## Adversarial Bandits with Knapsacks\*

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#### Abstract

We consider *Bandits with Knapsacks* (henceforth, *BwK*), a general model for multi-armed bandits under supply/budget constraints. In particular, a bandit algorithm needs to solve a well-known *knapsack problem*: find an optimal packing of items into a limited-size knapsack. The BwK problem is a common generalization of numerous motivating examples, which range from dynamic pricing to repeated auctions to dynamic ad allocation to network routing and scheduling. While the prior work on BwK focused on the stochastic version, we pioneer the other extreme in which the outcomes can be chosen adversarially. This is a considerably harder problem, compared to both the stochastic version and the "classic" adversarial bandits, in that regret minimization is no longer feasible. Instead, the objective is to minimize the *competitive ratio*: the ratio of the benchmark reward to algorithm's reward.

We design an algorithm with competitive ratio  $O(\log T)$  relative to the best fixed distribution over actions, where T is the time horizon; we also prove a matching lower bound. The key conceptual contribution is a new perspective on the stochastic version of the problem. We suggest a new algorithm for the stochastic version, which builds on the framework of regret minimization in repeated games and admits a substantially simpler analysis compared to prior work. We then analyze this algorithm for the adversarial version, and use it as a subroutine to solve the latter.

Our algorithm is the first "black-box reduction" from bandits to BwK: it takes an arbitrary bandit algorithm and uses it as a subroutine. We use this reduction to derive several extensions.

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*Version history.* The conference version corresponds, as an extended abstract, to the March'19 version of this manuscript. A major revision in Oct'19 improved the competitive ratios in Sections 5 and 6, reducing the dependence on d and shaving off some constant factors. In particular, we streamlined some looseness in the algorithm in Section 5, and made the final computation somewhat more efficient. Also, we made the lower bound statements more explicit, and expanded the discussion of open questions. The subsequent revisions fixed various inaccuracies in the proofs and added some follow-up work.

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# Contents

1	Introduction	3	
2	Related work         2.1       Simultaneous and independent work	<b>5</b> 7	
3	Preliminaries	8	
4	4.2 Our algorithm: repeated Lagrangian game	<b>10</b> 10 11 12	
5	A simple algorithm for Adversarial BwK5.1Analysis: proof of Theorem 5.1 and Lemma 5.7	<b>14</b> 15	
6	High-probability algorithm for Adversarial BwK6.1Full proof of Theorem 6.16.2Proof of Lemma 6.9: last full phase offers sufficient rewards6.3Proof of Lemma 6.5 (IPS estimators are good)	<b>19</b> 21 25 25	
7	Extensions7.1BwK with full feedback	<ul> <li>28</li> <li>29</li> <li>29</li> <li>30</li> <li>32</li> </ul>	
8	Lower bounds8.1Warm-up: example from the Introduction8.2The main lower bound: proof of Theorem 8.1(b)8.3Best dynamic policy: proof of Theorem 8.1(c) and Theorem 8.38.4Best fixed arm: proof of Theorem 8.1(d)	<b>33</b> 34 35 38 40	
9	Open Questions and Follow-Up Work	41	
Re	References 42		
A	Standard tools         A.1 Concentration Inequalities         A.2 Lagrangians: proof of Lemma 4.2         A.3 The stopped LP for Adversarial BwK: proof of Eq. (5.4)         A.4 Regret minimization in games: proof of Lemma 3.1	<b>48</b> 48 48 49 49	
B	Table of notation	51	

### **1** Introduction

Multi-armed bandits is a simple abstraction for the tradeoff between *exploration* and *exploitation*, *i.e.*, between making potentially suboptimal decisions for the sake of acquiring new information and using this information for making better decisions. Studied over many decades, multi-armed bandits is a very active research area spanning computer science, operations research, and economics (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006; Bergemann and Välimäki, 2006; Gittins et al., 2011; Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi, 2012; Slivkins, 2019; Lattimore and Szepesvári, 2020).

In this paper, we focus on bandit problems which feature supply or budget constraints, as is the case in many realistic applications. For example, a seller who experiments with prices may have a limited inventory, and a website optimizing ad placement may be constrained by the advertisers' budgets. This general problem is called *Bandits with Knapsacks (BwK)* since, in this model, a bandit algorithm needs effectively to solve a *knapsack problem* (find an optimal packing of items into a limited-size knapsack) or generalization thereof. The BwK model was introduced in Badanidiyuru et al. (2018) as a common generalization of numerous motivating examples, ranging from dynamic pricing to ad allocation to repeated auctions to network routing/scheduling. Various special cases with budget/supply constraints were studied previously, (*e.g.*, Besbes and Zeevi, 2009; Babaioff et al., 2015; Badanidiyuru et al., 2012; Singla and Krause, 2013; Combes et al., 2015).

In BwK, the algorithm is endowed with  $d \ge 1$  limited resources that are consumed by the algorithm. In each round, the algorithm chooses an action (*arm*) from a fixed set of K actions, and the outcome consists of a reward and consumption of each resource; all are assumed to lie in [0, 1]. The algorithm observes *bandit* feedback, *i.e.*, only the outcome of the chosen arm. The algorithm stops at time horizon T, or when the total consumption of some resource exceeds its budget. The goal is to maximize the total reward, denoted REW.

For a concrete example, consider *dynamic pricing*.<sup>1</sup> The algorithm is a seller with limited supply of some product. In each round, a new customer arrives, the algorithm chooses a price, and the customer either buys one item at this price or leaves. A sale at price p implies reward of p and consumption of 1. This example easily extends to d > 1 products/resources. Now in each round the algorithm chooses the per-unit price for each resource, and the customer decides how much of each resource to buy at this price.

Prior work on BwK focused on the stochastic version of the problem, called *Stochastic BwK*, where the outcome of each action is drawn from a fixed distribution. This problem has been solved optimally using three different techniques (Badanidiyuru et al., 2018; Agrawal and Devanur, 2014), and extended in various directions in subsequent work (Agrawal and Devanur, 2014; Badanidiyuru et al., 2016; Agrawal and Devanur, 2016).

We go beyond the stochastic version, and instead study the most "pessimistic", adversarial version where the rewards and resource consumptions can be arbitrary. We call it *adversarial bandits with knapsacks* (*Adversarial BwK*), as it extends the classic model of "adversarial bandits" (Auer et al., 2002). Bandits aside, this problem subsumes online packing problems (Mehta, 2013; Buchbinder and Naor, 2009b), where algorithm observes *full feedback* (the outcomes of all possible actions) in each round, and observes it *before* choosing an action.

**Hardness of the problem.** Adversarial BwK is a much harder problem compared to Stochastic BwK. The new challenge is that the algorithm needs to decide how much budget to save for the future, without being able to predict it. (It is also the essential challenge in online packing problems, and it drives our lower bounds.) This challenge compounds the ones already present in Stochastic BwK: that exploitation may be severely limited by the resource consumption during exploration, that optimal per-round reward no longer

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>See Section 8 in Badanidiyuru et al. (2018) for a detailed discussion of this and many other examples.

guarantees optimal total reward, and that the best fixed distribution over arms may perform much better than the best fixed arm. Jointly, these challenges amount to the following. An algorithm for Adversarial BwK must compete, during any given time segment  $[1, \tau]$ , with a distribution over arms that maximizes the total reward on this time segment. However, this distribution may behave very differently, in terms of expected per-round outcomes, compared to the optimal distribution for some other time segment  $[1, \tau']$ .

In more concrete terms, let  $OPT_{FD}$  be the total expected reward of the *best fixed distribution* over arms. In Stochastic BwK (as well as in adversarial bandits) an algorithm can achieve sublinear regret:  $OPT_{FD} - \mathbb{E}[REW] = o(T)$ .<sup>2</sup> In contrast, in Adversarial BwK regret minimization is no longer possible, and we therefore are primarily interested in the *competitive ratio*  $OPT_{FD} / \mathbb{E}[REW]$ .

It is instructive to consider a simple example in which the competitive ratio is at least  $\frac{5}{4} - o(1)$  for any algorithm. There are two arms and one resource with budget  $\frac{T}{2}$ . Arm 1 has zero rewards and zero consumption. Arm 2 has consumption 1 in each round, and offers reward  $\frac{1}{2}$  in each round of the first halftime ( $\frac{T}{2}$  rounds). In the second half-time, it offers either reward 1 in all rounds, or reward 0 in all rounds. Thus, there are two problem instances that coincide for the first half-time and differ in the second half-time. The algorithm needs to choose how much budget to invest in the first half-time, without knowing what comes in the second. Any choice leads to competitive ratio at least  $\frac{5}{4}$  on one of the problem instances.

Extending this idea, we prove an even stronger lower bound on the competitive ratio:

$$\operatorname{OPT}_{FD}/\mathbb{E}[\operatorname{REW}] \ge \Omega(\log T).$$
 (1.1)

Like the simple example above, the lower-bounding construction involves only two arms and only one resource, and forces the algorithm to make a huge commitment without knowing the future.

Algorithmic contributions. Our main result is an algorithm which nearly matches (1.1), achieving

$$\mathbb{E}[\text{REW}] \ge \frac{1}{O(\log T)} \left( \text{OPT}_{\text{FD}} - \text{reg} \right), \tag{1.2}$$

where reg is a low-order regret term.

We put forward a new algorithm for BwK, called LagrangeBwK, that unifies the stochastic and adversarial versions. It has a natural game-theoretic interpretation for Stochastic BwK, and admits a simpler analysis compared to the prior work. For Adversarial BwK, we use LagrangeBwK as a subroutine, though with a different parameter and a different analysis, to derive two algorithms: a simple one that achieves (1.2), and a more involved one that achieves the same competitive ratio with high probability. Absent resource consumption, we recover the optimal  $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{KT})$  regret for adversarial bandits.

LagrangeBwK is based on a new perspective on Stochastic BwK. We reframe a standard linear relaxation for Stochastic BwK in a way that gives rise to a repeated zero-sum game, where the two players choose among arms and resources, respectively, and the payoffs are given by the Lagrange function of the linear relaxation. Our algorithm consists of two online learning algorithms playing this repeated game. We analyze LagrangeBwK for Stochastic BwK, building on the tools from regret minimization in stochastic games, and achieve a near-optimal regret bound when the optimal value and the budgets are  $\Omega(T)$ .<sup>3</sup>

We obtain several extensions, where we derive improved performance guarantees for some scenarios. These extensions showcase the *modularity* of LagrangeBwK, in the sense that the two players can be implemented as arbitrary algorithms for adversarial online learning that admit a given regret bound. Each extension follows from the main results, with a different choice of the players' algorithms.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>More specifically, one can achieve regret  $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{KT})$  for adversarial bandits (Auer et al., 2002), as well as for Stochastic BwK if all budgets are  $\Omega(T)$  (Badanidiyuru et al., 2018). One can achieve sublinear regret for Stochastic BwK if all budgets are  $\Omega(T^{\alpha})$ ,  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$  (Badanidiyuru et al., 2018).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>This regime is of primary importance in prior work (*e.g.*, Besbes and Zeevi, 2009; Wang et al., 2014).

**Discussion.** LagrangeBwK has numerous favorable properties. As just discussed, it is simple, unifying, modular, and yields strong performance guarantees in multiple settings. It is the first "black-box reduction" from bandits to BwK: we take a bandit algorithm and use it as a subroutine for BwK. This is a very natural algorithm for the stochastic version once the single-shot game is set up; indeed, it is immediate from prior work that the repeated game converges to the optimal distribution over arms. Its regret analysis for Stochastic BwK is extremely clean. Compared to prior work (Badanidiyuru et al., 2018; Agrawal and Devanur, 2014), we side-step the intricate analysis of sensitivity of the linear program to non-uniform stochastic deviations that arise from adaptive exploration.

LagrangeBwK has a primal-dual interpretation, as arms and resources correspond respectively to primal and dual variables in the linear relaxation. Two players in the repeated game can be seen as the respective *primal algorithm* and *dual algorithm*. Compared to the rich literature on *primal-dual algorithms* (Williamson and Shmoys, 2011; Buchbinder and Naor, 2009b; Mehta, 2013) (including the more recent literature on stochastic online packing problems Devanur and Hayes, 2009; Agrawal et al., 2014; Devanur et al., 2011; Feldman et al., 2010; Molinaro and Ravi, 2012) LagrangeBwK has a very specific and modular structure dictated by the repeated game.

Logarithmic competitive ratios are fairly common and well-accepted in the area of approximation algorithms, and particularly in online algorithms (see Related Work for citations).

**Benchmarks.** We argue that the best fixed distribution over arms is an appropriate benchmark for Adversarial BwK. First, consider the total expected reward of the *best dynamic policy*, denote it  $OPT_{DP}$ . (The best dynamic policy is the best algorithm, in hindsight, that is allowed to switch arms arbitrarily across timesteps.) This is the strongest possible benchmark, but it is *too* strong for Adversarial BwK. Indeed, we show a simple example with just one resource (with budget B), where competitive ratio against this benchmark is at least  $\frac{T}{B^2}$  for any algorithm. Second, consider the total expected reward of the *best fixed arm*, denote it  $OPT_{FA}$ . It is a traditional benchmark in multi-armed bandits, but is uninteresting for Adversarial BwK. We show that the competitive ratio is at least  $\Omega(K)$  in the worst case, and this is matched, in expectation and up to a constant factor, by a trivial algorithm that samples one arm at random and sticks with it forever.

For Stochastic BwK, these three benchmarks are related as follows. The best fixed distribution is still the main object of interest in the analysis. However, all results – both ours and prior work – are almost automatically extended to compete against the best dynamic policy. The best fixed arm is a much weaker benchmark than the best fixed distribution: there are simple examples when their expected reward differs by a factor of two, in multiple special cases of interest (Badanidiyuru et al., 2018).

### 2 Related work

The literature on regret-minimizing online learning is vast; see Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006); Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi (2012); Hazan (2015) for background. Most relevant are two algorithms for adversarial rewards/costs: Hedge for full feedback (Freund and Schapire, 1999), and EXP3 for bandit feedback (Auer et al., 2002); both are based on the weighted majority algorithm from (Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994).

Stochastic BwK was introduced and optimally solved in Badanidiyuru et al. (2018). Subsequent work extended these results to soft supply/budget constraints (Agrawal and Devanur, 2014), a more general notion of rewards<sup>4</sup> (Agrawal and Devanur, 2014), combinatorial semi-bandits (Sankararaman and Slivkins, 2018), and contextual bandits (Badanidiyuru et al., 2014; Agrawal et al., 2016; Agrawal and Devanur, 2016). Several special cases with budget/supply constraints were studied previously: dynamic pricing (Besbes and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>The total reward is determined by the time-averaged outcome vector, but can be an arbitrary Lischitz-concave function thereof.

Zeevi, 2009; Babaioff et al., 2015; Besbes and Zeevi, 2012; Wang et al., 2014), dynamic procurement (Badanidiyuru et al., 2012; Singla and Krause, 2013) (a version of dynamic pricing where the algorithm is a buyer rather than a seller), dynamic ad allocation (Slivkins, 2013; Combes et al., 2015), and a version with a single resource and unlimited time (György et al., 2007; Tran-Thanh et al., 2010, 2012; Ding et al., 2013). While all this work is on regret minimization, Guha and Munagala (2007); Gupta et al. (2011) studied closely related Bayesian formulations.

Stochastic BwK was optimally solved using three different algorithms (Badanidiyuru et al., 2018; Agrawal and Devanur, 2014), with extremely technical and delicate analyses. All three algorithms involve inherently 'stochastic' techniques such as "successive elimination" and "optimism under uncertainty", and do not appear to extend to the adversarial version. One of them, PrimalDualBwK from Badanidiyuru et al. (2018), is a primal-dual algorithm superficially similar to ours. Indeed, it decouples into two online learning algorithms: a "primal" algorithm which chooses among arms, and a "dual" algorithm similar to ours, which chooses among resources. However, the two algorithms are not playing a repeated game in any meaningful sense, let alone a zero-sum game. The primal algorithm operates under a much richer input: it takes the entire outcome vector for the chosen arm, as well as the "dual distribution" – the distribution over resources chosen by the dual algorithm. Further, the primal algorithm is very problem-specific: it interprets the dual distribution as a vector of costs over resources, and chooses arms with largest reward-to-cost ratios, estimated using "optimism under uncertainty".

Our approach to using regret minimization in games can be traced to Freund and Schapire (1996, 1999) (see Ch. 6 in Schapire and Freund (2012)), who showed how a repeated zero-sum game played by two agents yields an approximate Nash equilibrium. This approach has been used as a unifying algorithmic framework for several problems: boosting (Freund and Schapire, 1996), linear programs (Arora et al., 2012), maximum flow (Christiano et al., 2011), and convex optimization (Abernethy and Wang, 2017; Wang and Abernethy, 2018). While we use a result with the  $1/\sqrt{t}$  convergence rate for the equilibrium property, recent literature obtains faster convergence for cumulative payoffs (but not for the equilibrium property) under various assumptions (Rakhlin and Sridharan, 2013; Daskalakis et al., 2015; Wei and Luo, 2018).

Repeated Lagrangian games, in conjunction with regret minimization in games, have been used in a series of recent papers (Rogers et al., 2015; Hsu et al., 2016; Roth et al., 2016; Kearns et al., 2018; Agarwal et al., 2017; Roth et al., 2017), as an algorithmic tool to solve convex optimization problems; application domains range from differential privacy to algorithmic fairness to learning from revealed preferences. All these papers deal with deterministic games (*i.e.*, same game matrix in all rounds). Reframing the problem in terms of repeated Lagrangian games is a key technical insight in this work. Most related to our paper are Roth et al. (2016, 2017), where a repeated Lagrangian game is used as a subroutine (the "inner loop") in an online algorithm; the other papers solve an offline problem. We depart from this prior work in several respects. Our main results are for the adversarial version, where the standard machinery does not apply and we provide a very different analysis. For the stochastic version, we use a stochastic game and we deal with some subtleties specific to BwK.

Online packing problems (*e.g.*, Buchbinder and Naor, 2009a,b; Devanur et al., 2011) can be seen as a special case of Adversarial BwK with a much more permissive feedback model: the algorithm observes full feedback (the outcomes for all actions) before choosing an action. Online packing subsumes various *online matching* problems, including the *AdWords problem* (Mehta et al., 2007) motivated by ad allocation (see Mehta, 2013, for a survey). While we derive  $O(\log T)$  competitive ratio against OPT<sub>FD</sub>, online packing admits a similar result against OPT<sub>DP</sub>.

Another related line of work concerns online convex optimization with constraints (Mahdavi et al., 2012, 2013; Chen et al., 2017; Neely and Yu, 2017; Chen and Giannakis, 2018). Their setting differs from ours

in several important respects. First, the action set is a convex subset of  $\mathbb{R}^{K}$  (and the algorithms rely on the power to choose arbitrary actions in this set). In particular, there is no immediate way to handle discrete action sets.<sup>5</sup> Second, convexity/concavity is assumed on the rewards and resource consumption. Third, full feedback is observed for the resource consumption. Moreover, in all papers except Chen and Giannakis (2018) one also observes either full feedback on rewards or the rewards gradient around the chosen action. Fourth, their algorithm only needs to satisfy the budget constraints at the time horizon (whereas in BwK the budget constraints hold for all rounds). Fifth, their fixed-distribution benchmark is weaker than ours: essentially, its time-averaged consumption must be small enough at each round t. Due to these differences, this setting admits sublinear regret for adversarial outcomes (Neely and Yu, 2017). The other papers in this line of work focus on stochastic outcomes.

Logarithmic competitive ratios are quite common in prior work on approximation algorithms and online algorithms. Examples include: set cover (Lovász, 1975; Johnson, 1974), buy-at-bulk network design (Awerbuch and Azar, 1997), sparsest cut (Arora et al., 2009), the dial-a-ride problem (Charikar and Raghavachari, 1998), online k-server (Bansal et al., 2011), online packing/covering (Azar et al., 2016), online set cover (Alon et al., 2003), online network design (Umboh, 2015), and online paging (Fiat et al., 1991).

### 2.1 Simultaneous and independent work

Three related papers have come to our attention after the initial version of our paper has appeared on arxiv.org in Nov'18. At the time, Cardoso et al. (2018); Rangi et al. (2019) have been available as yet unpublished technical reports, and Cardoso et al. (2019) has not yet appeared.

Cardoso et al. (2018) consider online convex optimization with knapsacks: essentially, the problem defined in Section 7.4, but with full feedback. Focusing on the stochastic version, they design an algorithm similar to LagrangeBwK, and derive a regret bound similar to ours, using a similar analysis. They also claim an extension to bandit feedback, without providing any details (such as the precise statement of Lemma 3.1 in terms of the regret property (3.2)).

Rangi et al. (2019) consider Adversarial BwK in the special case when there is only one constrained resource, including time. They attain sublinear regret, *i.e.*, a regret bound that is sublinear in T. They also assume a known lower bound  $c_{\min} > 0$  on realized per-round consumption of each resource, and their regret bound scales as  $1/c_{\min}$ . They also achieve polylog(T) instance-dependent regret for the stochastic version using the same algorithm (matching results from prior work on the stochastic version). BwK with only one constrained resource (including time) is a much easier problem, compared to the general case with multiple resources studied in this paper, in the following sense. First, the single-resource version admits much stronger performance guarantees (polylog(T) vs.  $\sqrt{T}$  regret bounds for Stochastic BwK, and sublinear regret vs. competitive ratio for Adversarial BwK). Second, the optimal all-knowing time-invariant policy is the best fixed arm, rather than the best fixed distribution over arms.

Cardoso et al. (2019) study online learning in repeated adversarial zero-sum games (which is our main technical tool). They obtain a powerful result for arbitrary games: an online learning algorithm which controls both players and guarantees convergence to the Nash equilibrium. They apply their framework to train Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs). Interestingly, they achieve the competitive ratio of 1, despite the adversarial setting. Their algorithm can continue up to round T, with no stopping rule like in BwK; for this reason, their results do not have an immediate bearing on our problem.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Unless there is full feedback, in which case one can use a standard reduction whereby actions in online convex optimization correspond to distributions over actions in a *K*-armed bandit problem.

### **3** Preliminaries

We use bold fonts to represent vectors and matrices. We use standard notation whereby, for a positive integer K, [K] stands for  $\{1, 2, \ldots, K\}$ , and  $\Delta_K$  denotes the set of all probability distributions on [K]. Some of the notation introduced further is summarized in Appendix B.

**Bandits with Knapsacks (BwK).** There are T rounds, K possible actions and d resources, indexed as [T], [K], [d], respectively. In each round  $t \in [T]$ , the algorithm chooses an action  $a_t \in [K]$  and receives an outcome vector  $o_t = (r_t; c_{t,1}, \ldots, c_{t,d}) \in [0, 1]^{d+1}$ , where  $r_t$  is a reward and  $c_{t,i}$  is consumption of each resource  $i \in [d]$ . Each resource i is endowed with budget  $B_i \leq T$ . The game stops early, at some round  $\tau_{alg} < T$ , when/if the total consumption of any resource exceeds its budget. The algorithm's objective is to maximize its total reward. Without loss of generality all budgets are the same:  $B_1 = B_2 = \ldots = B_d = B$ .<sup>6</sup>

The outcome vectors are chosen as follows. In each round t, the adversary chooses the *outcome matrix*  $M_t \in [0, 1]^{K \times (d+1)}$ , where rows correspond to actions. The outcome vector  $o_t$  is defined as the  $a_t$ -th row of this matrix, denoted  $M_t(a_t)$ . Only this row is revealed to the algorithm. The adversary is deterministic and *oblivious*, meaning that the entire sequence  $M_1, \ldots, M_T$  is chosen before round 1. A problem instance of BwK consists of (known) parameters (d, K, T, B), and the (unknown) sequence  $M_1, \ldots, M_T$ .

In the stochastic version of BwK, henceforth termed *Stochastic BwK*, each outcome matrix  $M_t$  is chosen from some fixed but unknown distribution  $\mathcal{D}_{BwK}$  over the outcome matrices. An instance of this problem consists of (known) parameters (d, K, T, B), and the (unknown) distribution  $\mathcal{D}_{BwK}$ .

Following prior work (Badanidiyuru et al., 2018; Agrawal and Devanur, 2014), we assume, w.l.o.g., that one of the resources is a *dummy resource* similar to time; formally, each action consumes B/T units of this resource per round (we only need this for Stochastic BwK). Further, we posit that one of the actions is a *null action*, which lets the algorithm skips a round: it has 0 reward and consumes 0 amount of each resource other than the dummy resource.

**Benchmarks.** Let  $\text{REW}(\text{ALG}) = \sum_{t \in [\tau_{alg}]} r_t$  be the total reward of algorithm ALG in the BwK problem. Our benchmark is the *best fixed distribution*, a distribution over actions which maximizes  $\mathbb{E}[\text{REW}(\cdot)]$  for a particular problem instance. The expected total reward of this distribution is denoted  $OPT_{FD}$ .

For Stochastic BwK, one can compete with the *best dynamic policy*: an algorithm that maximizes  $\mathbb{E}[\mathbb{REW}(\cdot)]$  for a particular problem instance. Essentially, this algorithm knows the latent distribution  $\mathcal{D}_{BwK}$  over outcome matrices. Its expected total reward is denoted  $OPT_{DP}$ .

Adversarial online learning. To state the framework of "regret minimization in games" below, we need to introduce the protocol of *adversarial online learning*, see Figure 1.

**Given:** action set A, payoff range  $[b_{\min}, b_{\max}]$ . In each round  $t \in [T]$ ,

1. the adversary chooses a payoff vector  $f_t \in [b_{\min}, b_{\max}]^K$ ;

2. the algorithm chooses a distribution  $p_t$  over A, without observing  $f_t$ ,

3. algorithm's chosen action  $a_t \in A$  is drawn independently from  $p_t$ ;

4. payoff  $f_t(a_t)$  is received by the algorithm.

### Figure 1: Adversarial online learning

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>To see that this is indeed w.l.o.g., for each resource *i*, divide all per-round consumptions  $c_{t,i}$  by  $B_i/B$ , where  $B := \min_{i \in [d]} B_i$  is the smallest budget. In the modified problem instance, all consumptions still lie in [0, 1], and all the budgets are equal to B.

In this protocol, the adversary can use previously chosen arms to choose the payoff vector  $f_t$ , but not the algorithm's random seed. The distribution  $f_t$  is chosen as a deterministic function of history. (The history at round t consists, for each round s < t, of the chosen action  $a_s$  and the observed feedback in this round.) We focus on two feedback models: *bandit feedback* (no auxiliary feedback) and *full feedback* (the entire payoff vector  $f_t$ ). The version for costs can be defined similarly, by setting the payoffs to be the negative of costs.

We are interested in adversarial online learning algorithms with known upper bounds on regret,

$$R_{\text{AOL}}(T) := \left[ \max_{a \in A} \sum_{t \in [T]} f_t(a) \right] - \left[ \sum_{t \in [T]} f_t(a_t) \right].$$
(3.1)

The benchmark here is the total payoff of the best arm, according to the payoff vectors actually chosen by the adversary. More precisely, we assume high-probability regret bounds of the following form:

$$\forall \delta > 0 \qquad \Pr\left[R_{\text{AOL}}(T) \le (b_{\max} - b_{\min}) R_{\delta}(T)\right] \ge 1 - \delta, \tag{3.2}$$

for some function  $R_{\delta}(\cdot)$ . We will actually use a stronger version implied by (3.2),<sup>7</sup>

$$\forall \delta > 0 \qquad \Pr\left[ \ \forall \tau \in [T] \quad R_{\text{AOL}}(\tau) \le (b_{\text{max}} - b_{\text{min}}) R_{\delta/T}(T) \ \right] \ge 1 - \delta. \tag{3.3}$$

Algorithms EXP3.P (Auer et al., 2002) for bandit feedback, and Hedge (Freund and Schapire, 1997) for full feedback, satisfy (3.2) with, resp.,

$$R_{\delta}(T) = O\left(\sqrt{|A| T \log(T/\delta)}\right) \quad \text{and} \quad R_{\delta}(T) = O\left(\sqrt{T \log(|A|/\delta)}\right). \tag{3.4}$$

**Regret minimization in games.** We build on the framework of *regret minimization in games*. A zero-sum game  $(A_1, A_2, G)$  is a game between two players  $i \in \{1, 2\}$  with action sets  $A_1$  and  $A_2$  and payoff matrix  $G \in \mathbb{R}^{A_1 \times A_2}$ . If each player *i* chooses an action  $a_i \in A_i$ , the outcome is a number  $G(a_1, a_2)$ . Player 1 receives this number as *reward*, and player 2 receives it as *cost*. A *repeated zero-sum game* G with action sets  $A_1$  and  $A_2$ , time horizon T and game matrices  $G_1, \ldots, G_T \in \mathbb{R}^{A_1 \times A_2}$  is a game between two algorithms, ALG<sub>1</sub> and ALG<sub>2</sub>, which proceeds over T rounds such that each round t is a zero-sum game  $(A_1, A_2, G_t)$ . The goal of ALG<sub>1</sub> is to maximize the total reward, and the goal of ALG<sub>2</sub> is to minimize the total cost.

The game  $\mathcal{G}$  is called *stochastic* if the game matrix  $G_t$  in each round t is drawn independently from some fixed distribution. For such games, we are interested in the *expected game*, defined by the expected game matrix  $G = \mathbb{E}[G_t]$ . We can relate the algorithms' performance to the minimax value of G.

**Lemma 3.1.** Consider a stochastic repeated zero-sum game between algorithms  $ALG_1$  and  $ALG_2$ , with payoff range  $[b_{\min}, b_{\max}]$ . Assume that each  $ALG_j$ ,  $j \in \{1, 2\}$  is an algorithm for adversarial online learning, as per Figure 1, which satisfies regret bound (3.2) with  $R_{\delta}(T) = R_{j,\delta}(T)$ .

Let  $\tau$  be some fixed round in the game. For each algorithm  $ALG_j$ ,  $j \in \{1, 2\}$ , let  $A_j$  be its action set, let  $p_{t,j} \in \Delta_{A_j}$  be the distribution chosen in each round t, and let  $\bar{p}_j = \frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t \in [\tau]} p_{t,j}$  be the average play distribution at round  $\tau$ . Let  $v^*$  be the minimax value for the expected game  $G = \mathbb{E}[G_t]$ .

Then for each  $\delta > 0$ , with probability at least  $1 - 2\delta$  it holds that

$$\forall \boldsymbol{p}_{2} \in \Delta_{A_{2}} \quad \bar{\boldsymbol{p}}_{1}^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{G} \, \boldsymbol{p}_{2} \geq v^{*} - \frac{1}{\tau} (b_{\mathrm{max}} - b_{\mathrm{min}}) \left( R_{1,\,\delta/T}(T) + R_{2,\,\delta/T}(T) + 4\sqrt{2T \log(T/\delta)} \right). \tag{3.5}$$

Eq. (3.5) states that the average play of player 1 is approximately optimal against any distribution chosen by player 2.<sup>8</sup> This lemma is well-known for the deterministic case (*i.e.*, when  $G_t = G$  for each round t), and folklore for the stochastic case. We provide a proof in Appendix A.4 for the sake of completeness.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Regret bound (3.3) follows from (3.2) using a simple "zeroing-out" trick: for a given round  $\tau \in [T]$ , the adversary can set all future payoffs to some fixed value  $x \in [b_{\min}, b_{\max}]$ , in which case  $R_{AOL}(\tau) = R_{AOL}(T)$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>If each player j chooses distribution  $p_j \in \Delta_{A_j}$ , and the game matrix is G, then expected reward/cost is  $p_1^T G p_2$ .

### **4** A new algorithm for Stochastic BwK

We present a new algorithm for Stochastic BwK, based on the framework of regret minimization in games. This is a very natural algorithm once the single-shot game is set up, and it allows for a very clean regret analysis. We will also use this algorithm as a subroutine for the adversarial version.

On a high level, we define a stochastic zero-sum game for which a mixed Nash equilibrium corresponds to an optimal solution for a linear relaxation of the original problem. Our algorithm consists of two regretminimizing algorithms playing this game. The framework of regret minimization in games guarantees that the average primal and dual play distributions ( $\bar{p}_1$  and  $\bar{p}_2$  in Lemma 3.1) approximate the mixed Nash equilibrium in the expected game, which correspondingly approximates the optimal solution.

#### 4.1 Linear relaxation and Lagrange functions

We start with a linear relaxation of the problem that all prior work relies on. This relaxation is stated in terms of expected rewards/consumptions, *i.e.*, implicitly, in terms of the expected outcome matrix  $M = \mathbb{E}[M_t]$ . We explicitly formulate the relaxation in terms of M, and this is essential for the subsequent developments. For ease of notation, we write the *a*-th row of M, for each action  $a \in [K]$ , as

$$\boldsymbol{M}(a) = (r^{\boldsymbol{M}}(a); c_1^{\boldsymbol{M}}(a), \ldots, c_d^{\boldsymbol{M}}(a)),$$

so that  $r^{M}(a)$  is the expected reward and  $c_{i}^{M}(a)$  is the expected consumption of each resource *i*.

Essentially, the relaxation assumes that each instantaneous outcome matrix  $M_t$  is equal to the expected outcome matrix  $M = \mathbb{E}[M_t]$ . The relaxation seeks the best distribution over actions, focusing on a single round with budgets rescaled as B/T. This leads to the following linear program (LP):

maximize 
$$\sum_{a \in [K]} X(a) r^{M}(a) \quad \text{such that} \\ \sum_{a \in [K]} X(a) = 1 \\ \forall i \in [d] \quad \sum_{a \in [K]} X(a) c_{i}^{M}(a) \leq B/T \\ \forall a \in [K] \quad 0 \leq X(a) \leq 1. \end{cases}$$
(4.1)

We denote this LP by  $LP_{M,B,T}$ . The solution X is the best fixed distribution over actions, according to the relaxation. The value of this LP, denoted  $OPT_{LP}(M, B, T)$ , is the expected per-round reward of this distribution. It is also the total reward of X in the relaxation, divided by T. We know from Badanidiyuru et al. (2018) that

$$T \cdot \operatorname{OPT}_{LP}(M, B, T) \ge \operatorname{OPT}_{DP} \ge \operatorname{OPT}_{FD},$$

$$(4.2)$$

where  $OPT_{DP}$  and  $OPT_{FD}$  are the total expected rewards of, respectively, the best dynamic policy and the best fixed distribution. In words,  $OPT_{DP}$  is sandwiched between the total expected reward of the best fixed distribution and that of its linear relaxation.

Associated with the linear program  $LP_{M,B,T}$  is the Lagrange function  $\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_{M,B,T}$ . It is a function  $\mathcal{L} : \Delta_K \times \mathbb{R}^d_{>0} \to \mathbb{R}$  defined as

$$\mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{X},\boldsymbol{\lambda}) := \sum_{a \in [K]} X(a) r^{\boldsymbol{M}}(a) + \sum_{i \in [d]} \lambda_i \left[ 1 - \frac{T}{B} \sum_{a \in [K]} X(a) c_i^{\boldsymbol{M}}(a) \right].$$
(4.3)

The values  $\lambda_1, \ldots, \lambda_d$  in Eq. (4.3) are called the *dual variables*, as they correspond to the variables in the dual LP. Lagrange functions are meaningful due to their max-min property (*e.g.*, Theorem D.2.2 in Ben-Tal and Nemirovski (2001)):

$$\min_{\boldsymbol{\lambda} \ge 0} \max_{\boldsymbol{X} \in \Delta_K} \mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{X}, \boldsymbol{\lambda}) = \max_{\boldsymbol{X} \in \Delta_K} \min_{\boldsymbol{\lambda} \ge 0} \mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{X}, \boldsymbol{\lambda}) = OPT_{LP}(\boldsymbol{M}, B, T).$$
(4.4)

This property holds for our setting because  $LP_{M,B,T}$  has at least one feasible solution (namely, one that puts probability one on the null action), and the optimal value of the LP is bounded.

**Remark 4.1.** We use the linear program  $LP_{M,B,T}$  and the associated Lagrange function  $\mathcal{L}_{M,B,T}$  throughout the paper. Both are parameterized by an outcome matrix M, budget B and time horizon T. In particular, we can plug in an arbitrary M, and we heavily use this ability throughout. For the adversarial version, it is essential to plug in parameter  $T_0 \leq T$  instead of the time horizon T. For the analysis of the high-probability result in Adversarial BwK, we use a rescaled budget  $B_0 \leq B$  instead of budget B.

### 4.2 Our algorithm: repeated Lagrangian game

The Lagrange function  $\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_{M,B,T}$  from (4.3) defines the following zero-sum game: the *primal player* chooses an arm *a*, the *dual player* chooses a resource *i*, and the payoff is a number

$$\mathcal{L}(a,i) = r^{M}(a) + 1 - \frac{T}{B} c_{i}^{M}(a).$$
(4.5)

The primal player receives this number as a reward, and the dual player receives it as cost. This game is termed the *Lagrangian game* induced by  $\mathcal{L}_{M,B,T}$ . This game will be crucial throughout the paper.

The Lagrangian game is related to the original linear program as follows:

**Lemma 4.2.** Assume one of the resources is the dummy resource. Consider the linear program  $LP_{M,B,T}$ , for some outcome matrix M. Then the value of this LP equals the minimax value  $v^*$  of the Lagrangian game induced by  $\mathcal{L}_{M,B,T}$ . Further, if  $(\mathbf{X}, \boldsymbol{\lambda})$  is a mixed Nash equilibrium in the Lagrangian game, then  $\mathbf{X}$  is an optimal solution to the LP.

The proof can be found in Appendix A.2. The idea is that because of the special structure of the LP, the second equality in (4.4) also holds when the dual vector  $\lambda$  is restricted to distributions.

Consider a repeated version of the Lagrangian game. Formally, the *repeated Lagrangian game* with parameters  $B_0 \leq B$  and  $T_0 \leq T$  is a repeated zero-sum game between the *primal algorithm* that chooses among arms and the *dual algorithm* that chooses among resources. Each round t of this game is the Lagrangian game induced by the Lagrange function  $\mathcal{L}_t := \mathcal{L}_{M_t, B_0, T_0}$ , where  $M_t$  is the round-t outcome matrix. Note that we use parameters  $B_0, T_0$  instead of budget B and time horizon T.<sup>9</sup>

**Remark 4.3.** Consider repeated Lagrangian game for Stochastic BwK (with  $B_0 = B$  and  $T_0 = T$ ). The payoffs in the expected game are defined by the expected Lagrange function  $\mathcal{L} := \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{L}_t]$ . By linearity,  $\mathcal{L}$  is the Lagrange function for the expected outcome matrix  $M = \mathbb{E}[M_t]$ :

$$\mathcal{L} := \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{L}_t] = \mathcal{L}_{M,B,T}.$$
(4.6)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>These parameters are needed only for the adversarial version. For Stochastic BwK we use  $B_0 = B$  and  $T_0 = T$ .

Our algorithm, called LagrangeBwK, is very simple: it is a repeated Lagrangian game in which the primal algorithm receives bandit feedback, and the dual algorithm receives full feedback.

To set up the notation, let  $a_t$  and  $i_t$  be, respectively, the chosen arm and resource in round t. The payoff is therefore  $\mathcal{L}_t(a_t, i_t)$ . It can be rewritten in terms of the observed outcome vector  $\mathbf{o}_t = (r_t; c_{t,1}, \ldots, c_{t,d})$ (which corresponds to the  $a_t$ -th row of the instantaneous outcome matrix  $\mathbf{M}_t$ ):

$$\mathcal{L}_t(a_t, i_t) = r_t + 1 - \frac{T_0}{B_0} c_{t, i_t} \in \left[ -\frac{T_0}{B_0} + 1, 2 \right].$$
(4.7)

Note that the payoff range is  $[b_{\min}, b_{\max}] = [-\frac{T_0}{B_0} + 1].$ 

With this notation, the pseudocode for LagrangeBwK is summarized in Algorithm 1. The pseudocode is simple and self-contained, without referring to the formalism of repeated games and Lagrangian functions. Note that the algorithm is implementable, in the sense that the outcome vector  $o_t$  revealed in each round t of the BwK problem suffices to generate full feedback for the dual algorithm.

Algorithm 1: Algorithm LagrangeBwK for Stochastic BwK.

input: parameters  $B_0, T_0$ , primal algorithm ALG<sub>1</sub>, dual algorithm ALG<sub>2</sub>. // ALG<sub>1</sub>, ALG<sub>2</sub> are adversarial online learning algorithms // with bandit feedback and full feedback, respectively for round  $t = 1, 2, 3, \ldots$  do

- 1. ALG<sub>1</sub> returns arm  $a_t \in [K]$ , algorithm ALG<sub>2</sub> returns resource  $i_t \in [d]$ .
- 2. arm  $a_t$  is chosen, outcome vector  $o_t = (r_t(a_t); c_{t,1}(a_t), \ldots, c_{t,d}(a_t)) \in [0, 1]^{d+1}$  is observed.
- 3. The payoff  $\mathcal{L}_t(a_t, i_t)$  from (4.7) is reported to ALG<sub>1</sub> as reward, and to ALG<sub>2</sub> as cost.
- 4. The payoff  $\mathcal{L}_t(a_t, i)$  is reported to  $ALG_2$  for each resource  $i \in [d]$ .

### 4.3 **Performance guarantees**

We consider algorithm LagrangeBwK with parameter  $T_0 = T$ . We assume the existence of the dummy resource; this is to ensure that the crucial step, Eq. (4.13), works out even if the algorithm stops at time T, without exhausting any actual resources. We obtain a regret bound that is non-trivial whenever  $B > \Omega(\sqrt{T})$ , and is optimal, up to log factors, in the regime when  $\min(OPT_{DP}, B) > \Omega(T)$ .

**Theorem 4.4.** Consider Stochastic BwK with K arms, d resources, time horizon T, and budget B. Assume that one resource is the dummy resource (with consumption  $\frac{B}{T}$  for each arm). Fix the failure probability parameter  $\delta \in (0, 1)$ . Consider algorithm LagrangeBwK with parameters  $B_0 = B$ ,  $T_0 = T$ .

If EXP3.P and Hedge are used as the primal and the dual algorithms, respectively, then the algorithm achieves the following regret bound, with probability at least  $1 - \delta$ :

$$OPT_{DP} - REW(LagrangeBwK) \le O\left(\frac{T}{B}\sqrt{TK\log(dT/\delta)}\right).$$
 (4.8)

In general, suppose each algorithm  $ALG_j$  satisfies a regret bound (3.2) with  $R_{\delta}(T) = R_{j,\delta}(T)$  and payoff range  $[b_{\min}, b_{\max}] = [-\frac{T}{B} + 1, 2]$ . Then with probability at least  $1 - O(\delta T)$  it holds that

$$OPT_{DP} - REW(LagrangeBwK) \le O\left(\frac{T}{B}\right) \left(R_{1,\delta/T}(T) + R_{2,\delta/T}(T) + \sqrt{T\log(dT/\delta)}\right).$$
(4.9)

**Remark 4.5.** To obtain (4.8) from the "black-box" result (4.9), we use regret bounds in Eq. (3.4).

Remark 4.6. From Badanidiyuru et al. (2018), the optimal regret bound for Stochastic BwK is

$$OPT_{DP} - \mathbb{E}[REW] \le \tilde{O}\left(\sqrt{KOPT_{DP}}\left(1 + \sqrt{OPT_{DP}/B}\right)\right)$$

Thus, the regret bound (4.8) is near-optimal if  $\min(OPT_{DP}, B) > \Omega(T)$ , and non-trivial if  $B > \Omega(\sqrt{T})$ .

We next prove the "black-box" regret bound (4.9). For the sake of analysis, consider a version of the repeated Lagrangian game that continues up to the time horizon T. In what follows, we separate the "easy steps" from what we believe is the crux of the proof.

**Notation.** Let  $X_t$  be the distribution chosen in round t by the primal algorithm ALG<sub>1</sub>. Let  $\overline{X}_{\tau} := \frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t \in [\tau]} X_t$  be the distribution of average play up to round  $\tau$ . Let  $M = \mathbb{E}[M_t]$  be the expected outcome matrix. Let  $r = (r^M(a) : a \in [K])$  be the vector of expected rewards over the actions. Likewise,  $c_i = (c_i^M(a) : a \in [K])$  be the vector of expected consumption of each resource  $i \in [d]$ .

Using Azuma-Hoeffding inequality. Consider the first  $\tau$  rounds, for some  $\tau \in [T]$ . The average reward and resource-*i* consumption over these rounds are close to  $\overline{X}_{\tau} \cdot r$  and  $\overline{X}_{\tau} \cdot c_i$ , respectively, with high probability. Specifically, a simple usage of Azuma-Hoeffding inequality (Lemma A.1) implies that

$$\frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t \in [\tau]} r_t \ge \overline{X}_{\tau} \cdot r - R_0(\tau) / \tau, \qquad (4.10)$$

$$\frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t \in [\tau]} c_{i,t} \le \overline{\boldsymbol{X}}_{\tau} \cdot \boldsymbol{c}_i + R_0(\tau) / \tau, \qquad \forall i \in [d],$$
(4.11)

hold with probability at least  $1 - \delta$ , where  $R_0(\tau) = O(\sqrt{\tau \log(d/\delta)})$ .

**Regret minimization in games.** Let us apply the machinery from regret minimization in games to the repeated Lagrangian game. Consider the game matrix G of the expected game. Using Eq. (4.6) and Lemma 4.2, we conclude that the minimax value of G is  $v^* = OPT_{LP}(M, B, T)$ .

We apply Lemma 3.1, with a fixed stopping time  $\tau \in [T]$ . Recall that the payoff range is  $b_{\text{max}} - b_{\text{min}} = \frac{T}{B} + 1$ . Thus, with probability at least  $1 - 2\delta$  it holds that

$$\boldsymbol{\lambda} \in \Delta_d: \quad \overline{\boldsymbol{X}}_{\tau}^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{G} \boldsymbol{\lambda} \ge v^* - \frac{1}{\tau} (\frac{T}{B} + 1) \cdot \operatorname{reg}(T), \tag{4.12}$$

where the regret term is  $\operatorname{reg}(T) := R_{1,\delta/T}(T) + R_{2,\delta/T}(T) + 4\sqrt{2T\log(T/\delta)}.$ 

**Crux of the proof.** Let us condition on the event that (4.10), (4.11), and (4.12) hold for each  $\tau \in [T]$ . By the union bound, this event holds with probability at least  $1 - 3\delta T$ .

Let  $\tau$  denote the *stopping time* of the algorithm, the first round when the total consumption of some resource exceeds its budget. Let *i* be the resource for which this happens; hence,

$$\sum_{t \in [\tau]} c_{i,t} > B. \tag{4.13}$$

Let us use Eq. (4.12) with  $\lambda = \lambda^{(i)}$ , the point distribution for this resource. Then

$$\overline{\mathbf{X}}_{\tau}^{\mathrm{T}} \mathbf{G} \boldsymbol{\lambda}^{(i)} = \mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{M},B,T}(\overline{\mathbf{X}}_{\tau}, \boldsymbol{\lambda}^{(i)}) \qquad (by \ Eq. \ (4.6))$$

$$= \overline{\mathbf{X}}_{\tau} \cdot \mathbf{r} + 1 - \frac{T}{B} \ \overline{\mathbf{X}}_{\tau} \cdot \mathbf{c}_{i} \qquad (by \ definition \ of \ Lagrange \ function)$$

$$\leq \frac{1}{\tau} \left( \left( \sum_{t \in [\tau]} r_{t} \right) - \left( \frac{T}{B} \sum_{t \in [\tau]} c_{i,t} \right) + \tau + (1 + \frac{T}{B}) R_{0}(\tau) \right) \qquad (plugging \ in \ (4.10) \ and \ (4.11))$$

$$\leq \frac{1}{\tau} \left( \left( \sum_{t \in [\tau]} r_{t} \right) + \tau - T + (1 + \frac{T}{B}) R_{0}(\tau) \right). \qquad (plugging \ in \ Eq. \ (4.13))$$

Plugging this into Eq. (4.12) and rearranging, we obtain

$$\sum_{t \in [\tau]} r_t \ge \tau \, v^* + T - \tau - (1 + \frac{T}{B}) \cdot \operatorname{reg}(T) - (1 + \frac{T}{B}) \, R_0(\tau).$$

Since  $v^* \leq 1$  (because  $v^* = OPT_{LP}$ , as we've proved above),

$$\operatorname{REW}(\operatorname{LagrangeBwK}) = \sum_{t \in [\tau]} r_t \ge T v^* - (1 + \frac{T}{B}) \cdot \operatorname{reg}(T) - (1 + \frac{T}{B}) R_0(\tau).$$

The claimed regret bound (4.9) follows by Eq. (4.2), completing the proof of Theorem 4.4.

### 5 A simple algorithm for Adversarial BwK

We present and analyze an algorithm for Adversarial BwK which achieves  $d \cdot \log T$  competitive ratio, in expectation, up to a low-order additive term. Our algorithm is very simple: we randomly guess the value of OPT<sub>FD</sub> and run LagrangeBwK with parameter  $T_0$  driven by this guess. The analysis is very different, however, since we cannot rely on the machinery from regret minimization in stochastic games. The crux of the analysis (Lemma 5.8) is re-used to analyze the high-probability algorithm in the next section.

In hindsight, the intuition for our algorithm can be explained as follows. Since LagrangeBwK builds on adversarial online learning algorithms  $ALG_j$ , it appears plausibly applicable to Adversarial BwK. We analyze it for an arbitrary parameter  $T_0$ , and find that it performs best when  $T_0$  is tailored to  $OPT_{FD}$  up to a constant multiplicative factor. This is precisely what our algorithm achieves using the random guess.

Our algorithm is presented as Algorithm 2. We guess the value of OPT<sub>FD</sub> within a given range  $[g_{\min}, g_{\max}]$ . We guess OPT<sub>FD</sub> uniformly on the "exponential scale": we draw the exponent u uniformly at random, and define the guess as  $\hat{g} = g_{\min} \cdot \kappa^u$ , for some scale parameter  $\kappa > 1$ .<sup>10</sup> We call LagrangeBwK with  $T_0 = \hat{g}/(d+1)$ . Our analysis works as long as OPT<sub>FD</sub>  $\leq g_{\max}$ , with  $g_{\min}$  appearing in the additive term.

**Theorem 5.1.** Consider Adversarial BwK with K arms, d resources, time horizon T, and budget B. Assume that one of the arms is a null arm that has zero reward and zero resource consumption. Consider Algorithm 2 with scale parameter  $\kappa > 1$ . Suppose algorithms  $ALG_j$  that satisfy the regret bound (3.2) with  $\delta = T^{-2}$  and regret term  $R_{\delta}(T) = R_{j,\delta}(T)$ , for any known payoff range  $[b_{\min}, b_{\max}]$ .

(a) If  $OPT_{FD} \leq g_{max}$  then the expected reward of Algorithm 2 satisfies

$$\mathbb{E}[REW] \ge \frac{OPT_{FD} - g_{\min}}{(d+1) \ln\left(\frac{g_{\max}}{g_{\min}}\right)} - reg - 1,$$
(5.1)

where  $\operatorname{reg} = (1 + \frac{\operatorname{OPT_{FD}}}{dB}) \left( R_{1, \delta/T}(T) + R_{2, \delta/T}(T) \right).$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Somewhat surprisingly, our results do not depend on the value  $\kappa$ . This is because the dependence on  $\kappa$  is captured via a normalized integral  $\ln \kappa \cdot \int_0^{\log_{\kappa} x} \kappa^u du$ , and this expression does not depend on  $\kappa$ .

(b) In particular, taking  $[g_{\min}, g_{\max}] = [\sqrt{T}, T]$ , we obtain

$$\mathbb{E}[\operatorname{REW}] \ge \frac{\operatorname{OPT_{FD}} - \sqrt{T}}{\frac{1}{2}(d+1)\,\ln(T)} - \operatorname{reg} - 1.$$
(5.2)

**Remark 5.2.** One can use algorithms EXP3.P for ALG<sub>1</sub> and Hedge for ALG<sub>2</sub>, with regret bounds given by (3.4), and achieve the regret term  $reg = O\left(1 + \frac{OPT_{FD}}{dB}\right) \sqrt{TK \log(Td/\delta)}$ . We obtain a meaningful performance guarantee as long as, say,  $reg < OPT_{FD}/2$ ; this requires  $OPT_{FD}$  and B to be at least  $\widetilde{\Omega}(\sqrt{TK})$ .

**Remark 5.3.** We define the outcome matrices slightly differently compared to Section 4 in that we do not posit a dummy resource. Formally, we assume that the null arm has zero consumption in every resource. This is essential for case 1 (i.e., when  $\tau_{alg} \leq \sigma$ ) in the analysis of Lemma 5.8.

**Remark 5.4.** The  $\log(T)$  appears in the competitive ratio because the algorithm needs to guess  $OPT_{FD}$  up to a constant factor. The factor of d can be traced to a pessimistic over-estimate in (5.12).

**Remark 5.5.** The algorithm simplifies when d = 1, i.e., if there is only one resource other than the dummy resource. Then the outcome matrices have only one resource, so the dual algorithm  $ALG_2$  is no longer needed.

**Remark 5.6.** The problem can be reduced to the case d = 1, which simplifies the algorithm, as per Remark 5.5, but increases the competitive ratio. The reduction is very simple: replacing all "true resources" (i.e., all resources other than the dummy resource) with the "maximal resource" whose consumption is the maximum over the true resources. The competitive ratio, i.e., the denominator in Eq. (5.1), increases by the factor of  $\frac{2d}{d+1}$ . Moreover, the reduction can be wasteful if the maximal consumption (across all resources) is much larger than a "typical" consumption of each resource. The analysis compares algorithm's reward to the benchmark for the "fake problem" with d = 1, then compares the said benchmark to  $OPT_{FD}$ . The former step is essentially the analysis in Section 5.1, albeit in a slightly simpler form. We omit the easy details.

If a problem instance of Adversarial BwK is actually an instance of adversarial bandits, then we recover the optimal  $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{KT})$  regret. (This easily follows by examining the proof of Lemma 5.8.)

**Lemma 5.7.** Consider LagrangeBwK, with algorithms EXP3.P for ALG<sub>1</sub> and Hedge for ALG<sub>2</sub>, for an instance of Adversarial BwK with zero resource consumption. This algorithm obtains  $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{KT})$  regret, for any parameters  $B_0, T_0 > 0$ . Accordingly, so does Algorithm 2 with any scale parameter  $\kappa > 0$ .

#### 5.1 Analysis: proof of Theorem 5.1 and Lemma 5.7

**Stopped linear program.** Let us set up a linear relaxation that is suitable to the adversarial setting. The expected outcome matrix is no longer available. Instead, we use *average* outcome matrices:

$$\overline{M}_{\tau} = \frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t \in [\tau]} M_t, \tag{5.3}$$

the average up to a given intermediate round  $\tau \in [T]$ . Similar to the stochastic case, the relaxation assumes that each instantaneous outcome matrix  $M_t$  is equal to the average outcome matrix  $\overline{M}_{\tau}$ . What is different now is that the relaxation depends on  $\tau$ : using  $\overline{M}_{\tau}$  is tantamount to stopping precisely at this round.

With this intuition in mind, for a particular end-time  $\tau$  we consider the linear program (4.1), parameterized by the time horizon  $\tau$  and the average outcome matrix  $\overline{M}_{\tau}$ . Its value,  $OPT_{LP}(\overline{M}_{\tau}, B, \tau)$ , represents the per-round expected reward, so it needs to be scaled by the factor of  $\tau$  to obtain the total expected reward. Finally, we maximize over  $\tau$ . Thus, our linear relaxation for Adversarial BwK is defined as follows:

$$OPT_{LP}^{[T]} := \max_{\tau \in [T]} \tau \cdot OPT_{LP}(\overline{M}_{\tau}, B, \tau) \ge OPT_{FD}.$$
(5.4)

The inequality in (5.4) is proved in the appendix (Section A.3).

**Regret bounds for ALG**<sub>j</sub>. Since each algorithm  $ALG_j$ ,  $j \in \{1, 2\}$  satisfies regret bound (3.2) with  $\delta = T^{-2}$ and  $R_{\delta}(T) = R_{j,\delta}(T)$ , it also satisfies a stronger version (3.3) with the same parameters. Recall from (4.7) that the payoff range is  $[b_{\min}, b_{\max}] = [-\frac{T_0}{B} + 1, 2]$ . For succinctness, let  $U_j(T|T_0) = (1 + \frac{T_0}{B}) R_{j,\delta/T}(T)$  denote the respective regret term in (3.3).

Let us apply these regret bounds to our setting. Let  $a_t \in [K]$  and  $i_t \in [d]$  be, resp., the chosen arm and resource in round t. We represent the outcomes as vectors over arms:  $r_t, c_{t,i} \in [0, 1]^K$  denote, resp., reward vector and resource-*i* consumption vector for a given round t. Recall that the round-t payoffs in LagrangeBwK are given by the Lagrange function  $\mathcal{L}_t := \mathcal{L}_{M_t,B,T_0}$  such that

$$\mathcal{L}_t(a,i) = r_t(a) + 1 - \frac{T_0}{B} c_{t,i}(a)$$
(5.5)

for each arm a and resource i. Consider the total Lagrangian payoff at a given round  $\tau \in [T]$ :

$$\sum_{t \in [\tau]} \mathcal{L}_t(a_t, i_t) = \operatorname{REW}_{\tau} + \tau - W_{\tau}, \tag{5.6}$$

where  $\text{REW}_{\tau} = \sum_{t \in [\tau]} r_t(a_t)$  is the total reward up to round  $\tau$ , and  $W_{\tau} = \frac{T_0}{B} \sum_{t \in [\tau]} c_{t,i_t}(a_t)$  is the consumption term. The regret bounds sandwich (5.6) from above and below:

$$\left(\max_{a\in[K]}\sum_{t\in[\tau]}\mathcal{L}_t(a,i_t)\right) - U_1(T|T_0) \le \mathbb{REW}_\tau + \tau - W_\tau \le \left(\min_{i\in[d]}\sum_{t\in[\tau]}\mathcal{L}_t(a_t,i)\right) + U_2(T|T_0).$$
(5.7)

This holds for all  $\tau \in [T]$ , with probability at least  $1 - 2\delta$ . The first inequality in (5.7) is due to the primal algorithm, and the second is due to the dual algorithm. Call them *primal* and *dual* inequality, respectively.

**Crux of the proof.** We condition on the event that (5.7) holds for all  $\tau \in [T]$ , which we call the *clean event*. The crux of the analysis is encapsulated in the following lemma, which analyzes an execution of LagrangeBwK with an arbitrary parameter  $T_0$  under the clean event.

**Lemma 5.8.** Consider an execution of LagrangeBwK with  $B_0 = B$  and an arbitrary parameter  $T_0$  such that the clean event holds. Fix an arbitrary round  $\sigma \in [T]$ , and consider the LP value relative to this round:

$$f(\sigma) := OPT_{LP}(\overline{M}_{\sigma}, B, \sigma).$$
(5.8)

The algorithm's reward up to round  $\sigma$  satisfies

$$REW_{\sigma} \ge \min(T_0, \, \sigma \cdot f(\sigma) - dT_0) - \left( \, U_1(T|T_0) + U_2(T|T_0) \, \right). \tag{5.9}$$

Taking  $\sigma$  to be the maximizer in (5.4), algorithm's reward satisfies

$$REW \ge \min(T_0, OPT_{FD} - dT_0) - (U_1(T|T_0) + U_2(T|T_0)).$$
(5.10)

Eq. (5.9) is used, with a different  $\sigma$ , for the high-probability analysis in Section 6.

*Proof.* Let  $\tau_{alg}$  be the stopping time of the algorithm. We consider two cases, depending on whether some resource is exhausted at time  $\sigma$ . In both cases, we focus on the round  $\min(\tau_{alg}, \sigma)$ .

**Case 1:**  $\tau_{alg} \leq \sigma$  and some resource is exhausted. Let us focus on round  $\tau = \tau_{alg}$ . If *i* is the exhausted resource, then  $\sum_{t \in [\tau]} c_{t,i}(a_t) > B$ . Let us apply the dual inequality in (5.7) for this resource:

$$\begin{aligned} \operatorname{REW}_{\tau} + \tau - W_{\tau} - U_2(T|T_0) &\leq \sum_{t \in [\tau]} \mathcal{L}_t(a_t, i) \\ &= \operatorname{REW}_{\tau} + \tau - \frac{T_0}{B} \sum_{t \in [\tau]} c_{t,i}(a_t) \\ &\leq \operatorname{REW}_{\tau} + \tau - T_0. \end{aligned}$$

It follows that  $W_{\tau} \geq T_0 - U_2(T|T_0)$ .

Now, let us apply the primal inequality in (5.7) for the null arm. Recall that the reward and consumption for this arm is 0, so  $\mathcal{L}_t(\text{null}, i_t) = 1$  for each round t. Therefore,

$$\operatorname{REW}_{\tau} + \tau - W_{\tau} + U_1(T|T_0) \ge \sum_{t \in [\tau]} \mathcal{L}_t(\operatorname{null}, i_t) = \tau.$$

We conclude that  $\text{REW}_{\tau} \ge W_{\tau} - U_1(T|T_0) \ge T_0 - U_1(T|T_0) - U_2(T|T_0).$ 

**Case 2:**  $\tau_{\text{alg}} \geq \sigma$ . Let us focus on round  $\sigma$ . Consider the linear program  $LP_{\overline{M}_{\sigma},B,\sigma}$ , and let  $X^* \in \Delta_K$  be an optimal solution to this LP. The primal inequality in (5.7) implies that

$$\operatorname{REW}_{\sigma} + \sigma - W_{\sigma} + U_{1}(\sigma) \geq \max_{a \in [K]} \sum_{t \in [\sigma]} \mathcal{L}_{t}(a, i_{t})$$

$$\geq \sum_{t \in [\sigma]} \sum_{a \in [K]} X^{*}(a) \mathcal{L}_{t}(a, i_{t})$$

$$= \sigma + \sum_{t \in [\sigma]} X^{*} \cdot r_{t} - \frac{T_{0}}{B} \sum_{t \in [\sigma]} X^{*} \cdot c_{t,i_{t}}$$

$$\operatorname{REW}_{\sigma} \geq \sigma \cdot f(\sigma) - \frac{T_{0}}{B} \sum_{t \in [\sigma]} X^{*} \cdot c_{t,i_{t}} - U_{1}(T|T_{0}). \tag{5.11}$$

In the last inequality we used the fact that  $\sum_{t \in [\sigma]} X^* \cdot r_t = \sigma \cdot f(\sigma)$  by optimality of  $X^*$ .

 $\sum_{t \in [\sigma]} X^* \cdot c_{t,i} \leq B$  for each resource *i*, since  $X^*$  is a feasible solution for  $OPT_{LP}(\overline{M}_{\sigma}, B, \sigma)$ . Then,

$$\sum_{t \in [\sigma]} \mathbf{X}^* \cdot \mathbf{c}_{t,i_t} \leq \sum_{i \in [d]} \sum_{t \in [\sigma]} \mathbf{X}^* \cdot \mathbf{c}_{t,i} \leq dB.$$
(5.12)

Plugging (5.12) into (5.11), we conclude that  $\text{REW}_{\sigma} \ge \sigma \cdot f(\sigma) - dT_0 - U_1(T|T_0)$ .

Conclusions from the two cases imply (5.10), as claimed.

Wrapping up (the easy version).  $OPT_{FD} \in [g_{\min}, g_{\max}]$ , then some guess  $\hat{g}$  is approximately correct:

$$OPT_{FD}/\kappa \le \widehat{g} \le OPT_{FD}.$$
 (5.13)

By Lemma 5.8, the algorithm's execution with this guess, assuming the clean event, satisfies (5.10), where, recalling that  $T_0 = \hat{g}/(d+1)$ , we have

$$\min(T_0, \operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{FD}} - dT_0) \geq \frac{\operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{FD}}}{\kappa(d+1)} \quad \text{and} \quad T_0 \leq \frac{\operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{FD}}}{d+1}.$$

The regret term for this guess is

$$\operatorname{reg} = U_1(T|T_0) + U_2(T|T_0) \le \left(1 + \frac{\operatorname{OPT_{FD}}}{(d+1)B}\right) \left(R_{1,\,\delta/T}(T) + R_{2,\,\delta/T}(T)\right).$$

To complete the proof of (5.1) (with a much larger constant in the denominator), note that we obtain a suitable guess  $\widehat{g}$  with probability  $1 / \left[ \log_{\kappa} \frac{g_{\max}}{g_{\min}} \right]$ .

Wrapping up (optimizing the constants). Let us go beyond the "approximately right guess" in (5.13), and account for contributions of *every* guess. In other words, let us integrate over the guesses.

Assume that OPT<sub>FD</sub> lies in the guess range  $[g_{\min}, g_{\max}]$ . Recall that the algorithm samples u uniformly at random from the interval  $[0, u_{\text{max}}]$ . Write

$$\begin{split} T_0 &= T_0(u) = g_{\min} \cdot \kappa^u / (d+1), \\ \text{reg} &= \text{reg}(u) = U_1(T | T_0(u)) + U_2(T | T_0(u)), \\ \Lambda(u) &= \min(T_0(u), \max(0, \text{OPT}_{\text{FD}} - dT_0(u))). \end{split}$$

Then by Lemma 5.8, for a particular choice of u, the algorithm's reward satisfies

$$\mathbb{E}[\text{REW} \mid u] \ge \Lambda(u) - \operatorname{reg}(u) - 1, \tag{5.14}$$

where the '-1' term accounts for the complement of the "clean event".

The  $\Lambda(u)$  term can be split into three cases as follows:

$$\Lambda(u) = \begin{cases} T_0(u) & \text{if } 0 \le u \le \log_{\kappa} \frac{OPT_{FD}}{g_{\min}}, \\ OPT_{FD} - dT_0(u) & \text{if } \log_{\kappa} \frac{OPT_{FD}}{g_{\min}} < u \le \log_{\kappa} \left( \frac{d+1}{d} \cdot \frac{OPT_{FD}}{g_{\min}} \right), \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$
(5.15)

So, we are only interested in  $u \le u^* := \log_{\kappa} \left( \frac{OPT_{FD}}{g_{\min}} \right)$ . Integrating the right-hand side of (5.14) over u, we obtain:

$$\mathbb{E}[\text{REW}] \ge \frac{1}{u_{\max}} \int_0^{u^*} \mathbb{E}[\text{REW} \mid u] \, \mathrm{d}u = \frac{1}{u_{\max}} \int_0^{u^*} \left(\Lambda(u) - \operatorname{reg}(u) - 1\right) \, \mathrm{d}u, \tag{5.16}$$

where  $u_{\max} = \log_{\kappa} \frac{g_{\max}}{g_{\min}}$  as per the algorithm's specification. Using (5.15) and omitting the easy details, the main term  $\Lambda(u)$  integrates as follows:

$$\int_0^{u^*} \Lambda(u) \,\mathrm{d}u \ge \frac{\operatorname{OPT}_{\mathrm{FD}} - g_{\min}}{(\ln \kappa)(d+1)}.$$
(5.17)

(We've only used the first "regime" in (5.15). As for the second "regime" in (5.15), integrating over it only improves (5.17) by a small additive term.)

To handle the regret term reg(u), note that it is non-decreasing with u, so

$$\frac{1}{u_{\max}} \int_0^{u^*} \operatorname{reg}(u) \, \mathrm{d}u \le \frac{u^* \cdot \operatorname{reg}(u^*)}{u_{\max}} \le \operatorname{reg}(u^*).$$

Plugging this into (5.16), we obtain

$$\mathbb{E}[\text{REW}] \ge \frac{1}{u_{\max}} \left( \frac{\text{OPT}_{\text{FD}} - g_{\min}}{(\ln \kappa)(d+1)} \right) - \text{reg}(u^*) - 1.$$
(5.18)

Recalling that  $T_0 = T_0(u^*) = OPT_{FD}/(d+1)$ , we have

$$\operatorname{reg}(u^*) = U_1(T|T_0) + U_2(T|T_0) \le \left(1 + \frac{\operatorname{OPT_{FD}}}{(d+1)B}\right) \left(R_{1,\delta/T}(T) + R_{2,\delta/T}(T)\right) + C_{1,\delta/T}(T) + C_{2,\delta/T}(T) + C_{2$$

Finally, because of the  $-g_{\min}$  term in (5.18), the assumption  $OPT_{FD} \ge g_{\min}$  is redundant. This completes the proof of Theorem 5.1(a).

**Proof Sketch of Lemma 5.7.** Recall that in the adversarial bandit setting we have  $c_{i,t} = 0$  for every  $i \in [d]$  and every  $t \in [T]$ . We re-analyze Lemma 5.8 with  $\sigma = T$ . Notice that case 1 never occurs. Thus we obtain obtain Eq. (5.11) in case 2. Note that  $\frac{T_0}{B} \sum_{t \in [\sigma]} X^* \cdot c_{t,i_t} = 0$  since  $c_{i,t} = 0$ . Therefore, we obtain

$$\operatorname{REW}_T \ge T \cdot f(T) - U_1(T|T_0).$$

We now argue that  $T \cdot f(T) = \max_{a \in [K]} \sum_{t \in [T]} r_t(a)$ . Let  $X^*$  be the optimal distribution over the arms. Thus  $\sum_{t \in [T]} X^* \cdot r_t = T \cdot f(T)$ . Note that since  $c_{i,t} = 0$  the only constraint on  $X^*$  is that it lies in  $\Delta_K$ . Therefore the maximizer is a point distribution on  $\max_{a \in [K]} \sum_{t \in [T]} r_t(a)$ . This proof does not rely on any specific value for  $B_0, T_0$ . The payoff range is  $[b_{\max}, b_{\min}] = [1, 2]$ , so  $U_1(T|T_0) = \tilde{O}(\sqrt{KT})$ .

### 6 High-probability algorithm for Adversarial BwK

We recover the  $O(d \log T)$  competitive ratio for Adversarial BwK, but with high probability rather than merely in expectation. Our algorithm uses LagrangeBwK as a subroutine, and re-uses the adversarial analysis thereof (Lemma 5.8). We do not optimize the regret term or the constant in the competitive ratio.

The algorithm is considerably more complicated compared to Algorithm 2. Instead of making one random guess  $\hat{g}$  for the value of  $OPT_{LP}^{[T]}$ , we iteratively refine this guess over time. The algorithm proceeds in phases. In the beginning of each phase, we start a fresh instance of LagrangeBwK with parameter  $T_0$  defined by the current value of  $\hat{g}$ .<sup>11</sup> We update the guess  $\hat{g}$  in each round (in a way specified later), and stop the phase once  $\hat{g}$  becomes too large compared to its initial value in this phase. We invoke LagrangeBwK with a rescaled budget  $B_0 = B/\Theta (\log T)$ . Within each phase, we simulate the BwK problem with budget  $B_0$ : we stop LagrangeBwK once the consumption of some resource in this phase exceeds  $B_0$ . For the remainder of the phase, we play the null arm with probability  $1 - \gamma_0$  and do uniform exploration with the remaining probability, for some parameter  $\gamma_0 \in (0, 1)$  (here and elsewhere, *uniform exploration* refers to choosing each action with equal probability). The pseudocode is summarized in Algorithm 3.

To complete algorithm's specification, let us define how to update the guess  $\hat{g}$  in each round t. The guess, denoted  $\hat{g}_t$ , is an estimate for  $OPT_{LP}^{[t]}$ , -as defined in (5.4). We form this estimate using a standard *inverse* propensity scoring (IPS) technique. Let  $p_t$  and  $a_t$  be, resp., the distribution and the arm chosen by the primal algorithm in round t. The instantaneous outcome matrix  $M_t$  is estimated by matrix  $M_t^{ips} \in [0, \infty)^{K \times d}$  such that each row  $M_t^{ips}(a)$  is defined as follows:

$$\boldsymbol{M}_{t}^{\text{ips}}(a) := \mathbf{1}_{\{a_{t}=a\}} \; \frac{1}{p_{t}(a_{t})} \; \boldsymbol{M}_{t}(a). \tag{6.1}$$

For a given end-time  $\tau$ , the average outcome matrix  $\overline{M}_{\tau}$  from (5.3) is estimated as

$$\overline{\boldsymbol{M}}_{\tau}^{\text{ips}} := \frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t \in [\tau]} \boldsymbol{M}_{t}^{\text{ips}}.$$
(6.2)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>The idea of restarting the algorithm in each phase is similar to the standard "doubling trick" in the online machine learning literature, but much more delicate in our setting.

Algorithm 3: High-probability algorithm for Adversarial BwK.

**input:** scale parameter  $\kappa$ , exploration parameter  $\gamma_0$ , primal algorithm ALG<sub>1</sub>, dual algorithm ALG<sub>2</sub> // ALG1, ALG2 are adversarial online learning algorithms with bandit feedback and full feedback, resp. 11 Initialize  $\hat{q} = 1$ . for each phase do Start a fresh instance ALG of LagrangeBwK with parameters  $B_0 = B/2\lceil \log_{\kappa} T \rceil$  and  $T_0 = \hat{g}/(3d\lceil \log_{\kappa} T \rceil)$ . Define  $\widehat{g}_{old} := \widehat{g}$ . for each round in this phase do Recompute the guess  $\hat{g}$ if  $\widehat{g} > \kappa \cdot \widehat{g}_{\text{old}}$  then start a new phase if consumption of all resources in this phase does not exceed  $B_0$  then Play the action chosen by ALG, observe the outcome and report it back to ALG. else Choose the null arm with probability  $1 - \gamma_0$ , do uniform exploration otherwise

Finally, we plug this estimate into (5.3) and define

$$\widehat{g}_t := \max_{\tau \in [t]} \tau \cdot \operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{LP}}(\overline{\boldsymbol{M}}_{\tau}^{\operatorname{1ps}}, B, \tau).$$
(6.3)

For the analysis, we will assume that the primal algorithm does some uniform exploration:

$$p_t(a) \ge \gamma > 0$$
 for each arm  $a \in [K]$  and each round  $t \in [T]$ . (6.4)

**Theorem 6.1.** Consider Adversarial BwK with K arms, d resources, time horizon T, and budget B. Let  $\delta > 0$  be the failure probability parameter. Assume that  $B > 5KT^{3/4}\log(2T^2)$ . Suppose that one of the arms is a null arm that has zero reward and zero resource consumption.

Consider Algorithm 3 with parameters  $\kappa = 2$  and  $\gamma_0 = T^{-1/4}$ . Assume that each algorithm  $ALG_j$ ,  $j \in \{1, 2\}$ , satisfies the regret bound (3.2) with payoff range  $[b_{\min}, b_{\max}] = [-\frac{T}{B} + 1, 2]$  and regret term  $R_{\delta}(T) = R_{j,\delta}(T)$ . Assume that the primal algorithm  $ALG_1$  satisfies (6.4) with parameter  $\gamma \ge T^{-1/4}$ .

Then the total reward REW collected by Algorithm 3 satisfies

$$\Pr\left[\operatorname{REW} \ge \frac{OPT_{FD}}{O(d\log T)} - O(\operatorname{reg})\right] \ge 1 - O(\delta T), \tag{6.5}$$

where the regret term is  $\operatorname{reg} = \frac{T}{B} \left( K T^{3/4} \log^{1/2}(\frac{1}{\delta}) + R_{1,\delta/T}(T) + R_{2,\delta/T}(T) \right).$ 

**Remark 6.2.** Using algorithms EXP3.P for  $ALG_1$  and Hedge for  $ALG_2$ , we can achieve (6.5) with

$$reg = O\left(\frac{TK}{B}\right) T^{3/4} \sqrt{\log(T/\delta)}.$$

This is because EXP3.P, with appropriately modified uniform exploration term  $\gamma = T^{-1/4}$ , satisfies the regret bound (3.2) with  $R_{\delta}(\tau) = O(T^{3/4})\sqrt{K\log\frac{T}{\delta}}$ , and for Hedge we can (still) use Eq. (3.4). The theorem is meaningful whenever, say,  $reg < OPT_{FD}/2$ . The latter requires  $OPT_{FD} \cdot \frac{B}{K} > \widetilde{\Omega}(T^{7/4})$ .

**Remark 6.3.** Like in Theorem 5.1, we posit that the null arm does not consume any resources.

**Remark 6.4.** For the sake of intuition, let us clarify the choice of parameters  $B_0$  and  $T_0$  in the algorithm. First,  $\lceil \log_{\kappa} T \rceil$  appears in both  $B_0$  and  $T_0$ , because it is an upper bound on the number of phases. Second, d is needed in  $T_0$  to counteract the dependence on d in Lemma 5.8, the adversarial analysis of LagrangeBwK. Third, the  $\frac{1}{2}$  appears in  $B_0$  because we allow half of the budget to be spent on uniform exploration. Finally, the  $\frac{1}{3}$  in  $T_0$  is needed to enable a specific step deep down in the analysis, the transition from Eq. (6.17) to Eq. (6.19).

