is defined as the social influence. Motivated by various realworld applications, e.g., viral marketing [12], social and political campaigning [11], social influence studies have attracted extensive research attention. The classic influence maximization problem [22], [12] identifies the top-k seed users in a social network such that the expected number of influenced users in the network, starting from those seeds and following an influence diffusion model, is maximized. The budget k on the seed set size usually depends on how many initial users the campaigner can directly influence by advertisements, re-tweets from "bots", free samples and discounted prices.

In reality, societies are complex systems, and polarize into groups of individuals with dramatically opposite perspectives. This phenomenon is also evident in online social networks based on political affiliations, religious views, controversial topics, personal biases and preferences [18]. Therefore, each campaign is generally launched and promoted with certain target audience in mind, e.g., all Republican voters, people who prefer jazz over metal music, or Android over iPhones, etc. Often, online campaigns have limited budgets and cannot afford to directly reach to all members of their target population. In such scenarios, it is desirable to minimize the number of seed users as permitted by the budget, while still maximizing the spread of the campaign in the target audience.

Furthermore, due to the existence of subgroups with differing views, relationships between social network users also include negative ones, such as foe, spite, and distrust relations. Indeed, signed social networks containing both positive and negative relationships are ubiquitous [39]. For example, in the explicit category, users can directly tag the polarity (positive or negative) to the relation between two users, e.g., Epinions, Slashdot, Ebay, and other online review and news forums. In the implicit category, the relationship polarities can be mined from the interaction data between users, such as, in Twitter a user u may support some users whom she follows (positive) and be against the others (negative). Following common sense and past literature on signed networks (including the structural balance theory) [5], [27], [28], [13], we assume that positive relations carry the influence in a positive manner, that is, a user would more likely trust and adopt her friends' opinions. On the other hand, negative relations tend to carry influence in a reverse direction, i.e., if a user's foe chooses some opinion, the user would more likely be influenced to select the opposite one. Our assumption supports the principles that "the friend of a friend is a friend", "the enemy of a friend is an enemy", "the friend of an enemy is an enemy", and "the enemy of an enemy is a friend". Ignoring such relationship polarities between users and treating signed social networks as unsigned ones would result in over-estimation of positive influence spread, thereby leading to lower-quality solutions. Social influence can be further complicated when competing campaigns are simultaneously spread over a signed social network. Therefore, influence and opinion dynamics in a signed social network is a critical problem that, unfortunately, remains pretty much open.

In this work, we investigate a *novel* influence diffusion problem: COSiNe (<u>Contrasting Opinions Maximization in a</u> <u>Signed Social Network</u>). We aim to find a limited number of influential seed nodes which maximize the adoption of two distinct, antithetical opinions in two non-overlapping user groups with opposing views, respectively. The main objective behind such influence maximization is to create general awareness in a population by improving the quality of the debate on naturally contentious issues without inadvertently introducing prejudiced ideas.

• **Applications.** An ideal application of our problem would be to increase awareness about infrequently discussed issues that are nonetheless controversial (such as capital punishment, nuclear energy, or affirmative action) — in a target population that naturally splits into two distinct ideological groups (such as democrats and republicans); in a forum that extensively

debates topics and proposes mutually agreeable solutions based on compromise, diversity, and inclusion (such as the United States Senate or House of Representatives). Contrary to initial expectations, polarization of opinions and increased conflict can often be beneficial [9], [21], [37], [16], [1], [34], [4], as discussed in the following.

The benefit of the conflicting opinions of various individuals collaborating together can be measured clearly on the online encyclopedia: Wikipedia. Wikipedia uses a six-category scale (ranging from "stub" to "featured article") to determine the quality of its articles, which are entirely crowd-sourced. Controversial articles such as those on the Syrian Civil War, Israel/Palestine, or George W. Bush attract a higher number of edits. The community debate can be seen on the "talk page" of each article. It has been found that higher polarization in the contributing community is associated with higher article quality for a broad range of articles – ranging from politics to science and social issues [37], [9].

Increased diversity is often correlated with greater business performance [35]. Similarly, disagreements amongst coworkers have been found to improve the decision making capabilities at the organisation level; with a recent study from Columbia Business School stating "cognitive conflict (that is, differences in information, knowledge, and opinions) can be a critical source of competitive advantage" [34]. Thus, there is a clear merit in allowing and even encouraging different opinions about the same topic to flourish in a business setting. This can be leveraged to improve the productivity of the organisation [16], [4]. When dealt with correctly, such differences in thought and opinions are a force for good.

Lastly, we illustrate an example from the world of politics that is most similar to our "ideal" application scenario. Unlike the American presidential system, in countries based upon the Westminster parliamentary system, there is an appointed head of government, different from the head of the state, and an appointed head of opposition. This balance between the government and the opposition is considered integral to the success of a functioning democracy in diverse countries such as in Britain and in India [1]. An equivalent analysis was made for the political system in the United States of America in 1950 by the American Political Science Association [21] which recommended a stronger two party system in order to strengthen the democratic process. Both these analyses point to the importance of opposition in political discourse, and go on to show that policies being enacted and implemented benefit from engagement, and even opposition. Meaningful discourse and spirited debate requires people who inherently hold opposing beliefs on a given issue, and thus maximizing opposing influences can be beneficial for a legislative body from the point of view of the general population.

• Challenges and contributions. Contrasting opinions maximization, as required in our problem setting, is a non-trivial one. First, one must employ an influence cascade model that has properties different from those for commercial, *one-time product purchasing* based marketing strategies. For example, people's opinions change over time; thus, activation based models, such as independent cascade (IC) and linear threshold (LT) models [22] are less appropriate in political contexts. Second, in reality a signed social network might not be perfectly balanced [28], that is, there may not exist a partition V_1, V_2 of the node set V, such that all edges with V_1 and V_2 are positive and all edges across V_1 and V_2 are negative. Such a network does not follow the social balance theory, and adds more complexity to the social influence cascade.

In this work, we employ the *voter model* [10], [20], [14], [28] to characterize influence diffusion in the two population groups of a social network. We define our model such that opposite influences, when applied on the same user, cancel each other, leading to a decay in the influence strength on any given user. Our model does not mandate that a user's choice be frozen upon one-time activation, explicitly allowing the user to switch opinions at later times. Moreover, voter model, being a stochastic one (it has a random walk based interpretation, which will be introduced in Section II), can deal with signed networks that are not perfectly balanced. We then define our novel **COSiNe** problem (contrasting opinions maximization), and design an efficient, exact solution.

The main contributions of this paper are as follows.

- We study the novel problem (COSiNe) of finding the topk seed nodes that maximize the adoption of two distinct, antithetical opinions in two given non-overlapping sets of target users, respectively, in a signed social network. We adapt the voter model to formulate our problem in §II.
- We design a linear-time, exact solution (COSiNeMax) for our problem. We demonstrate the correctness and derive time complexity of our algorithm in §III.
- We further characterize two different long-term opinion dynamics in a signed social network under extreme scenarios, and investigate how our proposed method, COSiNeMax finds the seed nodes intelligently under such extreme situations (§IV).
- We conduct a thorough experimental evaluation with several real-world signed social networks to demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our algorithm, compared to various baseline methods (§V).

II. PRELIMINARIES

We model a social network as a signed, directed graph with edge weights: $G = (V, E, \mathbf{A})$, where V is the set of nodes (users), $E \subseteq V \times V$ is the set of directed edges (links, connections, follower/followee relations, etc.), and A is the weighted adjacency matrix with $A_{ij} \neq 0$ when the edge $(i,j) \in E$, with A_{ij} being the weight of the edge (i,j). The weight A_{ij} represents the strength of j's influence on *i*. Moreover, as we consider a signed graph, the adjacency matrix A may contain negative entries. A positive entry A_{ii} indicates a positive relation, i.e., i considers j as a friend or *i* trusts *j*, whereas a negative entry A_{ij} denotes a negative relation, that is, i considers j as a foe, or i distrusts j. The absolute value $|A_{ii}|$ represents the strength of this positive or negative relation — the higher, the stronger. We further denote by A^+ and A^- the (unsigned) matrices with only positive and negative entries of A, respectively. Thus, $A = A^+ - A^-$.

A. Information Diffusion Model

The voter model was first introduced in [20], [10] to investigate territorial conflicts between two species and more abstractly, the properties of infinite systems of stochastic processes. It was then studied for maximizing influence in unsigned networks [14] and over signed networks [28]. We update the model from prior attempts in order to more naturally simulate the spread of *two contrasting ideas*, O_1 and O_2 , *simultaneously* in the same network.

We associate with each node a floating point value C in the range [-1, 1], that probabilistically determines the node's adopted idea O_1 or O_2 . The diffusion happens at discrete time steps, and the C value at every node can change with each time step. The opinion or idea adopted by node i at time step t is represented by $C_t(i): C_t(i) \to 1$ implies that the user is likely to adopt the idea O_1 at time step t, whereas $C_t(i) \rightarrow -1$ denotes that the user is likely to adopt the idea O_2 at time step t. In particular, the probability of node i adopting idea O_1 at time t is defined as $p(O_1) = \frac{1+C_t(i)}{2}$, and the probability of *i* adopting idea O_2 at time *t* is $p(O_2) = \frac{1 - C_t(i)}{2}$. The two probabilities are defined so that they always sum up to one. In our voter model, each node starts uninfluenced in the beginning, i.e., $C_t = 0$ at time t = 0, except those nodes being influenced as seed nodes for ideas O_1 or O_2 by the campaigner. For seed nodes, $C_0 = 1$ and $C_0 = -1$, respectively.

At every time step t, each node $i \in V$ adopts the idea of its outgoing neighbour $j \in V$ with probability $p = \frac{|A_{ij}|}{\Sigma_l |A_{il}|}$ if $A_{ij} > 0$, and adopts the opposite idea if $A_{ij} < 0$. Formally, $C_t(i)$

$$= \sum_{j \in V} \left(\frac{A_{ij}^{+}}{\sum_{l \in V} |A_{il}|} C_{t-1}(j) \right) - \sum_{j \in V} \left(\frac{A_{ij}^{-}}{\sum_{l \in V} |A_{il}|} C_{t-1}(j) \right)$$

= $\sum_{j \in V} \frac{A_{ij}^{+} - A_{ij}^{-}}{\sum_{l \in V} |A_{il}|} C_{t-1}(j)$ (1)

There is also an alternative, *random walk* interpretation of this voter model [28]. In this interpretation, we consider a walk across the graph that starts at an arbitrary node u. At each time step, from the current node i, an outgoing edge $i \rightarrow j$ is chosen with probability $p = \frac{|A_{ij}|}{\sum_l |A_{il}|}$ for the random walk. This walk is deemed to terminate at time t on some node v. Then, according to the voter model, $C_t(u) = C_0(v)$ if the path $u \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow v$ has an even number of negative edges (a *positive path*), and $C_t(u) = -C_0(v)$ if the path has an odd number of negative edges (a *negative path*).

By defining the voter model this way, opposite influences on a particular node tend to "cancel" out. The voter model also allows the opinion of a user to flip between two contrasting ideas, based on her neighbors' influences. Thus, our voter model is different from one-time, activation-based influence propagation models (e.g., independent cascade (IC) and linear threshold (LT) models [22]), and we employ it to study opinion diffusion and formation in online signed social networks. *B. Problem Statement*

Two non-overlapping groups V_1 and V_2 among the social network users are given as an input to our problem, such that,

 $V_1 \cap V_2 = \phi$ and $V_1 \cup V_2 \subseteq V$. The campaigner aims at influencing all nodes in V_1 with the idea O_1 , and all nodes in V_2 with the idea O_2 . Clearly, the users outside both the groups V_1 and V_2 have no business value to the campaigner.

We define an *opinion vector* C_t , according to the opinions of all the nodes in our network at any specific time t. Thus, for a network with |V| = n nodes:

$$\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{t}} = \begin{bmatrix} C_t(0) \\ C_t(1) \\ \vdots \\ C_t(n-1) \end{bmatrix}$$
(2)

The voter model can be described in matrix form in terms of the opinion vector and a *transition matrix* $\mathbf{P} = \mathbf{D}^{-1}\mathbf{A}$. Here, \mathbf{D} is a diagonal matrix that consists of all entries of $(\mathbf{A}^+ + \mathbf{A}^-) \cdot \mathbf{1}$ in its diagonal. From Equation 1, we get:

$$C_{t}(i) = \sum_{j \in V} \frac{A_{ij}^{+} - A_{ij}^{-}}{\sum_{l \in V} |A_{il}|} C_{t-1}(j)$$

$$\Longrightarrow C_{t}(i) = \sum_{j \in V} \frac{A_{ij}}{\sum_{l \in V} |A_{il}|} C_{t-1}(j)$$

$$\Longrightarrow \mathbf{C_{t}} = \mathbf{D}^{-1} \mathbf{A} \mathbf{C_{t-1}} = \mathbf{P} \mathbf{C_{t-1}} = \mathbf{P}^{t} \mathbf{C_{0}}$$
(3)

Similar to the opinion vector, we define a partition vector ρ to describe two target populations V_1 and V_2 . We define element ρ_i in this vector, for each node $i \in V$, as below:

$$\rho_{i} = \begin{cases}
+1 & \dots & \text{if } i \in V_{1} \\
-1 & \dots & \text{if } i \in V_{2} \\
0 & \dots & \text{if } i \in V \land i \notin (V_{1} \cup V_{2})
\end{cases} \tag{4}$$

The effectiveness ϵ_t of the advertising campaign across both target populations can now be measured by using the scalar product formula $\epsilon_t = \rho^T \cdot \mathbf{C_t}$. This promotes opinion O_1 in partition V_1 and opinion O_2 in partition V_2 , while also penalising the reverse situation, that is, O_1 in V_2 and O_2 in V_1 . The formulation correctly ignores the opinions of the nodes that do not belong in either V_1 or V_2 , that the campaigner is agnostic towards. It is worth noting that ϵ_t is a function of three parameters. (1) Future time step t: input to the problem, (2) ρ : which defines two non-overlapping target groups and is provided as an input to the problem, and (3) C_0 : the seed set that needs to be determined.

We consider budget k on the number of seed nodes, which is an input parameter. We are now ready to define our problem.

Problem 1. [COSiNe] Given a signed, directed graph with edge weights: $G = (V, E, \mathbf{A})$, a future time step t > 0, $\boldsymbol{\rho}$ vector which defines two non-overlapping target groups V_1, V_2 for two contrasting ideas O_1 and O_2 , respectively, and a budget k on the total number of seed nodes, find the top-k seed nodes, together with their advertisement types (between O_1 and O_2), such that the effectiveness $\epsilon_t = \boldsymbol{\rho}^T \cdot \mathbf{C}_t$ of the campaign is maximized.

III. ALGORITHM: SHORT-TERM OPINIONS MAXIMIZATION In this section, we design an efficient and *exact* algorithm for the COSiNe problem and with a given, finite time step t > 0. We refer to this as "short-term" since t could be small and we do not look for characteristics of the opinion dynamics as $t \to \infty$. The long-term case will be discussed in Section IV.

Our strategy for finding the most influential seed nodes is as follows. We compute the amount of influence of each node on the rest of the network at time t. It turns out that, according to our voter model, selecting the top-k individually most influential nodes as the seed nodes is equivalent to the set of k nodes with the highest influence. The correctness of our algorithm is proved in Section III-A.

Our complete algorithm, COSiNeMax is given in Algorithm 1. To find the individual influence power $\epsilon(i)$ of each node $i \in V$, we simulate random walks in the reverse direction of the actual influence diffusion (Lines 1-14). The number of walks terminating at a specific node can thus be used as a measure of the node's ability to influence other nodes, based on our voter model. We next select the top-k nodes having the maximum absolute influence power individually as the seed set (Lines 15-37). Furthermore, for a seed node j, if $\epsilon(j)$ is positive, it is influenced with idea O_1 ; otherwise the seed node is influenced with O_2 (Lines 29-33).

A. Proof of Correctness

We prove the correctness of Algorithm 1 in two steps. First, we show that the aggregate of the individual influence of k nodes is identical to the influence strength of the set consisting of the same k nodes together (Theorem 1). Second, we demonstrate that the seed set formed by the top-k nodes as selected by Algorithm 1 is indeed the best seed set given inputs G, t, k, and ρ (Theorem 2).

Theorem 1. Let $\epsilon_t = \boldsymbol{\rho}^T \cdot \mathbf{C}_t$ be the total influence of a seed set Ω consisting of k nodes. We denote by $\epsilon_t(i)$ the individual influence of a node $i \in \Omega$. Then, $\epsilon_t = \sum_{i \in \Omega} \epsilon_t(i)$.

Proof. We denote by Ω the seed set with k nodes. The subset of seed nodes influenced by the idea O_1 is denoted as Ω^+ , whereas the subset of seed nodes influenced by the idea O_2 is denoted as Ω^- . Clearly, $\Omega_1 \cap \Omega_2 = \phi$ and $\Omega_1 \cup \Omega_2 = \Omega$. Let ϵ_t be the total influence by the seed set Ω , whereas we represent by $\epsilon_i(t)$ the individual influence when the seed set consists of the single node $i \in \Omega$.

Consider three vectors e_1 , e_2 , and e_i , each having dimensionality |V|. They represent various subsets of Ω : e_i consists of |V| - 1 zeros, with only the *i*-th element being ± 1 (depending on whether *i* has been influenced with idea O_1 or O_2 , respectively), representing the singleton set $\{i\}$. Analogously, e_1 consists of +1 corresponding to all nodes in the set Ω_1 , and e_2 consists of -1 for all nodes in the set Ω_2 . The rest of the elements in e_1 and e_2 are zeros. Formally,

$$e_{1}(j) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } j \notin \Omega_{1} \\ +1 & \text{if } j \in \Omega_{1} \end{cases} e_{2}(j) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } j \notin \Omega_{2} \\ -1 & \text{if } j \in \Omega_{2} \end{cases}$$
$$e_{i}(j) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } j \neq i \\ +1 & \text{if } j = i, \ j \in \Omega_{1} \\ -1 & \text{if } j = i, \ j \in \Omega_{2} \end{cases}$$
(5)

Thus, $e = e_1 + e_2$ is the vector denoting the seed set $\Omega = \Omega_1 \cup \Omega_2$. Next, we derive the following.

Algorithm 1 COSiNeMax: Maximize Contrasting Opinions

Require: Signed graph $G = (V, E, \mathbf{A})$; time step t > 0; $\boldsymbol{\rho}$ vector to define two non-overlapping target groups V_1, V_2 for two contrasting ideas O_1, O_2 , respectively; budget k **Ensure:** Set Ω of top k nodes, with their advertisement types

Ensure: Set Ω of top-k nodes, with their advertisement types (between O_1 and O_2), that maximizes $\epsilon_t = \boldsymbol{\rho}^T \cdot \mathbf{C_t}$ 1: $\mathbf{P} = \mathbf{D}^{-1}\mathbf{A}$ \triangleright Transition Matrix of G 2: $\boldsymbol{\epsilon} \leftarrow [0, 0, 0, \dots, 0]$ \triangleright Initialise row vector of size |V|3: for $i \leftarrow 1, |V|$ do if $i \in V_1$ then 4: $\epsilon[i] \leftarrow +1$ 5: else if $i \in V_2$ then 6: 7: $\epsilon[i] \leftarrow -1$ 8: else $\epsilon[i] \leftarrow 0$ 9: 10: end if 11: end for 12: for $i \leftarrow 1, t$ do 13: $\boldsymbol{\epsilon} = \boldsymbol{\epsilon} \cdot \mathbf{P}$ 14: end for $\triangleright \epsilon$ is distribution of reverse random walks at time t $\triangleright \Omega$ is a set of tuples $\langle i \in V, \tau(i) \rangle$ 15: $\Omega \leftarrow \Phi$ $\triangleright \tau(i)$ denotes the individual influence of node i 16: for $j \leftarrow 1, |V|$ do if $size(\Omega) \leq k$ then 17: insert $(\Omega, \langle j, |\epsilon[j]| \rangle)$ 18: if $\epsilon(j) > 0$ then 19: $Opinion(j) \leftarrow O_1$ 20: 21: else $Opinion(j) \leftarrow O_2$ 22: 23: end if else 24: $\langle i, \tau(i) \rangle \leftarrow \min(\Omega) \triangleright \min$ is based on $\tau()$ values 25: if $|\epsilon[j]| > \tau(i)$ then 26: remove $(\Omega, \langle i, \tau(i) \rangle)$ 27: insert $(\Omega, \langle j, |\epsilon[j]| \rangle)$ 28: if $\epsilon(j) > 0$ then 29: $Opinion(j) \leftarrow O_1$ 30: 31: else $Opinion(j) \leftarrow O_2$ 32: end if 33: 34: end if end if 35. 36: end for 37: return Ω , $Opinion(i : i \in \Omega)$ ▷ Optimal seed nodes,

with their advertisement types between O_1 and O_2

$$\epsilon = \boldsymbol{\rho}^{T} \cdot \boldsymbol{C}_{t} = \boldsymbol{\rho}^{T} \cdot (\boldsymbol{P}^{t} e) \qquad \rhd \text{ Following Equation 3}$$

$$= \boldsymbol{\rho}^{T} \cdot \boldsymbol{P}^{t}(\boldsymbol{e}_{1} + \boldsymbol{e}_{2}) = \boldsymbol{\rho}^{T} \cdot \boldsymbol{P}^{t} \left(\Sigma_{i \in \Omega_{1}} \left(\boldsymbol{e}_{i} \right) + \Sigma_{i \in \Omega_{2}} \left(\boldsymbol{e}_{i} \right) \right)$$

$$= \Sigma_{i \in \Omega} (\boldsymbol{\rho}^{T} \boldsymbol{P}^{t} e_{i}) = \Sigma_{i \in \Omega} (\boldsymbol{\rho}^{T} \boldsymbol{C}_{t}(i)) \qquad \rhd \text{ Following Equation 3}$$

$$= \Sigma_{i \in \Omega} \epsilon_{i}$$
(6)

Hence, the theorem.

Theorem 2. The seed set Ω , consisting of the top-k individu-

ally most influential nodes as selected by Algorithm 1, is the optimal seed set having size k.

Proof. Notice that Algorithm 1 selects the top-k individually most influential nodes into the seed set Ω . Therefore, the following holds: $\epsilon_j \geq \epsilon_i$ for all nodes $i, j \in V$, such $j \in \Omega$ and $i \notin \Omega$.

We demonstrate that for any other seed set Ω' , such that $\Omega' \neq \Omega$, $|\Omega'| = |\Omega|$ cannot have more influence than that of Ω . Let us define $\omega' = \Omega' \setminus \Omega$, $\omega = \Omega \setminus \Omega'$, and $o = \Omega' \cap \Omega$. Note that since the size of both Ω and Ω' is k, $|\omega'| = |\omega|$.

We prove by contradiction: Following Theorem 1, and if possible, we assume that $\sum_{i \in \Omega'} \epsilon_i > \sum_{j \in \Omega} \epsilon_j$. Then, we get:

$$\Sigma_{i\in\Omega'}\epsilon_i > \Sigma_{j\in\Omega}\epsilon_j$$

$$\implies \Sigma_{i\in\omega'\cup o}\epsilon_i > \Sigma_{j\in\omega\cup o}\epsilon_j$$

$$\implies \Sigma_{i\in\omega'}\epsilon_i + \Sigma_{i\in o}\epsilon_i > \Sigma_{j\in \omega}\epsilon_j + \Sigma_{j\in o}\epsilon_j$$

$$\implies \Sigma_{i\in\omega'}\epsilon_i > \Sigma_{j\in \omega}\epsilon_j$$

$$\implies \exists (i\in\omega', j\in\omega) \quad \text{such that} \quad \epsilon_i > \epsilon_j$$

$$\implies \exists (i\notin\Omega, j\in\Omega) \quad \text{such that} \quad \epsilon_i > \epsilon_j$$

This contradicts that Algorithm 1 selects the top-k individually most influential nodes into the seed set Ω . Hence, the theorem.

B. Time Complexity Analysis

Time complexity of our algorithm is: $\mathcal{O}(|E|t)$ as follows. **Transition matrix calculation.** Line 1 finds the transition matrix **P**. This is an $\mathcal{O}(|E|)$ operation, as it involves using the element-wise absolute values in **A**, calculating **D**, and finally computing $\mathbf{D}^{-1} \cdot \mathbf{A}$. Note that real-world networks are generally sparse, thus **A** can be represented as a sparse matrix with |E| non-zero elements. Inverting **D** is an $\mathcal{O}(|V|)$ operation, since **D** is a diagonal matrix: The inverse of a diagonal matrix is obtained by replacing each element in the diagonal with its reciprocal. Finally, $\mathbf{D}^{-1} \cdot \mathbf{A}$ can be computed in $\mathcal{O}(|E|)$ time via sparse matrix multiplication, as each diagonal element of \mathbf{D}^{-1} is multiplied with exactly one element of **A**, and this forms a non-zero element in the transition matrix **P**. Moreover, it is easy to verify that **P** will have |E| non-zero elements.

Initialisation of ϵ . This requires time $\mathcal{O}(|V|)$ in lines 3-11. **Random walk simulation.** The slowest step in the algorithm is random walk simulation in lines 12-14. In this phase, we require $\mathcal{O}(|E|t)$ time. Since ϵ is a one dimensional vector, each multiplication in line 13 costs $\mathcal{O}(|E|)$ due to sparse matrix multiplication, and this operation is repeated t times.

Seed set selection. Finally, in lines 15-37 we select the top-k nodes with the individually highest absolute influence power. This is similar to choosing the top-k elements in an unordered list, and can be accomplished in $\mathcal{O}(|V| \log k)$ time.

Thus, time complexity of our algorithm is bounded by the random walk simulation, and the time complexity is: $\mathcal{O}(|E|t)$, which is linear in the size of the input graph.

IV. LONG-TERM OPINIONS FORMULATION

We now turn our attention to the long-term scenario, that is, opinion dynamics as $t \to \infty$. In particular, we consider two extreme scenarios with respect to the two non-overlapping groups V_1 and V_2 in the signed social network. For simplicity, in this section we shall assume that $V_1 \cup V_2 = V$ and the graph is strongly connected.

• Socially balanced partitions: With respect to partitions V_1, V_2 , all intra-partition edges are positive, and all interpartition edges are negative. • Socially anti-balanced partitions: With respect to partitions V_1, V_2 , all intra-partition edges are negative, and all interpartition edges are positive.

Remarks. First, even though most real-world datasets do not exactly fall under the above two categories, a real-world network could resemble one of them. For example, we observe that the *Tagged* dataset [15] that we use in our experiments, has more than three times as many positive inter-partition edges than all other kinds of edges combined, thereby making these partitions close to socially anti-balanced partitions. By analyzing the long-term opinion dynamics for the two categories, we demonstrate how intelligently our algorithm finds the seed nodes even under such extreme situations. Second, we employ our algorithm, COSiNeMax in all scenarios, as its optimality has been proved in \S III-A irrespective of future time step t (i.e., short-term vs. long-term), graph structures, and node partitions.

For ease of discussion, we define a *signed path* in a signed, directed social network as a sequence of nodes with the edges being directed from each node to the following one. The *length* of the path is the total number of directed edges in it. The sign of a path is positive if there is an even number of negative edges along the path; otherwise the sign of a path is negative.

A. Socially Balanced Partitions

Recall that the campaigner's objective is as follows: At time step t, all nodes in V_1 will adopt opinion O_1 , and nodes in V_2 will adopt opinion O_2 . We next show that *if the input partitions* are socially balanced, then by following our algorithm, at $t \rightarrow \infty$, indeed nodes in V_1 will adopt opinion O_1 and nodes in V_2 will adopt O_2 .

To prove this, it is easy to verify that all paths that begin and end in the same partition have positive signs (due to even number of negative edges on those paths). Analogously, all paths that begin in one partition and end in the other partition must have negative signs because of odd number of negative edges on them. This has two implications as given below.

First, COSiNeMax will select all seed nodes of O_1 only from the users in V_1 , and all seeds for O_2 only from V_2 . This is because in Lines 4-7 of Algorithm 1, all nodes in V_1 starts as positive, and in partition V_2 all nodes starts as negative (at t = 0). Now, repeated multiplications with the transition matrix **P** (Lines 12-14) can be considered as a union of random walks. Therefore, at any arbitrary future time step t, all nodes in V_1 would remain positive, because all random walks starting at V_1 and also ending at V_1 must consist of only positive paths. Similarly, at any arbitrary future time step t, all nodes in V_2 would remain negative. Now, in Lines 29-33, the seed nodes are influenced based on their final sign, that is, if positive then influenced with opinion O_1 , and otherwise with opinion O_2 . This concludes that the seed nodes for O_1 will only be selected from group V_1 , and those for O_2 will be picked only from V_2 . Second, for socially balanced partitions, if all seeds of O_1 are from V_1 , and all seeds for O_2 are from V_2 , then at $t \rightarrow \infty$, nodes in V_1 will adopt opinion O_1 and nodes in V_2 will adopt O_2 . This holds because each path from any seed in V_1 to some other node in V_1 will always be a positive path, thereby carrying the same opinion as that of the seed (i.e., O_1), whereas every path from a seed in V_2 to some other node in V_1 will be a negative path, thereby carrying the opposite opinion to that of the seed (i.e., also O_1).

B. Socially Anti-balanced Partitions

We show that if all seeds of O_1 are from V_1 , all seeds for O_2 are from V_2 , and when $t \to \infty$, then anti-balanced partitions switch opinions between O_1 and O_2 at even and odd time steps, respectively.

1) Even time steps: For even time steps, we consider paths of even lengths. Among such paths, all paths that begin and end in the same partition have positive signs (due to even number of negative edges), and all paths that begin and end in different partitions have negative signs (due to odd number of negative edges). Hence, this is identical to the situation in socially balanced partitions, and similar results hold. In other words, (1) COSiNeMax will select all seed nodes of O_1 only from the users in V_1 , and all seeds for O_2 only from V_2 . (2) For socially anti-balanced partitions, if all seeds of O_1 are from V_1 , and all seeds for O_2 are from V_2 , then at $t \to \infty$, with t being even, nodes in V_1 will adopt opinion O_1 and nodes in V_2 will adopt O_2 .

2) Odd time steps: For odd time steps (with $t \to \infty$), one can follow similar reasoning to show that the opposite case arises. We now consider paths of odd lengths. Among such paths, all paths that end in the same partition as they began have negative signs (due to odd number of negative edges), and all paths that end in the opposite partition as they began have positive signs (due to even number of negative edges). This results in swapping of opinions for the two partitions, relative to the ones in an even time step.

Notice that COSiNeMax intelligently selects seed nodes: When the objective is to maximize the adoption of O_1 at V_1 and O_2 at V_2 in an odd time step, in anti-balanced partitions as $t \to \infty$, COSiNeMax will select all seed nodes of O_1 only from the users in V_2 , and all seeds for O_2 only from V_1 .

V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

We show empirical results to demonstrate effectiveness and efficiency of our solution, and compare it with three baselines. We analyze sensitivity of COSiNeMax by varying several parameters, e.g., number of seed and targets, time steps.

A. Environment Setup

Our code is implemented in Python, using sparse matrix operations from the *scipy* library, and the experiments were performed on a single core of a 16GB, 1.8GHz, Intel i7-8550U processor. Each experimental result is averaged over 10 runs. Our *source code* and *datasets* are publicly available at: github.com/COSiNe Max/COSiNe-Max and drive.google.com/drive/folders/1hHn14eYehzRp8nk_sup RfnhahXDDjjmn?usp=sharing, respectively.

TABLE I: Dataset characteristics

Dataset	#Nodes	#Edges	#Positive Edges	#Negative Edges	
Epinions	132 585	701 926	605 854 (86%)	96 072 (14%)	
GitHub	44 914	44 100 700	26 185 530 (59%)	17 915 170 (41%)	
Tagged	5 607 448	546 799 071	443 895 613 (81%)	102 903 458 (19%)	

 TABLE II: Tagged: Signed

 edge weight distribution

Cat.	Weight	#Edges
1	-1.0	5762K (0.67%)
2	-0.9	9361K (1.09%)
3	-0.5	139379K (16.24%)
4	-0.1	202003K (23.53%)
5	0.3	150877K (17.58%)
6	0.8	350724K (40.87%)
7	1.0	137K (0.02%)
		•

Fig. 1: GitHub: Signed edge

1) Datasets: We summarize our datasets in Table I. (1)

weight distribution

Epinions. This social network dataset is extracted from the product review website epinions.com, where users may trust or distrust others [31]. It is a signed and directed network: A user trusting another is represented with an edge of weight +1, and distrusting another is denoted by weight -1. The products being reviewed fall into one of 34 unique verticals, and we, uniformly at random, partition these verticals into two categories. The nodes are then split into two non-overlapping partitions V_1 and V_2 depending on the product categories that they review. (2) GitHub. The dataset (blog.github.com/2009-07-29-the-2009-github-contest) is extracted from an anonymized dataset of user-repository interactions on github.com, utilising information about users "watching" other's repositories. We classify users into partitions V_1, V_2 based on whether the most used language in their watched repositories is among the top-10 most popular languages following TIOBE index: tiobe.com/tiobeindex/programming-langu ages-definition/. We connect any two users in the network with a bidirectional edge if they watch the same repository, with edge weight inversely proportional to the number of watchers for that repository. The sign of this edge is positive if both nodes view more singlelanguage repositories (or, both view more multi-language repositories), and negative otherwise (i.e., one views singlelanguage repositories and the other views multi-language repositories). The signed edge weight distribution is shown in Figure 1. (3) Tagged. Our largest real-life dataset is collected from the online social network tagged.com [15]. The nodes are partitioned into V_1 and V_2 using anonymized gender metadata.

partitioned into V_1 and V_2 using anonymized gender metadata. Moreover, each edge of the network belongs to one of seven categories. This categorical information is converted into a signed edge weight as given in Table II: The intuition is to have many modestly weighted positive and negative edges (i.e., edge weights between -0.5 to 0.8), and only a few edges with very high positive and negative edge wights (i.e., edge weights -1.0 or +1.0).

2) Competing Methods: We compare the proposed COSiNeMax method (Algorithm 1) with three baselines. (1) Random. Uniformly at random selection of k seed nodes. (2) Degree. The top-k nodes with the highest out-degrees. (3) Individual InfMax. In this baseline approach, we follow the voter model over signed networks [28], however we consider

each target set separately. That is, we first compute the top- $\lfloor k/2 \rfloor$ seed nodes so to maximize the spread of the idea O_1 in the target partition V_1 . Next, we find another top- $\lfloor k/2 \rfloor$ seed nodes that maximize the spread of the idea O_2 within the target set V_2 . Therefore, by comparing with the *Individual Influence Maximization* approach as described above, we demonstrate the improvements due to our algorithm COSiNeMax, which returns the top-k optimal seed nodes considering the spread of two contrasting ideas O_1 and O_2 simultaneously.

For each baseline, at t = 0 we target a seed node i with idea O_1 if $i \in V_1$, and with O_2 if $i \in V_2$.

3) Parameters Setup: **#Seeds.** We set the default number of seed nodes as 5% for *Epinions* and *GitHub*, while 1% for *Tagged*. This roughly translates to 7K, 1.3K, and 56K seeds in *Epinions*, *GitHub*, and *Tagged*, respectively. For sensitivity analysis, we vary the number of seeds from 0.8% to 90% (i.e., 1K to 120K) in *Epinions*.

#Target nodes. In the experimental setting, we consider all nodes in the network as the target set of the campaigner. For sensitivity analysis, we vary the number of target nodes from 15% to 90% (i.e., 20K to 120K) in the *Epinions* dataset. The target nodes are selected uniformly at random, and then we split them into two non-overlapping partitions V_1 and V_2 based on the categories of products that each user reviews.

Time steps. We consider time steps up to 30 (short-term); for the long-term scenario we exhibit up to 500 time steps.

4) Evaluation Metrics: We employ two metrics for the effectiveness measure.

Expected number of correctly influenced nodes. We compute the number of nodes influenced by idea O_1 in target partition V_1 , and by O_2 in target partition V_2 . Recall that the probability of node *i* adopting idea O_1 at time *t* is defined as $p(O_1) = \frac{1+C_t(i)}{2}$, and the probability of *i* adopting idea O_2 at time *t* is $p(O_2) = \frac{1-C_t(i)}{2}$. Here, $C_t(i) \in [-1, 1]$ is computed following Equation 3.

Moreover, we disregard weakly influenced nodes, i.e., node $i \in V_1$ when its $p(O_1)$ is less than a predefined threshold (0.5), and $i \in V_2$ when its $p(O_2)$ is less than a predefined threshold (0.5). Such a user is likely to be undecided between two opposite opinions on a specific issue. Formally, we report the following.

Expected number of correctly influenced nodes

$$= \sum_{i \in V_1, C_t(i) > 0} \left(\frac{1 + C_t(i)}{2} \right) + \sum_{i \in V_2, C_t(i) < 0} \left(\frac{1 - C_t(i)}{2} \right)$$

Influence percentage w.r.t. all targets as seeds. We also measure *campaign effectiveness constrained by a limited number of seeds*, with respect to the hypothetical scenario when all target nodes can be employed as seeds. We recall that in Section II, the effectiveness of the campaign was formulated as $\rho^T \cdot \mathbf{C_t}$. This promotes opinion O_1 in partition V_1 and opinion O_2 in partition V_2 , while penalising the reverse situation, that is, O_1 in V_2 and O_2 in V_1 .

To better compare the aforementioned campaign effectiveness of each baseline and our proposed algorithm, we compare it to the case when all target nodes are assigned as seed nodes. At time step t = 0, the seeds are influenced with the respective idea of the target partition that they belong to. According to the voter model, opposite influences on the same node cancel each other out, thus there could be a decay with time in the magnitude of influence. Let us denote by T_t the campaign effectiveness at time step t in this scenario (i.e., when all target nodes were seed nodes at t = 0).

Finally, we report $\left(\frac{\boldsymbol{\rho}^T \cdot \mathbf{C_t}}{T_t} \times 100\right)\%$ as the influence percentage w.r.t. all target nodes used as seed nodes.

B. Effectiveness Results

We present effectiveness results on three networks (Figure 2). We find that our designed COSiNeMax achieves higher expected number of influenced nodes than all three baselines. Notice that *Epinions* (Figure 2(a)) shows some reduction in the expected number of correctly influenced nodes with larger time steps till it saturates. Such reduction is not observed in *GitHub* and *Tagged*. This is due to higher sparsity of *Epinions*, with the presence of many separated components, each consisting of a few nodes. In such a sparse network, random walks from seed nodes initially influence a large number of nodes. However, this influence is unable to sustain at later time steps due to sparsity of the graph. In other words, the sparsity of the network prevents long random walks from returning to the same nodes, thereby reducing the influence over time.


When we compare the influence percentage (w.r.t. all targets as seeds) of each algorithm, COSiNeMax also outperforms all baselines (Figure 3). However, the peak value obtained in each dataset is different, with *Epinions* having the highest at 120%, *GitHub* having 55%, and *Tagged* at 40%. The sparsity of *Epinions* dissipates the total influence T_t very rapidly, reducing it by almost 75 % in the first time step itself. This quick decrease in influence is prevented with COSiNeMax by selecting the seed nodes more intelligently, thus achieving the peak value at higher than 100%.

The oscillatory plots of the baselines in *Tagged* (Figures 2(c), 3(c)) can be explained based on graph structure and node partitions. *Tagged* has more than three times as many positive inter-partition edges than all other kinds of edges combined, thereby making these partitions close to socially anti-balanced partitions. Thus, if the seed nodes in the two partitions are not targeted by O_1 or O_2 intelligently, as it is done in case of baselines (see Section V-A2), such oscillatory behaviour in influence spread arises. This is similar to the oscillatory behaviour discussed in Section IV due to socially anti-balanced graph partitions. **COSiNeMax** is able to circumvent this problem by targeting all seed nodes in V_1 as O_1 when maximizing influence for even time steps, and as O_2 when maximizing influence for odd time steps.

C. Efficiency Results

We compare running time to find seed nodes by all algorithms in Figure 4. While time taken increases almost linearly with time steps for both COSiNeMax and Individual InfMax, it is evident that both Random and Degree are faster, and their seed set finding times are independent of input time step.

In case of Individual InfMax, the seed nodes are computed in two stages: once for opinion O_1 in the target set V_1 , and then



All Seed


w.r.t.

*

40

30

(a) *Epinions*, #seeds=5% of all users Fig. 2: Expected number of correctly influenced users for different time steps. Seeds are




Random Degree Ind. InflMa> COSiNe Max

(b) GitHub, #seeds=5% of all users


Random

- Degree • • Ind. InflMax - COSiNe Max

25




(c) Tagged, #seeds=1% of all users selected according to various algorithms.





(a) *Epinions*, #seeds=5% of all users (b) *GitHub*, #seeds=5% of all users (c) *Tagged*, #seeds=1% of all users Fig. 3: Influence percentage w.r.t. "All Seed" for different time steps. Seeds are selected according to various algorithms. "All Seed" denotes the case when all target nodes are used as seeds, and influenced by the respective idea at t = 0 (this metric is defined in Section V-A4).


15 Time Step



(a) *Epinions*, #seeds=5% of all users (b) GitHub, #seeds=5% of all users Fig. 4: Running time to find seed nodes according to various algorithms.










