Abstract:
In asymmetric zero-sum games, one player has superior information about the game over the other. It is known that the informed players (maximizer) face the tradeoff of ex...Show MoreMetadata
Abstract:
In asymmetric zero-sum games, one player has superior information about the game over the other. It is known that the informed players (maximizer) face the tradeoff of exploiting its superior information at the cost of revealing its superior information, but the basic point of the uninformed player (minimizer)'s decision making remains unknown. This paper studies the finite stage asymmetric repeated games from both players' viewpoints, and derives that not only security strategies but also the opponents' corresponding best responses depends only on the informed player's history action sequences. Moreover, efficient LP formulations to compute both player's security strategies are provided.
Published in: 2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)
Date of Conference: 12-14 December 2016
Date Added to IEEE Xplore: 29 December 2016
ISBN Information: