Abstract:
To enable heterogeneous channel valuations in spatial spectrum reuse, user characteristics involving the supply and demand relationship need to be considered. In this pap...Show MoreMetadata
Abstract:
To enable heterogeneous channel valuations in spatial spectrum reuse, user characteristics involving the supply and demand relationship need to be considered. In this paper, we design a channel transaction mechanism for non-symmetric networks and maximize the social welfare in consideration of multi-level channel valuations of the secondary users (SUs). Specifically, we group the SUs into allowable user crowds (AUCs) through a modified Bron-Kerbosch algorithm. We introduce a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction, in which the participants are limited to the AUCs. To facilitate the bid formation, we transform the constrained VCG auction to a step-by-step decision process. In each step, the truthful bidding of an AUC is to reveal the accumulated channel valuation of the coalition. Meanwhile, the SUs in a coalition play a coalitional game with transferable utilities. We use the Shapley value to realize fair payoff distribution among the SUs in a coalition. Furthermore, we approach the optimal channel allocation via a greedy algorithm and batch allocation. In our simulation, we compare the low-complexity algorithms and demonstrate the efficiency of the channel transaction mechanism.
Date of Conference: 11-14 January 2019
Date Added to IEEE Xplore: 28 February 2019
ISBN Information: