In this paper, we present a novel control architecture capable to deal with the constrained Load Frequency Control (LFC) problem in a distributed way and to jointly manage time-delay attacks on the communication links existing amongst power areas and a set of high level controllers located at remote sides. The starting idea consists in abstractly modeling the power grid as a leader-follower configuration so that a first input -first output protocol can be adopted to compute adequate control actions. The latter is achieved by resorting to an overlapping system description which prescribes that several areas of the power grid concur to obtain a single element of the leader-follower structure. The approach is based on to the reachability analysis developed in [3] where sequences of one-step ahead controllable sets have been formally derived by taking into account existing state/input constraints, distributed structure of the problem and data loss occurrences due to possible cyber attacks. Simulations put in light the reconfiguration capabilities of the proposed framework that allow one to “isolate” the attacked power units which in principle could compromise the overall operation mode of the power grid.