(Sec



for opinion O_2 in the target set V_2 . However, COSiNeMax holistically identifies all seed nodes in the entire graph. This explains why COSiNeMax is faster than Individual InfMax over two smaller graphs. On the other hand, COSiNeMax

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15000

륃 12500

<u></u>≩ 1000


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·.

requires more time than Individual InfMax over Tagged, which is a larger dataset and the complexity of performing random walks over entire graph dominates seed set finding time.



(a) Expected #correctly inf. users (b) Influence % w.r.t. "All Seed" Fig. 7: Results on long-term opinions formation, *Epinions*, #seeds=1% of all users.

D. Sensitivity Analysis w.r.t. #Seeds & #Targets

We investigate sensitivity of the algorithms w.r.t. numbers of seed and target nodes. In Figures 5 and 6, we present sensitivity analysis results using *Epinions*, generated for two time steps, t = 3 (short-term) and t = 200 (long-term). Finally, we also revisit the variation with time steps, and study longerterm dynamics, with time steps from 0 to 500 (Figure 7).

We find that the superior performance of our algorithm, COSiNeMax — both in terms of (a) expected number of correctly influenced nodes and (b) influence percentage (w.r.t. all targets as seeds) — is maintained for all parameter configurations. Our empirical results demonstrate that COSiNeMax finds the best quality solution regardless of the target set size, seed set budget, and input time step.

In regards to long-term dynamics, we find that all algorithms, except the Random baseline, achieves saturation over time, with no further variation in influence. The expected number of correctly influenced nodes and the influence percentage (w.r.t. all targets as seeds) in this saturated state are both higher for our COSiNeMax than the baselines.

VI. RELATED WORK

Influence maximization in social networks. The classic influence maximization problem finds a limited number of seed users that generate the largest expected influence cascade in a social network. Kempe et. al. [22] designed the linear threshold (LT) and the independent cascade (IC) models, and developed *approximation algorithms* having theoretical performance guarantees. However, the computation of influence cascade is still #P-hard following both IC and LT models [8]. Lappas et. al. introduced the concept of target marketing and k-effectors — by identifying k seed nodes such that a given activation pattern can be established [25].

Competitive Influence maximization. Influence maximization in the presence of a negative campaign was investigated in [2], which assumes that the later campaign has prior knowledge of rival side's initial seed nodes. Bordin et. al. [3] analyzed the similar problem under the LT model; while [6] attempts at preventing the spread of an existing negative campaign in the network. However, as competitive new products from rival companies are often launched around the same time, [29], [23] considered influence maximization in the presence of multiple competing campaigners, who promote their products in a social network around the same time. Complementary influence maximization was proposed in [30] for promoting complementary products together.

Our work is fundamentally different from prior literature. **First**, they generally consider activation based models (e.g., IC and LT) suitable for *one-time* product purchase. In contrast, our voter model allows users to switch opinions at later times based on their neighbors' opinions. Thus, voter model is more suitable to study opinion diffusion and formation in online social networks. **Second**, although earlier works consider multiple competitive campaigns, different from our study they do not consider diffusion with both positive and negative edges in a *signed* social network. **Third**, due to the inherent complexity of IC, LT models and their variants, the problems investigated in those works are generally NP-hard and also #P-hard, while the voter model can solve our problem *exactly* in linear time.

Signed social networks. Signed network research dates back to 1940's with the work of Heider [19], and was formalized by Harary and Carwright [5]. Signed networks have recently become popular in data mining and social network analysis (for a survey, see [39]). In [26], Leskovec et al. studied the structure of social networks with negative relationships based on two social science theories — balance theory and status theory. Kunegis et al.[24] investigated spectral properties of signed undirected networks, having applications in link predictions and clustering. Tang et al. [39] performed node classification in signed networks.

Influence maximization in signed social networks. With the prevalence of signed social networks, recent works investigated the problem of finding the seed set that maximizes positive influence, which is also known as positive influence maximization. [27], [36], [38] studied positive influence maximization under different extensions of IC and LT models. Li et al. [28] explored similar problem in a signed social network with voter model. Unlike ours, they do not aim at maximizing two contrasting opinions in two non-overlapping target regions. Moreover, in [28] all seed nodes can be influenced by only one type of idea, that is, for positive influence maximization, all seeds will be influenced by the positive idea. However, as demonstrated in our experiments, maximizing each influence separately (i.e., Individual InfMax) results in a sub-optimal solution compared to ours (i.e., COSiNeMax): We return optimal seed nodes considering the spread of two contrasting ideas simultaneously.

Measuring and minimizing social polarization. Garimella et al. detected topics from Twitter data that caused intense debate [18]. Techniques to reduce polarization and disagreement in

social networks by updating nodes and edges were developed in [17], [32], [33]. We acknowledge that in certain situations it is indeed necessary to reduce polarization, as otherwise created "echo chambers" (a metaphoric situation in which specific kinds of opinions and convictions are strengthened and spread through the repetition and continuous communication among users who share the same kind of thoughts inside a *closed* system) may result in extreme conflicts and instability. However, as we discussed earlier, for public awareness, open and honest discussion, diversity and inclusion, educated voting, and towards better democracy, *polarization, with certain regulations, is the key* [9], [21], [37], [16], [1], [34], [4]. Our work is motivated from this perspective.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

We formulated and investigated the novel problem of contrasting opinions maximization in two distinct target groups, respectively, over a signed social network. Motivated by scenarios such as increasing voter engagement and turnout, steering public debates and discussions on societal issues with contentious opinions, we adapted the voter model to effectively study influence diffusion. We efficiently solved this problem, and designed an exact algorithm. We then empirically compared this algorithm with several baselines on three realworld signed network datasets. Our analysis reveals that the proposed algorithm, COSiNeMax finds the seed set with the highest expected number of influenced nodes, and has the highest relative total influence. This behaviour is demonstrated over all datasets and for different variations of time steps, seed set budget, and target population size parameters. In future, it would be interesting to consider adaptive seeding, as opposed to one-time seeding, for even more effective shortterm opinions maximization in a signed, social network.

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