*Proof Sketch of Theorem 6.1.* The proof consists of several steps. First, we argue that the guess  $\hat{g}_t$  is close to  $OPT_{LP}^{[t]}$  with high probability. This argument only relies on the uniform exploration property (6.3) and the definition of IPS estimators, not on any properties of the algorithm. We immediately obtain concentration for the average outcome matrices. With some work, we derive concentration on the respective LP-values.

Next, we focus on a particular phase in the execution of the algorithm. We say that a phase is *full* if the stopping condition  $\hat{g}_t > \kappa \cdot \hat{g}_{old}$  has fired. We focus on the last full phase. We prove there is enough reward to be collected in this phase. Essentially, letting  $\tau_1, \tau_2$  be, resp., the start and end time of this phase, we consider the BwK problem restricted to time interval  $[\tau_1, \tau_2]$ , and lower-bound the LP-value of this problem in terms of the LP-value of the original problem. Finally, we use the adversarial analysis of LagrangeBwK (Lemma 5.8) to guarantee that our algorithm actually collects that value.

Because of the stopping condition  $\hat{g}_t > \kappa \cdot \hat{g}_{old}$ , there can be at most  $\lceil \log_{\kappa} T \rceil$  phases. Therefore, rescaling the budget to  $B_0/2\lceil \log_{\kappa} T \rceil$  guarantees that the algorithm consumes at most B/2 of the budget. We then argue that, with high-probability, the additional uniform exploration in each phase, consumes a budget of at most B/2 with high-probability. Thus, the algorithm never runs out of budget.

### 6.1 Full proof of Theorem 6.1

We now describe the full proof of Theorem 6.1, following the plan outlined in the proof sketch. We decompose the analysis into several distinct pieces, present them one by one, and then show how to put them together. Each piece is presented as a lemma, with appropriate notation and intuition.

For clarity, most of the analysis is presented for an arbitrary parameter  $\kappa > 1$  in the algorithm, as long as it is an absolute constant, and an arbitrary parameter  $\gamma$  in Eq. (6.4). We only plug in  $\kappa = 2$  and  $\gamma \ge T^{-1/4}$  in the very end, in Eq. (6.19) and right after.

**Extended notation.** To argue about a given phase, we extend some of our notation to refer to arbitrary time intervals, not just  $[1, \tau]$ . In what follows, fix time interval  $[\tau_1, \tau_2]$ , and let  $\Delta \tau = \tau_2 - \tau_1 + 1$ . Let

$$\begin{split} \overline{\boldsymbol{M}}_{[\tau_1,\tau_2]} &:= \frac{1}{\boldsymbol{\Delta}\tau} \sum_{t=\tau_1}^{\tau_2} \boldsymbol{M}_t, \\ \overline{\boldsymbol{M}}_{[\tau_1,\tau_2]}^{\text{ips}} &:= \frac{1}{\boldsymbol{\Delta}\tau} \sum_{t=\tau_1}^{\tau_2} \boldsymbol{M}_t^{\text{ips}} \end{split}$$

be, resp., the average outcome matrix and its IPS-estimate on this time interval. Define

$$OBJ([\tau_1, \tau_2]) := \Delta \tau \cdot OPT_{LP}(\overline{M}_{[\tau_1, \tau_2]}, B, \Delta \tau),$$
(6.6)

$$OBJ^{ips}([\tau_1, \tau_2]) := \Delta \tau \cdot OPT_{LP}(\overline{\boldsymbol{M}}_{[\tau_1, \tau_2]}^{ips}, B, \Delta \tau).$$
(6.7)

We use short-hand  $OBJ(\tau_2) = OBJ([1, \tau_2])$  and  $OBJ^{ips}(\tau_2) = OBJ^{ips}([1, \tau_2])$ . We think of these quantities, resp., as the LP-objective given the stopping time at  $\tau_2$ , and the IPS-estimate thereof. Recall that

$$OPT_{LP}^{[\tau]} := \max_{t \in [\tau]} OBJ(t).$$
(6.8)

$$\widehat{g}_{\tau} := \max_{t \in [\tau]} \operatorname{OBJ}^{\operatorname{ips}}(t).$$
(6.9)

Uniform exploration does not exhaust budget. The uniform exploration in Algorithm 3 happens for at most  $\gamma_0 T$  rounds in expectation, and therefore for at most  $\gamma_0 T + 3\sqrt{\gamma_0 T \ln(1/\delta)}$  rounds with probability at least  $1 - \delta$ .<sup>12</sup> It does not consume more than B/2 units of each resource, since  $\gamma_0 = T^{-1/4}$  and  $B > 4T^{3/4}$ .

**IPS estimators are good.** We argue that, essentially, the guess  $\hat{g}_{\tau}$  is close to  $OPT_{LP}^{[\tau]}$  with high probability. To this end, we prove that  $OBJ(\tau)$  is close to its IPS estimator, for any given  $\tau \in [T]$ .

**Lemma 6.5.** With probability at least  $1 - d\delta T$  it holds that

$$\forall \tau \in [T] \qquad \left| OBJ^{ips}(\tau) - OBJ(\tau) \right| \le DEV(\tau) := \left( 1 + \frac{2OBJ(\tau)}{B} \right) \frac{K}{\gamma} \sqrt{2\tau \log \frac{T}{\delta}}, \tag{6.10}$$

If the event (6.10) holds, then  $\hat{g}_{\tau}$  and  $OPT_{LP}^{[\tau]}$  are indeed close:

$$\forall \tau \in [T] \qquad \left| \widehat{g}_{\tau} - OPT_{LP}^{[\tau]} \right| \le DEV_{\max} := \frac{KT}{\gamma B} \sqrt{18T \log \frac{T}{\delta}} \tag{6.11}$$

The proof of this lemma is deferred Section 6.3. It only relies on the uniform exploration property (6.3) and the definition of IPS estimators, not on anything that the algorithm does. A somewhat subtle point is to derive concentration on the respective LP-values from concentration of the average outcome matrices.

**IPS estimates do not change too fast.** We use the phase-stopping condition in the algorithm to argue that algorithm's guesses  $\hat{g}_t$  and estimates  $OBJ^{ips}(t)$  do not change too fast.

**Lemma 6.6.** Consider a full phase in the execution of the algorithm. Let  $\tau$  be the first round in this phase, let  $\tau'$  be any other round in this phase, and let  $\tau''$  be any round in the next phase. Then

$$\widehat{g}_{\tau'} \le \kappa \cdot \widehat{g}_{\tau} < \widehat{g}_{\tau''}.$$

*Proof.* The first inequality holds because the phase-stopping condition did not fire at round  $\tau'$ . For the second inequality, let t denote the first round in the next phase. Then

$$\widehat{g}_{\tau''} \ge \widehat{g}_t \qquad (since \ (\widehat{g}_t) \ is \ monotone \ by \ Eq. \ (6.9)) > \kappa \cdot \widehat{g}_{\tau} \qquad (by \ the \ phase-stopping \ condition). \qquad \Box$$

**Claim 6.7.**  $\hat{g}_t = OBJ^{ips}(t) > OBJ^{ips}(t-1)$  for any round t such that  $\hat{g}_t > \hat{g}_{t-1}$ . The latter condition holds, in particular, if t is the first round in some phase.

*Proof.* The claim follows from Eq. (6.9) and the phase-stopping condition. In particular, if t is the first round in some phase and  $\hat{g}_t = \hat{g}_{t-1}$ , then this phase would have started earlier.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>By an easy application of Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds (Lemma A.2).

**Claim 6.8.** For any round t, we have  $\widehat{g}_{t+1} - \widehat{g}_t \leq OBJ^{ips}(t+1) - OBJ^{ips}(t) \leq K/\gamma$ .

*Proof.* Fix round t. If  $\hat{g}_{t+1} > \hat{g}_t$ , then  $\hat{g}_{t+1} = OBJ^{ips}(t+1)$  by Claim 6.7. Since  $\hat{g}_t \ge OBJ^{ips}(t)$  by Eq. (6.9), it follows that

$$\widehat{g}_{t+1} - \widehat{g}_t \le \operatorname{OBJ}^{\operatorname{ips}}(t+1) - \operatorname{OBJ}^{\operatorname{ips}}(t).$$
(6.12)

Let us analyze the right-hand side in Eq. (6.12). Recall the IPS-estimate matrices defined in Eq. (6.1) and Eq. (6.2): the round-t matrix  $M_t^{ips}$  and the time-average matrix  $\overline{M}_t^{ips}$ . Let  $X^*$  denote the optimal solution to the LP induced by  $\overline{M}_{t+1}^{ips}$ . This is the LP that determines  $OBJ^{ips}(t+1)$ , as per Eq. (6.7). So,  $OBJ^{ips}(t+1) = \sum_{\tau=1}^{t+1} X^* \cdot r_{\tau}^{ips}$ , where  $r_{\tau}^{ips}$  is the reward vector in  $M_{\tau}^{ips}$ . Recall that the constraint in this LP is  $X \cdot \sum_{\tau=1}^{t+1} c_{\tau}^{ips} \leq B$ . Since  $X^*$  satisfies this constraint and

Recall that the constraint in this LP is  $X \cdot \sum_{\tau=1}^{t+1} c_{\tau}^{\text{ips}} \leq B$ . Since  $X^*$  satisfies this constraint and  $c_{t+1}^{\text{ips}} \geq 0$ , we have  $X^* \cdot \sum_{\tau=1}^{t} c_{\tau}^{\text{ips}} \leq B$ . So,  $X^*$  is also feasible to the LP induced by  $\overline{M}_t^{\text{ips}}$ . It follows that  $\text{OBJ}^{\text{ips}}(t) \geq \sum_{\tau=1}^{t} X^* \cdot r_{\tau}^{\text{ips}}$ .

Putting this together, the right-hand side of Eq. (6.12) is at most  $X^* \cdot r_{t+1}^{\text{ips}}$ . This is at most  $K/\gamma$ , since the IPS-estimated reward of each arm is at most  $1/\gamma$  by Eq. (6.4).

Last full phase offers sufficient rewards. Recall that a phase in the execution of the algorithm is called *full* if the stopping condition  $\hat{g}_t > \kappa \cdot \hat{g}_{old}$  has fired. We focus on the last full phase; let  $\tau_{start}, \tau_{end}$  denote the first and last time-steps of this phase. We prove there is enough reward to be collected in this phase.

Let  $\tau^*$  denote the maximizer in Eq. (5.4) which we interpret as the *optimal stopping time*. Essentially, we compare the LP value for the time interval  $[\tau_{start}, \tau_{end}]$  with the LP value for the time interval  $[1, \tau^*]$ . The former is expressed as  $OBJ([\tau_{start}, \tau_{end}])$  and the latter as  $OPT_{LP}^{[T]}$ . Note that the time horizon T lies in the subsequent phase (so we can apply Lemma 6.6).

**Lemma 6.9.** Consider a run of the algorithm such that event (6.10) holds. Then

$$OBJ([\tau_{start}, \tau_{end}]) \ge \left(\frac{1}{\kappa} - \frac{1}{\kappa^2}\right) OPT_{LP}^{[T]} - O(DEV_{\max}).$$
(6.13)

The proof of this lemma is deferred Section 6.2.

Adversarial analysis of LagrangeBwK. Let us plug in the adversarial analysis of LagrangeBwK, as encapsulated in Lemma 5.8. We focus on the last full phase in the execution. We interpret it as an execution of algorithm LagrangeBwK with parameters  $B_0, T_0$  on an instance of Adversarial BwK with budget  $B_0$ that starts at round  $\tau_{start}$  of the original problem. Let  $\hat{g} = \hat{g}_{\tau_{start}}$  be the guess at the first round of the phase. Then the parameters are  $B_0 = B/\text{ratio}$  and  $T_0 = \hat{g}/(3d \cdot \text{ratio})$ , where  $\text{ratio} = \lceil \log_{\kappa} T \rceil$ .

We apply Lemma 5.8 for round  $\sigma = \tau_{end} - \tau_{start} + 1$  in the execution of LagrangeBwK. Restated in our notation,  $f(\sigma)$  in Lemma 5.8 becomes

$$f(\sigma) = \operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{LP}}(\overline{\boldsymbol{M}}_{[\tau_{start}, \tau_{end}]}, B_0, \sigma)$$

Thus, we obtain that with probability at least  $1 - \delta$  we have

$$\operatorname{REW} \ge \sum_{t=\tau_{start}}^{\tau_{end}} r_t(a_t) \ge \min\left(\frac{\widehat{g}}{3d\lceil \log_{\kappa} T \rceil}, \ \sigma f(\sigma) - \frac{d\widehat{g}}{3d\lceil \log_{\kappa} T \rceil}\right) - \operatorname{reg}(T), \tag{6.14}$$

where the regret term is  $\operatorname{reg}(T) := (1 + \frac{T}{B}) \left( R_{1, \delta/T}(T) + R_{2, \delta/T}(T) \right).$ 

**Rescaling the budget.** Since we use rescaled budget  $B_0$ , we need to connect the corresponding LP-values to those for the original budget B. We use the following general fact, observed in Agrawal and Devanur (2014): for any outcome matrix M, budget B, time horizon T, and rescaling factor  $\psi \in (0, 1]$ ,

$$OPT_{LP}(\boldsymbol{M}, \psi B, T) \ge \psi \cdot OPT_{LP}(\boldsymbol{M}, B, T).$$
(6.15)

This holds because an optimal solution  $\mu$  to  $LP_{M,B,T}$ , the vector  $\psi \mu$  is feasible to  $LP_{M,\psi B,T}$ .

**Putting it all together.** Let us show how to complete the proof of Theorem 6.1 using the tools derived above. Throughout, we condition on the high-probability events in Lemma 6.5 and Eq. (6.14).

Recall that  $[\tau_{start}, \tau_{end}]$  denotes the last full phase, and let  $\hat{g}$  denote the guess at the beginning of this phase. Recall that  $\hat{g} = OBJ^{ips}(\tau_{start})$ .

From Eq. (6.15) we have that  $\sigma f(\sigma) \ge \frac{1}{\text{ratio}} \text{OBJ}([\tau_{start}, \tau_{end}])$  since  $B_0 = \frac{B}{\text{ratio}}$ . Combining this with Eq. (6.14) we obtain

$$\operatorname{REW} = \sum_{t=\tau_{start}}^{\tau_{end}} r_t(a_t) \ge \frac{1}{\operatorname{ratio}} \min\left(\frac{\widehat{g}}{3d}, \operatorname{OBJ}([\tau_{start}, \tau_{end}]) - \frac{d\widehat{g}}{3d}\right) - \operatorname{reg}(T).$$
(6.16)

By Lemma 6.9, we can re-write Eq. (6.16) as

$$\operatorname{REW} \ge \frac{1}{\operatorname{ratio}} \min\left(\frac{\widehat{g}}{3d}, \left(\frac{1}{\kappa} - \frac{1}{\kappa^2}\right) \operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{LP}}^{[T]} - \frac{\widehat{g}}{3}\right) - \operatorname{reg}(T) - O(\operatorname{DEV}_{\max}).$$
(6.17)

Let us characterize how the guess  $\widehat{g}$  deviates from OPT<sup>[T]</sup><sub>LP</sub>:

$$\operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{LP}}^{[T]}/\kappa^2 - O(\operatorname{DEV}_{\max}) \le \widehat{g} \le \operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{LP}}^{[T]}/\kappa + O(\operatorname{DEV}_{\max}).$$
(6.18)

To prove the upper bound in Eq. (6.18),

$$\widehat{g} \leq \widehat{g}_T / \kappa \qquad (by Lemma \ 6.6)$$
$$\leq \operatorname{OPT}_{LP}^{[T]} / \kappa + \operatorname{DEV}_{\max} / \kappa \qquad (by Lemma \ 6.5).$$

For the lower bound in Eq. (6.18), we observe that

$$\begin{split} \widehat{g}_{T} &\leq \kappa \cdot \widehat{g}_{\tau_{end}+1} & (a \ phase \ didn't \ start \ at \ T) \\ &\leq \kappa \left( \widehat{g}_{\tau_{end}} + K/\gamma \right) & (By \ Claim \ 6.8) \\ &\leq \kappa \left( \kappa \cdot \widehat{g} + K/\gamma \right) & (a \ phase \ didn't \ start \ at \ \tau_{end}) \\ &\widehat{g} &\geq \widehat{g}_{T}/\kappa^{2} - \text{DEV}_{\max}/\kappa^{2} - K/\gamma \\ &\geq \text{OPT}_{\text{LP}}^{[T]}/\kappa^{2} - O(\text{DEV}_{\max}) & (by \ Eq. \ (6.11)). \end{split}$$

This completes the proof of Eq. (6.18).

Plugging Eq. (6.18) back into Eq. (6.17) and using  $\kappa = 2$  we get,

$$\operatorname{REW} \ge \frac{1}{\operatorname{ratio}} \min\left(\frac{\operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{LP}}^{[T]}}{12d}, \frac{\operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{LP}}^{[T]}}{12}\right) - \operatorname{reg}(T) - O(\operatorname{DEV}_{\max}).$$
(6.19)

Moreover,  $OPT_{LP}^{[T]} \ge OPT_{FD}$  by Eq. (5.4). Plugging this into Eq. (6.19) and using  $\gamma \ge T^{-1/4}$ , we obtain Eq. (6.5), completing the proof of the theorem.

### 6.2 Proof of Lemma 6.9: last full phase offers sufficient rewards

First, we decompose the objective on a time interval as a difference between the interval's endpoints:

$$OBJ([T_1, T_2]) \ge OBJ(T_2) - OBJ(T_1 - 1).$$
 (6.20)

This step holds for any two rounds  $T_1 < T_2 \leq T$ . It is proved similarly to Claim 6.8.

*Proof of Eq. (6.20).* Let  $\mu$  denote the optimal solution to  $L\mathbb{P}_{\overline{M}_{T_2},B,T_2}$ . In particular, it satisfies the consumption constraint  $\mu \cdot \sum_{t \in [T_2]} c_{t,i} \leq B$ . Since resource consumption is always non-negative,  $\mu \cdot \sum_{t \in [T_1-1]} c_{t,i} \leq B$ , which is the consumption constraint for  $L\mathbb{P}_{\overline{M}_{T_1-1},B,T_1-1}$ . So,  $\mu$  is feasible for that LP as well. Consequently,

$$\sum_{t \in [T_1-1]} \boldsymbol{\mu} \cdot \boldsymbol{r}_t \leq \text{OBJ}(T_1-1)$$

Likewise  $\mu$  is also feasible for LP $_{\overline{M}_{[T_1,T_2]},B,[T_1,T_2]}$ , and consequently

$$OBJ([T_1, T_2]) \ge \sum_{t \in [T_1, T_2]} \boldsymbol{\mu} \cdot \boldsymbol{r}_t = \sum_{t \in [T_2]} \boldsymbol{\mu} \cdot \boldsymbol{r}_t - \sum_{t \in [T_1 - 1]} \boldsymbol{\mu} \cdot \boldsymbol{r}_t$$
$$\ge OBJ(T_2) - OBJ(T_1 - 1).$$

The rest of the proof is specific to the time interval being the last full phase.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{OBJ}([\tau_{start}, \tau_{end}]) &\geq \text{OBJ}(\tau_{end}) - \text{OBJ}(\tau_{start} - 1) & (by \ Eq. \ (6.20)) \\ &\geq \text{OBJ}^{\text{ips}}(\tau_{end}) - \text{OBJ}^{\text{ips}}(\tau_{start} - 1) - 2 \cdot \text{DEV}_{\max} & (by \ Lemma \ 6.5) \\ &\geq \text{OBJ}^{\text{ips}}(\tau_{end} + 1) - \text{OBJ}^{\text{ips}}(\tau_{start}) - 2 \cdot \text{DEV}_{\max} - K/\gamma. \end{aligned}$$

In the last inequality, we control  $OBJ^{ips}(\tau_{start})$  and  $OBJ^{ips}(\tau_{end})$  using, resp., Claim 6.7 and Claim 6.8.

Let us transition from  $OBJ^{ips}(\cdot)$  to guesses  $\hat{g}$ , and use the machinery for comparing the guesses across time. For a more succinct notation, write  $t = \tau_{end} + 1$ . Then

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{OBJ}\left(\left[\tau_{start}, \tau_{end}\right]\right) + 2 \cdot \text{DEV}_{\max} + K/\gamma \geq \widehat{g}_t - \widehat{g}_{\tau_{start}} & (by \ Claim \ 6.7) \\ &> \widehat{g}_t \cdot (1 - 1/\kappa) & (by \ Lemma \ 6.6) \\ &\geq \widehat{g}_T \cdot (1/\kappa - 1/\kappa^2) & (by \ Lemma \ 6.6) \\ &\geq \left(\operatorname{OPT}_{\mathrm{LP}}^{[T]} - \operatorname{DEV}_{\max}\right) \cdot (1/\kappa - 1/\kappa^2) & (by \ Lemma \ 6.5). \end{array}$$

Rearranging, we complete the proof of Lemma 6.9 as follows.

$$\mathsf{OBJ}\left(\left[\tau_{start}, \tau_{end}\right]\right) \ge \mathsf{OPT}_{\mathsf{LP}}^{[T]} \cdot \left(1/\kappa - 1/\kappa^2\right) - \mathsf{DEV}_{\max} \cdot \left(1/\kappa - 1/\kappa^2 + 2\right) + K/\gamma.$$

### 6.3 **Proof of Lemma 6.5 (IPS estimators are good)**

Recall that for every  $t \in [T]$  and  $a \in [K]$  we have that  $p_t(a)$ , the probability that arm a is chosen at time t is at least  $\frac{\gamma}{K}$ . We now prove Lemma 6.10 which relates linear sums of rewards and consumptions computed using the unbiased estimates and the true values. Denote  $R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau) := \frac{K}{\gamma} \sqrt{2\tau \ln(T/\delta)}$ .

**Claim 6.10.** Let  $\delta > 0$ ,  $\gamma > 0$  used by the EXP3. $P(\gamma)$  be given parameters. Then we have the following statements for any fixed  $z \in \Delta_K$ .

$$\Pr\left[\exists \tau \in [T] \mid \left| \sum_{t \in [\tau]} \mathbf{z} \cdot \left[ \mathbf{r}_t^{i_{\mathcal{D}S}} - \mathbf{r}_t \right] \right| > R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau) \right] \le \delta$$
(6.21)

$$\forall i \in [d] \qquad \Pr\left[\exists \tau \in [T] \quad \left| \sum_{t \in [\tau]} \boldsymbol{z} \cdot \left[ \boldsymbol{c}_{t,i}^{ips} - \boldsymbol{c}_{t,i}(a) \right] \right| > R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau) \right] \leq \delta \tag{6.22}$$

*Proof.* The proof of this follows directly from the invocation of the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality. We will show this for Equation (6.21). Define  $Y_t := \mathbf{z} \cdot \left[\mathbf{r}_t^{\text{ips}} - \mathbf{r}_t\right]$  (like-wise for the lower-tail use  $Y_t := \mathbf{z} \cdot (\mathbf{r}_t - \mathbf{r}_t^{\text{ips}})$ ). Note that this forms a martingale difference sequence since  $\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{z} \cdot (\mathbf{r}_t^{\text{ips}} - \mathbf{r}_t) | \mathcal{H}_{t-1}] = \mathbf{z} \cdot [\mathbf{r}_t - \mathbf{r}_t] = 0$ . Here we used the fact that  $\mathbf{z}$  is not random and fixed before the start of the algorithm. Also we have that  $|Y_t| \leq \frac{K}{\gamma}$ . Using Lemma A.1 and taking a union bound over all  $\tau \in [T]$  we have the desired equation.

We will now prove the two inequalities in Eq. (6.10). We will first prove the first inequality in Eq. (6.10). Let  $\mu^*$  denote the optimal solution to  $OPT_{LP}\left(\overline{M}_{\tau}, B\left(1 - \frac{R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau)}{B}\right), \tau\right)$ . Note this is valid whenever  $B > \Omega\left(\frac{K}{\gamma}\sqrt{\tau \log \frac{T}{\delta}}\right)$ . From Equation (6.22) we have that with probability at least  $1 - \delta$  for every  $i \in [d]$ ,

$$\sum_{t \in [\tau]} \boldsymbol{\mu}^* \cdot \boldsymbol{c}_{t,i}^{\text{ips}} \leq \sum_{t \in [\tau]} \boldsymbol{\mu}^* \cdot \boldsymbol{c}_{t,i} + R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau).$$
  
$$\leq B \tag{6.23}$$

Eq. (6.23) used the fact that  $\sum_{t \in [\tau]} \mu^* \cdot c_{t,i} \leq B (1 - R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau))$ . Using Equation (6.21), we have that with probability at least  $1 - \delta$ ,

$$\sum_{t\in[\tau]} \boldsymbol{\mu}^* \cdot \boldsymbol{r}_t \leq \sum_{t\in[\tau]} \boldsymbol{\mu}^* \cdot \boldsymbol{r}_t^{\text{ips}} + R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau).$$

Using the fact that,

$$\sum_{t \in [\tau]} \boldsymbol{\mu}^* \cdot \boldsymbol{r}_t = \operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{LP}} \left( \overline{\boldsymbol{M}}_{\tau}, B\left( 1 - \frac{R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau)}{B} \right), \tau \right),$$

we have the following.

$$\operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{LP}}\left(\overline{\boldsymbol{M}}_{\tau}, B\left(1 - \frac{R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau)}{B}\right), \tau\right) - R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau) \leq \sum_{t \in [\tau]} \boldsymbol{\mu}^* \cdot \boldsymbol{r}_t^{\operatorname{ips}}.$$
(6.24)

From Eq. (6.23) we have that  $\mu^*$  is feasible to OPT<sup>1ps</sup><sub>LP</sub> ( $\tau$ ) and from Eq. (6.24) this implies that

$$OBJ^{ips}(\tau) \ge OPT_{LP}\left(\overline{M}_{\tau}, B\left(1 - \frac{R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau)}{B}\right), \tau\right) - R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau).$$
(6.25)

Finally from Eq. (6.15) we have

$$OPT_{LP}\left(\overline{M}_{\tau}, B\left(1 - \frac{R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau)}{B}\right), \tau\right) \ge \left(1 - \frac{R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau)}{B}\right) OBJ(\tau).$$
(6.26)

From Eq. (6.25) and Eq. (6.26) we have

$$OBJ^{ips}(\tau) \ge OBJ(\tau) - \underbrace{R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau) \left(1 + \frac{OBJ(\tau)}{B}\right)}_{\le \left(1 + \frac{2OBJ(\tau)}{B}\right) \frac{K}{\gamma} \sqrt{2\tau \log \frac{T}{\delta}}},$$

which gives the lower-tail in Eq. (6.10).

We will now prove the second inequality in Eq. (6.10) in a similar fashion. Let  $\tilde{\mu}^*$  denote the optimal solution to  $OBJ^{ips}\left(\overline{M}_{\tau}, B\left(1 - \frac{R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau)}{B}\right), \tau\right)$ . From Equation (6.22) we have that with probability at least  $1 - \delta$  for every  $i \in [d]$ ,

$$\sum_{t \in [\tau]} \tilde{\boldsymbol{\mu}}^* \cdot \boldsymbol{c}_{t,i} \leq \sum_{t \in [\tau]} \tilde{\boldsymbol{\mu}}^* \cdot \boldsymbol{c}_{t,i}^{\text{ips}} + R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau).$$

$$\leq B \tag{6.27}$$

Eq. (6.27) used the fact that  $\sum_{t \in [\tau]} \tilde{\mu}^* \cdot c_{t,i}^{i_{\text{DS}}} \leq B (1 - R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau))$ . Using Equation (6.21), we have that with probability at least  $1 - \delta$ ,

$$\sum_{t\in[\tau]} \tilde{\boldsymbol{\mu}}^* \cdot \boldsymbol{r}_t^{\text{ips}} \leq \sum_{t\in[\tau]} \tilde{\boldsymbol{\mu}}^* \cdot \boldsymbol{r}_t + R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau).$$

From the fact that

$$\sum_{t \in [\tau]} \tilde{\boldsymbol{\mu}}^* \cdot \boldsymbol{r}_t^{\text{ips}} = \text{OPT}_{\text{LP}}^{\text{ips}} \left( \overline{\boldsymbol{M}}_{\tau}^{\text{ips}}, B\left( 1 - \frac{R_{\gamma, \delta}(\tau)}{B} \right), \tau \right),$$

we get the following.

$$\operatorname{OPT}_{LP}^{\operatorname{ips}}\left(\overline{\boldsymbol{M}}_{\tau}^{\operatorname{ips}}, B\left(1 - \frac{R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau)}{B}\right), \tau\right) - R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau) \leq \sum_{t \in [\tau]} \tilde{\boldsymbol{\mu}}^* \cdot \boldsymbol{r}_t.$$
(6.28)

From Eq. (6.27) we have that  $\tilde{\mu}_{j}^{*}$  is feasible to OPT<sub>LP</sub> ( $\tau$ ) and from Eq. (6.28) this implies that

$$\operatorname{OPT}_{LP}^{\operatorname{ips}}\left(\overline{M}_{\tau}^{\operatorname{ips}}, B\left(1 - \frac{R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau)}{B}\right), \tau\right) \leq \operatorname{OBJ}\left(\tau\right) + R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau).$$
(6.29)

Finally from Eq. (6.15) we have

$$\operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{LP}}^{\operatorname{ips}}\left(\overline{\boldsymbol{M}}_{\tau}^{\operatorname{ips}}, B\left(1 - \frac{R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau)}{B}\right), \tau\right) \ge \left(1 - \frac{R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau)}{B}\right) \operatorname{OBJ}^{\operatorname{ips}}\left(\tau\right).$$
(6.30)

Combining Eq. (6.30) and Eq. (6.29) we get,

$$OBJ^{ips}(\tau) \le OBJ(\tau) + R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau) + \frac{R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau)}{B - R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau)} (OBJ(\tau) + R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau)).$$
(6.31)

Since  $B > 2R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau)$  we get,

$$OBJ^{ips}(\tau) \le OBJ(\tau) + \underbrace{\frac{2R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau)}{B} \left(OBJ(\tau) + R_{\gamma,\delta}(\tau)\right)}_{\le \left(1 + \frac{2OBJ(\tau)}{B}\right)\frac{K}{\gamma}\sqrt{2\tau\log\frac{T}{\delta}}},$$

and thus we get the upper-tail in Eq. (6.10).

We will now prove Eq. (6.11). Recall that  $\widehat{g}_{\tau} := \max_{t \in [\tau]} \operatorname{OBJ}^{\operatorname{ips}}(t)$ . Moreover  $\operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{LP}}^{[\tau]} = \max_{t \in [\tau]} \operatorname{OBJ}(t)$ . Consider  $\widehat{g}_{\tau} - OPT_{LP}^{[\tau]}$ . We have,

$$\begin{aligned} \widehat{g}_{\tau} - \operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{LP}}^{[\tau]} &= \max_{t \in [\tau]} \operatorname{OBJ}^{\operatorname{ips}}(t) - \operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{LP}}^{[\tau]} \\ &\leq \max_{t \in [\tau]} (\operatorname{OBJ}(t) + \operatorname{DEV}(t)) - \operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{LP}}^{[\tau]} \\ &\leq \max_{t \in [\tau]} \operatorname{OBJ}(t) + \max_{t \in [\tau]} \operatorname{DEV}(t) - \operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{LP}}^{[\tau]} \\ &= \max_{t \in [\tau]} \operatorname{DEV}(t). \end{aligned}$$

Now consider  $\operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{LP}}^{[\tau]} - \widehat{g}_{\tau}$ . We have,

$$\begin{aligned} \operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{LP}}^{[\tau]} &- \widehat{g}_{\tau} \leq \operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{LP}}^{[\tau]} - \max_{t \in [\tau]} (\operatorname{OBJ}(t) - \operatorname{DEV}(t)) \\ &\leq \operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{LP}}^{[\tau]} - \max_{t \in [\tau]} \operatorname{OBJ}(t) + \max_{t \in [\tau]} \operatorname{DEV}(t) \\ &= \max_{t \in [\tau]} \operatorname{DEV}(t). \end{aligned}$$

This completes the proof of Lemma 6.5.

### 7 Extensions

We obtain several extensions which highlight the modularity of LagrangeBwK: we apply Theorem 4.4 and Theorem 5.1 with appropriately chosen primal algorithm ALG<sub>1</sub>, and immediately obtain strong performance guarantees.<sup>13</sup> We tackle four well-known scenarios:

- *full feedback* (*e.g.*, Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994; Freund and Schapire, 1997; Arora et al., 2012): in each round, the algorithm chooses an action and observes the outcomes of all possible actions; this is a classic scenario in online machine learning.
- *combinatorial semi-bandits* (*e.g.*, György et al., 2007; Kale et al., 2010; Audibert et al., 2011): actions are feasible subsets of "atoms". The atoms in the chosen action have individual outcomes that are observed and add up to the action's total outcome. Typical motivating example are subsets/lists of news articles, ads, or web search results.
- *contextual bandits with policy sets* (*e.g.*, Langford and Zhang, 2007; Dudík et al., 2011; Agarwal et al., 2014): before each round, a *context* is observed, and the algorithm competes against the best policy (mapping from context to actions) in a given policy class. In a typical application scenario, the context includes known features of the current user.
- bandit convex optimization (starting from Kleinberg (2004); Flaxman et al. (2005), with recent advances Bubeck et al. (2015); Hazan and Levy (2014); Bubeck et al. (2017)). Here the set of actions is a convex set X ⊂ ℝ<sup>K</sup>. For each round t, the adversary chooses a concave function f<sub>t</sub> : X → [0, 1] such that the reward for chosen action x ∈ X is f<sub>t</sub>(x).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>For these theorems to hold,  $ALG_1$  needs to satisfy regret bound (3.2) only against adaptive adversaries that arise in the repeated Lagrange game in the corresponding extension, not against *arbitrary* adaptive adversaries.

Formalities. To simplify the statements, we make the following assumptions without further mention:

- The dual algorithm, ALG<sub>2</sub>, is always Hedge, with the associated regret bound from Eq. (3.4). For high-probability regret bounds,  $\delta = \frac{1}{T}$  is a fixed and known failure probability parameter.
- For Stochastic BwK, one resource is the dummy resource (with consumption  $\frac{B}{T}$  for each arm). Algorithm LagrangeBwK is run with parameters  $B_0 = B$  and  $T_0 = T$ .
- For Adversarial BwK, one of the arms is a *null arm* that has zero reward and zero resource consumption. Algorithm 2 is run with any  $\kappa > 1$  and range  $[g_{\min}, g_{\max}] = [\sqrt{T}, T]$ , as in Theorem 5.1(b).

A typical corollary. All our corollaries have the following shape, for some regret term reg:

(C1) In the stochastic version, algorithm LagrangeBwK achieves, with probability at least  $1 - \frac{1}{T}$ ,

$$OPT_{DP} - REW \le O\left(\frac{T}{B} \cdot reg\right)$$

(C2) In the adversarial version, Algorithm 2 achieves

$$\frac{\mathbb{E}[\texttt{REW}]}{\texttt{OPT}_{\texttt{FD}}} \geq \frac{2}{(d+1)\,\ln(T)} - O(\texttt{reg})\left(\frac{1}{\texttt{OPT}_{\texttt{FD}}} + \frac{1}{dB}\right).$$

Corollaries similar to (C2) can be achieved for Algorithm 3, too; we omit them for ease of exposition.

#### 7.1 BwK with full feedback

In the full-feedback version of BwK, the entire outcome matrix  $M_t$  is revealed to the algorithm after each round t. Accordingly, we can use Hedge as the primal algorithm ALG<sub>1</sub>. The effect is, essentially, that the dependence on K, the number of arms, in the regret term becomes logarithmic rather than  $\sqrt{K}$ .

**Corollary 7.1.** Consider BwK with full feedback. Using Hedge as the primal algorithm, we obtain corollaries (C1) and (C2) with regret term  $reg = \sqrt{T \ln (dKT)}$ .

Adversarial BwK with full feedback have not been studied before. For the stochastic version, the regret bound is unsurprising: one expects to obtain a similar improvement with each of the three other algorithms in the prior work on Stochastic BwK by tracing the "confidence terms" through the analysis. The significance here is that we obtain this result as an immediate corollary.

#### 7.2 Combinatorial Semi-Bandits with Knapsacks

Following Sankararaman and Slivkins (2018), we consider *Combinatorial Semi-BwK*, a common generalization of BwK and *combinatorial semi-bandits* (e.g., György et al., 2007; Kale et al., 2010; Audibert et al., 2011). In this problem, actions correspond to subsets of some finite ground set  $\Omega$  of size n, whose elements are called *atoms*. There is a fixed family  $\mathcal{F} \subset 2^{\Omega}$  of feasible actions. For each round t, there is an outcome vector  $\mathbf{o}_{t,e} \in [0, \frac{1}{n}]^{d+1}$  for each round atom  $e \in \Omega$ , with the same semantics as the actions' outcome vectors. If an action  $S \subset \Omega$  is chosen, the outcome vectors  $\mathbf{o}_{t,e}$  are observed for all atoms  $e \in S$ , and the action's outcome is the sum  $\mathbf{M}_t(S) = \sum_{e \in S} \mathbf{o}_{t,e} \in [0,1]^d$ . In the adversarial case, all outcome vectors  $\mathbf{o}_{t,e}, t \in [T]$ ,  $e \in \Omega$  are chosen by an adversary arbitrarily before round 1. In the stochastic case, the atomic outcome matrix  $(o_{t,e} : e \in \Omega)$  is drawn independently in each round t from some fixed distribution. Combinatorial semi-bandits, as studied previously, is a special case with no resource constraints (d = 0).

Typical motivating examples involve ad/content personalization scenarios. Atoms can correspond to items news articles, ads, or web search results, and actions are subsets that satisfy some constraints on quantity, relevance, or diversity of items. One can also model ranked lists of atoms: then atoms are rank-item pairs, and each feasible action  $S \subset \Omega$  satisfies a constraint that each rank between 1 and |S| is present in exactly one chosen rank-item pair.

A naive application of our main results suffers from regret terms that are proportional to  $\sqrt{|\mathcal{F}|}$ , which may be exponential in the number of atoms n. Instead, the work on combinatorial semi-bandits features regret bounds that scale polynomially in n. This is what we achieve, too. We use an algorithm from Neu and Bartók (2016) which solves combinatorial semi-bandits in the absence of resource constraints. This algorithm satisfies a high-probability regret bound (3.2) against an adaptive adversary, with  $R_{\delta}(T) = O(\sqrt{nT \log(1/\delta)})$ .<sup>14</sup>

**Corollary 7.2.** Consider Combinatorial Semi-BwK with n atoms. Using the algorithm from Neu and Bartók (2016) as the primal algorithm, we obtain corollaries (C1) and (C2) with regret term  $reg = \sqrt{nT \log T}$ .

The adversarial version of Combinatorial Semi-BwK has not been studied before.

The stochastic version has been studied in Sankararaman and Slivkins (2018) when the action set is a matroid, achieving regret

$$\tilde{O}\left(\operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{DP}}\sqrt{n/B}+\sqrt{T/n}+\sqrt{\operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{DP}}}
ight)$$

This regret bound becomes  $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{nT})$  in the regime when B and  $OPT_{DP}$  are  $\Omega(T)$  (see Footnote 14). We achieve the same regret bound for this regime, without the matroid assumption and without any extra work. However, the regret bound in Sankararaman and Slivkins (2018) can be substantially better than ours when  $OPT_{DP} \ll T$ .

### 7.3 Contextual Bandits with Knapsacks

Following Badanidiyuru et al. (2014); Agrawal et al. (2016), we consider *Contextual Bandits with Knapsacks* (*cBwK*), a common generalization of BwK and *contextual bandits with policy sets* (*e.g.*, Langford and Zhang, 2007; Dudík et al., 2011; Agarwal et al., 2014). The only change in the protocol, compared to BwK, is that in the beginning of each round t a context  $x_t \in \mathcal{X}$  arrives and is observed by the algorithm before it chooses an action. The context set  $\mathcal{X}$  is arbitrary and known. In the adversarial version (*Adversarial cBwK*) both  $x_t$  and the outcome matrix  $M_t$  is chosen by an adversary. In the stochastic version (*Stochastic cBwK*) the pair  $(x_t, M_t)$  is chosen independently from some fixed but unknown distribution over such pairs.

In cBwK one is also given a finite set  $\Pi$  of *policies*: deterministic mappings from contexts to actions.<sup>15</sup> Essentially, the algorithm competes with the best course of action restricted to these policies. For a formal definition, let us interpret cBwK as a BwK problem with action set  $\Pi$ , denote this problem as  $BwK(\Pi)$ . In other words, actions in  $BwK(\Pi)$  are policies in cBwK. An algorithm for  $BwK(\Pi)$  is oblivious to context arrivals. It chooses a policy  $\pi_t \in \Pi$  in each round t, and receives an outcome for this policy: namely, the outcome for action  $\pi(x_t)$ . We are interested in the usual benchmarks for this problem, the best algorithm  $OPT_{DP}$  and the best fixed distribution  $OPT_{FD}$  (where both benchmarks are constrained to use policies in  $\Pi$ ); denote them  $OPT_{DP}(\Pi)$  and  $OPT_{FD}(\Pi)$ , respectively.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>Prior work (Neu and Bartók, 2016; Sankararaman and Slivkins, 2018) posits that atoms' per-round rewards/consumptions lie in the range [0, 1], rather than  $[0, \frac{1}{n}]$ , so their stated regret bounds should be recaled accordingly.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>W.l.o.g. assume that  $\Pi$  contains all *constant policies*, *i.e.*, all policies that always evaluate to the same action.

Without budget constraints (*i.e.*, with B = T), this is exactly contextual bandits with policy set  $\Pi$ . Both benchmarks then reduce to the standard benchmark of the best fixed policy.

**Background: algorithm EXP4.P.** We use EXP4.P (Beygelzimer et al., 2011), an algorithm for the contextual version of adversarial online learning with bandit feedback. The algorithm operates according to the protocol in Figure 2.

**Given:** action set [K], context set  $\mathcal{X}$ , policy set  $\Pi$ , payoff range  $[b_{\min}, b_{\max}]$ . In each round  $t \in [T]$ ,

- 1. the adversary chooses a context  $x_t \in \mathcal{X}$  and a payoff vector  $\boldsymbol{g}_t \in [b_{\min}, b_{\max}]^K$ ;
- 2. the algorithm chooses a distribution  $p_t$  over  $\Pi$  (without seeing  $x_t$ );
- 3. a policy  $\pi_t \in \Pi$  is drawn independently from  $p_t$ ;
- 4. algorithm's chosen action is defined as  $a_t = \pi_t(x_t) \in [K]$ ;
- 5. payoff  $g_t(a_t)$  is received by the algorithm.

Figure 2: Adversarial contextual bandits

We are interested in regret bounds for EXP4.P relative to the best fixed policy:

$$OPT_{\Pi} = \max_{\pi \in \Pi} \sum_{t \in [T]} f_t(\pi(x_t)).$$

For each round t, the pair  $(x_t, g_t)$  induces a payoff vector  $f_t \in [b_{\min}, b_{\max}]^{\Pi}$  on policies:

$$f_t(\pi) = g_t(\pi(x_t)) \qquad \forall \pi \in \Pi.$$

**Theorem 7.3** (Beygelzimer et al. (2011)). Fix failure probability  $\delta > 0$ , policy set  $\Pi$ , and payoff range  $[b_{\min}, b_{\max}]$ . Then algorithm EXP4.P (appropriately tuned) satisfies the following regret bound:

$$\Pr\left[ OPT_{\Pi} - \sum_{t \in [T]} f_t(\pi_t) \le (b_{\max} - b_{\min}) R_{\delta}(T) \right] \ge 1 - \delta,$$

$$(7.1)$$

with regret term  $R_{\delta}(T) = O\left(\sqrt{\tau K \log(KT |\Pi|/\delta)}\right).$ 

**Our solution for cBwK.** We solve cBwK by reducing it to  $BwK(\Pi)$ , and treating it as a BwK problem. A naive solution simply posits  $|\Pi|$  arms and directly applies the machinery developed earlier in this paper. This results in  $\sqrt{|\Pi|}$  dependence in regret bounds, which is unsatisfactory, as the policy set may be very large. Instead, we use EXP4.P as the primal algorithm (ALG<sub>1</sub>). We interpret EXP4.P as an algorithm for (non-contextual) adversarial online learning, as defined in Section 3, with action set  $\Pi$ . It is easy to see that Theorem 7.3 provides regret bound (3.2) under this interpretation. Therefore, we obtain the following:

**Corollary 7.4.** Consider contextual bandits with knapsacks, with policy set  $\Pi$ . Using EXP4.P as the primal algorithm, we obtain corollaries (C1) and (C2) with regret term  $reg = \sqrt{TK \ln (dKT |\Pi|)}$ . The benchmarks are  $OPT_{DP} = OPT_{DP}(\Pi)$  and  $OPT_{FD} = OPT_{FD}(\Pi)$ .

Adversarial cBwK has not been studied before. The regret bound for the adversarial case is meaningful only if  $B > \sqrt{T}$ . This is essentially inevitable in light of the lower bound in Theorem 8.3.

Stochastic cBwK has been studied in Badanidiyuru et al. (2014); Agrawal et al. (2016), achieving regret

$$O(\operatorname{reg})(1 + \operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{DP}}(\Pi)/B), \tag{7.2}$$

where the reg term is the same as in Corollary 7.4. Whereas the regret bound from Corollary 7.4 is  $O(\operatorname{reg} \cdot T/B)$ . Note that we match (7.2) in the regime  $\operatorname{OPT}_{DP}(\Pi) > \Omega(T)$ . Our regret bound is optimal, up to logarithmic factors, in the regime  $B > \Omega(T)$ . This is due to the min  $\left(T, \Omega(\sqrt{KT \log(|\Pi|)/\log(K)})\right)$  lower bound on regret, which holds for contextual bandits (Agarwal et al., 2012).

**Discussion.** Our algorithms are slow, as the per-round running time of EXP4.P is proportional to  $|\Pi|$ . The state-of-art approach to computational efficiency in contextual bandits is *oracle-efficient algorithms*, which make only a small number of calls to an oracle that finds the best policy in  $\Pi$  for a given data set. In particular, prior work for Stochastic cBwK (Agrawal et al., 2016) obtains an oracle-efficient algorithm with regret bound as in (7.2). To obtain oracle-efficient algorithms for cBwK in our framework, both for the stochastic and adversarial versions, it suffices to replace EXP4.P with an oracle-efficient algorithm for adversarial contextual bandits that obtains regret bound (7.1), possibly with a larger regret term  $R_{\delta}$ . Such algorithms *almost* exist: a recent breakthrough (Syrgkanis et al., 2016a; Rakhlin and Sridharan, 2016; Syrgkanis et al., 2016b) obtains algorithms with similar regret bounds, but only for expected regret.

### 7.4 Bandit Convex Optimization with Knapsacks

We consider *Bandit Convex Optimization with Knapsacks* (*BCOwK*), a common generalization of BwK and *bandit convex optimization*. We define BCOwK as a version of BwK, where the action set  $\mathcal{X}$  is a convex subset of  $\mathbb{R}^K$ . For each round t, there is a concave function  $f_t : \mathcal{X} \to [0, 1]$  and convex functions  $g_{t,i} : \mathcal{X} \to [0, 1]$ , for each resource i, so that the reward for choosing action  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}$  in this round is  $f_t(\mathbf{x})$  and consumption of each resource i is  $g_{t,i}(\mathbf{x})$ . In the stochastic version, the tuple of functions  $(f_t; g_{t,1}, \ldots, g_{t,d})$ is sampled independently in each round t from some fixed distribution (which is not known to the algorithm). In the adversarial version, all these tuples are chosen by an adversary before the first round.

Neither stochastic nor adversarial version of BCOwK have been studied in prior work (but see the discussion of constrained online convex optimization in Section 2). Bandit convex optimization, as studied previously, is a special case with no resource constraints (d = 0).

The primal algorithm  $ALG_1$  in LagrangeBwK faces an instance of BCO (with an adaptive adversary). This is because the Lagrange function (4.3) is a concave function of the action, as sum of concave functions. For our primal algorithm, we use a recent breakthrough on BCO due to Bubeck et al. (2017). This algorithm satisfies the high-probability regret bound (3.2) against an adaptive adversary, with regret term

$$R_{\delta}(T) = O(K^{9.5} \log^7(T) \sqrt{T \log(1/\delta)}).$$

We assume the existence of a *null arm*: a point  $x \in \mathcal{X}$  such that  $f_t(x) = g_{t,i}(x) = 0$  for each resource *i* except the "dummy resource". (Recall that we posit the "dummy resource" – a resource whose consumption is B/T for each arm – for the stochastic version.) Unlike elsewhere in this paper, this assumption is not without loss of generality: indeed, the null arm should be "embedded" into  $\mathcal{X}$  without breaking the convexity/concavity properties. Moreover, we assume that the null arm lies in the interior of  $\mathcal{X}$ .

**Corollary 7.5.** Consider BCOwK for a given convex set  $\mathcal{X} \subset \mathbb{R}^K$ . Using the algorithm from Bubeck et al. (2017) as the primal algorithm, we obtain corollaries (C1) and (C2) with regret term  $r \in g = K^{9.5} \log^{7.5}(T) \sqrt{T}$ .

**Remark 7.6.** LagrangeBwK framework extends to infinite action sets: everything carries over, as long as Eq. (4.4) holds. (Essentially, we never take union bounds over actions, and we can replace max and sums over actions with sup and integrals.) For BCOwK, Eq. (4.4) is a statement about constrained convex optimization programs. According to Slater's condition (see Eq. (5.27) in Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004), it suffices to have a point  $\mathbf{x}$  in the interior of  $\mathcal{X}$  such that  $g_{t,i}(\mathbf{x}) < B/T$  for each resource  $i \in [d]$  other than the dummy resource (or any other resource whose consumption is the same in all rounds). One such point is the null arm.

### 8 Lower bounds

We prove the lower bounds on the competitive ratio that we have claimed in Section 1: the  $\Omega(\log T)$  lower bound w.r.t. the best fixed distribution benchmark ( $OPT_{FD}$ ), the  $\Omega(T)$  lower bound w.r.t. the best dynamic policy benchmark ( $OPT_{DP}$ ), and the  $\Omega(K)$  lower bound w.r.t. the best fixed arm benchmark ( $OPT_{FA}$ ). As a warm-up, we analyze the simple example from Section 1 that leads to the  $\frac{5}{4}$  lower bound w.r.t.  $OPT_{FD}$ . All lower-bounds are for a randomized algorithm against an oblivious adversary. We summarize all these lower bounds in the following theorem:

**Theorem 8.1.** Consider Adversarial BwK with a single resource (d = 1), K arms, budget B, and time horizon T. Consider any randomized algorithm for this problem, and let REW denote its reward. Then:

- (a)  $OPT_{FD}/\mathbb{E}[REW] \ge \frac{5}{4} o(1)$  for some problem instance (from the example in the Introduction). This holds even if  $OPT_{FD} \ge T/4$  and B = T/2.
- (b)  $OPT_{FD}/\mathbb{E}[REW] \ge \Omega(\log T)$  for some problem instance with K = 2 arms. This holds for any given budget  $B \in [c_0 \log^3(T), O(T^{1-\alpha})]$ , even if  $OPT_{FD} \ge B^2/T$ . Here  $\alpha \in (0, 1)$  is an arbitrary absolute constant, and  $c_0$  is any large enough absolute constant.
- (c)  $OPT_{DP}/\mathbb{E}[REW] \ge T/B^2$  for some problem instance with K = 2 arms. This holds for any given budget  $B < \sqrt{T}$ , with  $OPT_{FD} = B$ .
- (d)  $OPT_{FA}/\mathbb{E}[REW] \ge \Omega(K)$  for some problem instance. This holds for any given budget B, with  $OPT_{FA} > B/K^K$ .

**Remark 8.2.** The lower bounds for parts (a,b,c) hold (even) for problem instances with K = 2 arms, one of which is the "null arm" with no rewards and no resource consumption. The lower bounds in parts (a,b) hold even for a much more permissive feedback model from the online packing literature, namely, when the algorithm observes the outcome vector for all actions in a given round, and moreover does it before it chooses an arm in this round.

We tweak our construction from Theorem 8.1(c) to obtain a strong lower bound for the contextual version of Adversarial BwK (a.k.a. Adversarial cBwK), as studied in Section 7.3. This lower bound implies that Adversarial cBwK is essentially hopeless in the regime  $B < \sqrt{T}$ , complementing a strong positive result (Corollary 7.4) for the regime  $B > \tilde{\Omega}(\sqrt{T})$ . It is proved in Section 8.3, along with Theorem 8.1(c).

**Theorem 8.3.** Consider adversarial contextual bandits with knapsacks (Adversarial cBwK), with policy class  $\Pi$ , a single resource (d = 1), K = 2 arms, and any given budget  $B < \sqrt{T}$ . Consider any randomized algorithm for this problem, and let REW denote its reward. Then

 $OPT_{FD}(\Pi) / \mathbb{E}[REW] \ge T/B^2$  for some problem instance.

**Notation.** In the proof of lower-bounds below, we use the following notation. Given an instance  $\mathcal{I}$ , we denote  $OPT_{FD}(\mathcal{I})$ ,  $OPT_{FA}(\mathcal{I})$  and  $OPT_{DP}(\mathcal{I})$  to denote the optimal value of the best fixed distribution, best fixed arm and best dynamic policy respectively, for instance  $\mathcal{I}$ . Likewise let  $OPT_{LP}^{[T]}(\mathcal{I})$  denote the optimal LP value for instance  $\mathcal{I}$  and given an algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  and an instance  $\mathcal{I}$ , let  $\mathbb{E}[REW(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I})]$  denote the expected reward obtained by  $\mathcal{A}$  on instance  $\mathcal{I}$ , where the expectation is over the internal randomness of the algorithm.

### 8.1 Warm-up: example from the Introduction

As a warm-up, let us recap and analyze the example from the Introduction.

**Construction 8.4.** There are two arms and one resource with budget  $B = \frac{T}{2}$ . Arm 1 has zero rewards and zero consumption. Arm 2 has consumption 1 in each round, and offers reward  $\frac{1}{2}$  in each round of the first half-time ( $\frac{T}{2}$  rounds). In the second half-time, arm 2 offers either reward 1 in all rounds, or reward 0 in all rounds. More formally, there are two problem instances, call them  $I_1$  and  $I_2$ , that coincide for the first half-time and differ in the second half-time.

**Lemma 8.5.** Any algorithm suffers  $OPT_{FD}/\mathbb{E}[REW] \geq \frac{5}{4} - o(1)$  on some instance in Construction 8.4.

The intuition is that given a random instance as input the algorithm needs to choose how much budget to invest in the first half-time, without knowing what comes in the second, and any choice (in expectation) leads to the claimed competitive ratio.

To prove Lemma 8.5 (as well we the main lower bound in Theorem 8.1(b)) we compare algorithm's performance to  $OPT_{LP}^{[T]}$ , and invoke the following lemma:

**Lemma 8.6.** 
$$OPT_{FD} \ge OPT_{LP}^{[T]} - O\left(OPT_{LP}^{[T]} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{\log dT}{B}}\right)$$

*Proof.* Let  $\tau^*$  denote the time-step at which  $OPT_{LP}^{[T]}$  is maximized. Let p denote the optimal solution to  $\tau^* \cdot OPT_{LP}(\overline{M}_{\tau^*}, B(1-\epsilon), \tau^*)$  where  $\epsilon = \sqrt{\frac{\log dT}{B}}$ . Note that  $OPT_{FD}$  is at least as large as the expected total reward obtained by the distribution p. From the Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds (Lemma A.2), with probability at least  $1 - dT^{-2}$  we have

$$orall i \in [d] \qquad \sum_{t \in [ au^*]} oldsymbol{p} \cdot oldsymbol{c}_{t,i} \leq B.$$

Conditioning on this event the expected total reward obtained by p is

$$\sum_{t \in [\tau^*]} \boldsymbol{p} \cdot \boldsymbol{r}_t = \tau^* \cdot \operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{LP}}(\overline{\boldsymbol{M}}_{\tau^*}, B(1-\epsilon), \tau^*).$$

Thus the expected total reward obtained by p is at least  $\tau^* \cdot OPT_{LP}(\overline{M}_{\tau^*}, B(1-\epsilon), \tau^*)$ . <sup>16</sup> Moreover from Eq. (6.15) we have that

$$\begin{aligned} \operatorname{OPT}_{\mathrm{FD}} &\geq \tau^* \cdot \operatorname{OPT}_{\mathrm{LP}}(\overline{M}_{\tau^*}, B(1-\epsilon), \tau^*) \\ &\geq (1-\epsilon)\tau^* \cdot \operatorname{OPT}_{\mathrm{LP}}(\overline{M}_{\tau^*}, B, \tau^*) \\ &\geq \operatorname{OPT}_{\mathrm{LP}}^{[T]} - O\left(\operatorname{OPT}_{\mathrm{LP}}^{[T]}\sqrt{\frac{\log dT}{B}}\right). \end{aligned}$$

<sup>16</sup>With probability  $T^{-2}$  we assume that p has an expected reward of 0.

Proof of Lemma 8.5. Denote the two arms by  $A_1$  and  $A_0$  where  $A_0$  denotes the null arm. The consumption for arm  $A_1$  is 1 for all rounds in both  $\mathcal{I}_1$  and  $\mathcal{I}_2$ . Thus the only difference between the two instances is the rewards obtained for playing arm  $A_1$  in each round. The instances have two phases where each phase lasts for  $\frac{T}{2}$  rounds. In phase 1, in both  $\mathcal{I}_1$  and  $\mathcal{I}_2$  playing arm  $A_1$  fetches a reward  $\frac{1}{2}$ . In the second phase, in  $\mathcal{I}_1$ , the reward for playing arm  $A_1$  is 0 while in  $\mathcal{I}_2$  the reward for playing arm  $A_1$  is 1. Thus the *outcome* matrix for the first  $\frac{T}{2}$  time-steps is the same in instances  $\mathcal{I}_1$  and  $\mathcal{I}_2$ .

Consider a randomized algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$ . Let  $\alpha_1$  be the expected number of times arm  $A_1$  is played by  $\mathcal{A}$  in the first  $\frac{T}{2}$  rounds on instances  $\mathcal{I}_1$  and  $\mathcal{I}_2$ . Note since the outcome matrix is same, the expected number of times the arm is played should be same in both the instances. Let  $\alpha_{2,1}$ ,  $\alpha_{2,2}$  denote the expected number of times arm  $A_1$  is played in the second phase in instances  $\mathcal{I}_1$  and  $\mathcal{I}_2$  respectively.

Recall that in this section we are interested in a lower-bound on the competitive ratio  $OPT_{FD}/\mathbb{E}[REW]$ for every instance. Consider  $OPT_{LP}^{[T]}(\mathcal{I}_1)$ , the optimal value of the best fixed distribution on  $\mathcal{I}_1$ . Using Eq. (5.4) with  $\tau = \frac{T}{2}$  this equals  $\frac{T}{2} \cdot OPT_{LP}\left(\overline{M}_{\frac{T}{2}}, B, \frac{T}{2}\right)$  which evaluates to  $\frac{T}{4}$ . Likewise  $OPT_{LP}^{[T]}(\mathcal{I}_2)$ equals  $T \cdot OPT_{LP}\left(\overline{M}_T, B, T\right)$ , which evaluates to  $\frac{3T}{8}$ . Consider the performance of  $\mathcal{A}$  on  $\mathcal{I}_1$ . We have,

$$\frac{\operatorname{OPT}_{LP}^{[T]}(\mathcal{I}_1)}{\mathbb{E}[\operatorname{REW}(\mathcal{A},\mathcal{I}_1)]} \ge \left(\frac{T}{4}\right) / \left(\frac{\alpha_1}{2}\right).$$

$$(8.1)$$

Likewise on  $\mathcal{I}_2$  we have,

$$\frac{\operatorname{OPT}_{LP}^{[T]}(\mathcal{I}_2)}{\mathbb{E}[\operatorname{REW}(\mathcal{A},\mathcal{I}_2)]} \ge \left(\frac{3T}{8}\right) / \left(\frac{\alpha_1}{2} + \alpha_{2,2}\right).$$
(8.2)

Thus the competitive ratio of A is at least the maximum of the ratios in Eq. (8.1) and Eq. (8.2). Thus we want to minimize this maximum and is achieved when the two ratios are equal to each other.

Notice that the term  $\alpha_{2,1}$  does not appear in Eq. (8.1) and Eq. (8.2). By setting the term in Eq. (8.1) equal to the term in Eq. (8.2) and re-arranging,

$$\alpha_1 = 4\alpha_{2,2}.\tag{8.3}$$


Moreover we have  $\alpha_1 + \alpha_{2,2} \leq B$ . Combining this with Eq. (8.3) we get  $\alpha_1 \leq \frac{4B}{5} = \frac{2T}{5}$  and the corresponding competitive ratio is at least  $\left(\frac{T}{4}\right) / \left(\frac{\alpha_1}{2}\right) \geq \frac{5}{4}$ . By Lemma 8.6 with d = 1, for every  $j \in [2]$ ,

$$\operatorname{OPT}_{\mathrm{FD}}(\mathcal{I}_j)/\operatorname{\mathbb{E}}[\operatorname{REW}(\mathcal{A},\mathcal{I}_j)] \geq \frac{5}{4} - O\left(\frac{\operatorname{OPT}_{\mathrm{LP}}^{[T]}}{T}\sqrt{\frac{\log T}{B}}\right).$$

#### 8.2 The main lower bound: proof of Theorem 8.1(b)

To obtain the  $\Omega(\log T)$  lower bound in Theorem 8.1(b), we extend Construction 8.4 to one with  $\Omega(\log T)$  phases rather than just two. As before, the algorithm needs to decide how much budget to save for the subsequent phases; without knowing whether they would bring higher rewards or nothing. The construction is as follows, see Figure 3 for a pictorial representation:

**Construction 8.7.** There is one resource with budget B, and two arms, denoted  $A_0, A_1$ . Arm  $A_0$  is the "null arm" that has zero reward and zero consumption. The consumption of arm  $A_1$  is 1 in all rounds. The rewards of  $A_1$  are defined as follows. We partition the time into  $\frac{T}{B}$  phases of duration B each (for simplicity, assume that B divides T). We consider  $\frac{T}{B}$  problem instances; for each instance  $\mathcal{I}_{\tau}, \tau \in [\frac{T}{B}]$  arm  $A_1$  has positive rewards up to and including phase  $\tau$ ; after that all rewards are 0. In each phase  $\sigma \in [\tau]$ , arm  $A_1$  has reward  $\sigma B/T$  in each round.



Time, in  $\frac{T}{B}$  phases of B rounds each

Figure 3: The lower-bounding construction for the  $\Omega(\log T)$  lower bound. Here  $\epsilon = \frac{B}{T}$ .

The lower bound holds for a wide range of budgets B, as expressed by the following lemma:

Lemma 8.8. For any budget B and any algorithm there is a problem instance in Construction 8.7 such that

$$\frac{OPT_{FD}}{\mathbb{E}[REW]} \ge \frac{1}{2} \cdot \ln(\lfloor T/B \rfloor) + \zeta - O\left(\frac{\log^{1.5} T}{\sqrt{B}}\right),\tag{8.4}$$

where  $\zeta = 0.577...$  is the Euler-Masceroni constant, and  $OPT_{FD} \ge B^2/T$ .

In the rest of this subsection we prove Lemma 8.8. Fix any randomized algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$ . As before in this sub-section we are interested in the ratio  $OPT_{FD}/\mathbb{E}[REW(\mathcal{A})]$ . We argue that it has the claimed competitive ratio on at least one instance  $\mathcal{I}_{\tau}$  in the construction 8.7. The proof proceeds in two parts. We first argue about the solution structure of the optimal distribution for the construction 8.7 (we prove this formally in Lemma 8.9). Next we characterize the expected number of times arm  $A_1$  is played if  $\mathcal{A}$  optimal algorithm in each of the phases. Combining the two we get Lemma 8.8.

Structure of the optimal solution. Define  $OPT_{LP}(\overline{M}_{\tau^*}, B, \tau^*)$  to be the optimal value of LP 4.1 on the instance  $\mathcal{I}_{\tau}$ . Then we have the following Lemma.

**Lemma 8.9.** For a given instance  $\mathcal{I}_{\tau}$  we have  $OPT_{LP}(\overline{M}_{\tau^*}, B, \tau^*) = \frac{\epsilon B(\tau+1)}{2}$ .

*Proof.* Let  $\mathcal{P}(t)$  denote the non-zero reward on arm  $A_1$  at time-step t (*i.e.*,  $\mathcal{P}(t) = \lceil \frac{t}{B} \rceil \epsilon$ ). It suffices to prove that the optimal stopping time  $\tau^* = B\tau$ . Indeed, given that the stopping time is  $B\tau$ , the optimal solution is to set  $X(1) = \frac{1}{\tau}$  and  $X(0) = 1 - \frac{1}{\tau}$  thus obtaining a total reward of  $\frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t \in [B\tau]} \mathcal{P}(t)\epsilon$ . From the definition of  $\mathcal{P}(t)$  we have that  $\frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t \in [B\tau]} \mathcal{P}(t)\epsilon = \frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{j \in [\tau]} \epsilon Bj$ . Using the fact that  $\sum_{j \in [\tau]} j = \frac{\tau(\tau+1)}{2}$  we get the statement of the Lemma. Thus it remains to prove that the optimal stopping time  $\tau^* = B\tau$ .

First it is easy to prove that  $\tau^* \leq B\tau$ . Since there are no rewards after time-step  $\tau^*$ , we have

$$\forall t' > 0 \qquad \text{OPT}_{\text{LP}}(\overline{M}_{\tau*+t'}, B, \tau^* + t') = \frac{1}{\tau+t'} \sum_{t \in [\tau^*]} \mathcal{P}(t) \epsilon < \frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t \in [B\tau]} \mathcal{P}(t) \epsilon.$$

Now we will argue that the optimal stopping time cannot be strictly lesser than  $\tau^*$ . To do so, first we argue that for two stopping times  $t_1 < t_2$  within the same phase, the maximum objective is achieved for the stopping time  $t_2$ . This implies that the optimal stopping time has to be the last time step of some phase.

Consider times  $t_1 < t_2$  such that  $\mathcal{P}(t_1) = \mathcal{P}(t_2) = \tau$ . Then we want to claim that

$$\frac{B}{t_1}\left(\sum_{t\in[t_1]}\mathcal{P}(t)\epsilon\right)\leq \frac{B}{t_2}\left(\sum_{t\in[t_2]}\mathcal{P}(t)\epsilon\right).$$

For contradiction assume the inequality does not hold. Then we have the following.

$$\sum_{t \in [t_1]} \mathcal{P}(t) > \frac{t_1}{t_2} \left( \sum_{t \in [t_2]} \mathcal{P}(t) \right).$$

Note that  $\sum_{t \in [B(\tau-1)]} \mathcal{P}(t) = \sum_{t' \in [\tau]} Bt' = \frac{B(\tau-1)\tau}{2}$ . Thus we have

$$\sum_{t \in [t_1]} \mathcal{P}(t) = \frac{B(\tau - 1)\tau}{2} + (t_1 - B(\tau - 1))\tau,$$
  
$$\sum_{t \in [t_2]} \mathcal{P}(t) = \frac{B(\tau - 1)\tau}{2} + (t_2 - B(\tau - 1))\tau.$$

Therefore we have,

$$\frac{B(\tau-1)\tau}{2} + (t_1 - B(\tau-1))\tau > \frac{t_1B(\tau-1)\tau}{2t_2} + \frac{t_1}{t_2} \cdot (t_2 - B(\tau-1))\tau.$$

Further re-arranging, we get  $B(\tau - 1) > t_1$ . This is a contradiction since  $t_1$  is in phase  $\tau$ , so  $t_1 \ge B(\tau - 1)$ .

Next we argue that the optimal value is achieved when the stopping time is in the last *non-zero rewards* phase. Consider two phases  $\tau_1 < \tau_2$ . Thus the ending times are  $B\tau_1$  and  $B\tau_2$ . To prove that the optimal value increases by stopping at  $B\tau_2$ , as opposed to  $B\tau_1$ , we want to show that

$$\frac{1}{\tau_1} \sum_{t \in [\tau_1]} Bt\epsilon \le \frac{1}{\tau_2} \sum_{t \in [\tau_2]} Bt\epsilon$$

As before assume for a contradiction that this doesn't hold. Then re-arranging we get,  $\frac{\tau_1(\tau_1+1)}{2} > \frac{\tau_1(\tau_2+1)}{2}$ , which implies  $\tau_1 > \tau_2$ , contradiction. We conclude that the stopping time is  $\tau^* = B\tau$ .

**Expected behavior of the optimal algorithm.** Consider any randomized algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$ . The performance of  $\mathcal{A}$  is then as follows. From the definition of  $OPT_{LP}^{[T]}$  we have,

$$\frac{\operatorname{OPT}_{LP}^{[T]}}{\mathbb{E}[\operatorname{REW}(\mathcal{A})]} = \max_{1 \le \tau \le T/B} \frac{B\tau \cdot \operatorname{OPT}_{LP}(\overline{M}_{B\tau}, B, B\tau)}{\mathbb{E}[\operatorname{REW}(\mathcal{A})]}.$$
(8.5)

We will now show that for any algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$ , there exists an instance  $j \in \left\lceil \frac{T}{B} \right\rceil$ ,

$$\frac{\operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{LP}}^{[T]}(\mathcal{I}_j)}{\mathbb{E}[\operatorname{REW}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I}_j)]} \ge \Omega(\log T).$$
(8.6)

Consider two consecutive instances  $\mathcal{I}_{\tau}$  and  $\mathcal{I}_{\tau+1}$ . The outcome matrices in the phases  $1, 2, \ldots, \tau$  look identical in both these instances. This implies that any randomized algorithm cannot distinguish the two instances (in expectation). Thus, the expected number of times arm  $A_1$  is chosen by algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  in phases  $1, 2, \ldots, \tau$  is identical. Let  $\alpha_{\tau}$  denote the expected number of times  $\mathcal{A}$  plays arm  $A_1$  in phase  $\tau$ . Note that this is the same for all instances  $\mathcal{I}_{\tau}, \mathcal{I}_{\tau+1}, \ldots, \mathcal{I}_{T/B}$ , as just argued. Thus, we can write

$$\mathbb{E}[\operatorname{REW}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I}_{\tau})] = \sum_{j \in [\tau]} j \epsilon \alpha_j.$$
(8.7)

Note that the expected number of times arm  $A_1$  is played in phase  $\tau$  on instances  $\mathcal{I}_1, \mathcal{I}_2, \ldots, \mathcal{I}_{\tau-1}$  does not appear in this expression and thus, is irrelevant for our purposes. Additionally, WLOG we only consider algorithms that exhaust its budget B. Indeed, an algorithm can instead choose only arm  $A_1$  when the number of steps remaining equals its residual budget, without any degradation in the total reward. Combining Eq. (8.7) with Lemma 8.9, the LHS in Eq. (8.5) can be lower-bounded by,

$$\frac{\operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{LP}}^{[T]}}{\mathbb{E}[\operatorname{REW}(\mathcal{A})]} \geq \frac{\epsilon B}{2} \cdot \left( \min_{\substack{\alpha \geq 0: \\ \langle \alpha, 1 \rangle = B}} \max_{1 \leq \tau \leq T/B} \frac{\tau + 1}{\sum_{j \in [\tau]} j \epsilon \alpha_j} \right).$$
(8.8)

We can characterize the optimal solution  $\alpha$  in Eq. (8.8) as follows. Since the objective is a minimum over  $\frac{T}{B}$  convex functions with a single equality constraint on the sum of the variables, from complementary slackness condition the minimum is attained when

for each 
$$\tau \in [T/B]$$
, the expression  $\left(\sum_{j \in [\tau]} j\alpha_j\right) \cdot \frac{1}{\tau+1}$  is the same . (8.9)

We will now prove that Eq. (8.9) leads to the following recurrence for the maximizing values of  $\alpha_i$ .

$$\forall j \ge 2 \qquad \alpha_j = \frac{\alpha_1}{2j}.\tag{8.10}$$

We will prove the recurrence Eq. (8.10) via induction. The base case is when j = 2. By Eq. (8.9),

$$\frac{1}{\alpha_1} = \frac{3/2}{\alpha_1 + 2\alpha_2},$$

which implies that  $\alpha_2 = \frac{1}{4}\alpha_1$ , and we are done. Now consider the inductive case; let all  $\alpha$  up to  $\alpha_{\tau}$  satisfy the recurrence Eq. (8.10). Consider the instance  $\mathcal{I}_{\tau}$  and  $\mathcal{I}_{\tau+1}$ . From Eq. (8.9) we have,

$$\frac{\alpha_1 + \sum_{j=2}^{\tau} \alpha_1/2}{\tau + 1} = \frac{\alpha_1 + \sum_{j=2}^{\tau} \alpha_1/2 + (\tau + 1)\alpha_{\tau+1}}{\tau + 2}$$

Rearranging,  $\alpha_{\tau+1} = \frac{1}{2(\tau+1)}\alpha_1$ . This completes the inductive step, and the proof of Eq. (8.10). We complete the proof of the lemma as follows. As argued in Eq. (8.10), for the minimum value of  $\{\alpha_j\}_{j\in[T/B]}$ , the expression  $\frac{\epsilon B}{2} \cdot \frac{\tau+1}{\sum_{j\in[\tau]} j\epsilon\alpha_j}$ , which is the RHS in Eq. (8.8), is the same for all  $\tau$  and in particular for  $\tau = 1$ . Substituting  $\tau = 1$ , this evaluates to  $B/\alpha_1$ . Since  $\alpha_1(1+1/4+1/6+\ldots+B/2T) \leq B$  it follows that  $\alpha_1 \leq 2B/H(\frac{T}{B})$ , where H(n) denotes the  $n^{th}$  Harmonic number. So, the right-hand side of Eq. (8.5) is at least  $\frac{1}{2}H(\frac{T}{B})$ . of Eq. (8.5) is at least  $\frac{1}{2}H(\frac{T}{B})$ . Finally,  $H(n) \ge \ln(n) + \zeta$ , where  $\zeta = 0.577...$  is the Euler-Masceroni constant. Combining this with Lemma 8.6 we obtain Eq. (8.4).

#### 8.3 Best dynamic policy: proof of Theorem 8.1(c) and Theorem 8.3

Consider the following construction of the lower-bound example.

**Construction 8.10.** There is one resource with budget B, and two arms, denoted  $A_0, A_1$ . Arm  $A_0$  is the 'null arm' that has zero reward and zero consumption. The consumption of arm  $A_1$  is 1 in all rounds. The rewards of  $A_1$  are defined as follows. We partition the time into  $\frac{T}{B}$  phases of duration B each (for simplicity, assume that B divides T). We consider  $\frac{T}{B}$  problem instances; for each instance  $\mathcal{I}_{\tau}, \tau \in [T/B]$  arm  $A_1$  has 0 reward in all phases except phase  $\tau$ ; in phase  $\tau$  it has a reward of 1 in each round.

**Lemma 8.11.** Consider Construction 8.10 with any given time horizon  $T \ge 2$  and budget  $B \le \sqrt{T}$ . Let *ALG be an arbitrary randomized algorithm for BwK. Then for one of the problem instances,* 

$$OPT_{DP}/\mathbb{E}[REW] \ge T/B^2. \tag{8.11}$$

*Proof.* Let  $n = \frac{T}{B}$  be the number of phases in Construction 8.10. Let ALG be a deterministic algorithm. Let REW denote its total reward, and let  $\mathbb{E}_{\tau}[\cdot]$  denote the expectation over the uniform-at-random choice of the problem instance  $\mathcal{I}_{\tau}$ . We claim that

$$OPT_{DP}/\mathbb{E}_{\tau}[REW] \ge T/B^2.$$
(8.12)

Assume that ALG maximizes  $\mathbb{E}_{\tau}[\mathsf{REW}]$  (over deterministic algorithms). Then it satisfies the following:

• Within each phase, if ALG ever chooses to play arm  $A_1$ , it does so in the first round of the phase. If it receives a reward of 1 in this round, it plays  $A_1$  for the rest of the phase. Else, it never plays  $A_1$  for the rest of this phase.

For each  $\tau \in [n]$ , let  $\alpha_{\tau}$  denote the number of times ALG chooses arm  $A_1$  in phase  $\tau$  in problem instance  $\mathcal{I}_{\tau}$ . The expected reward of ALG over the uniform-at-random choice of the problem instance  $\mathcal{I}_{\tau}$  is  $\mathbb{E}[\mathbb{REW}] = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i \in [n]} \alpha_i$ . Let  $(\alpha_{\pi(1)}, \alpha_{\pi(2)}, \ldots, \alpha_{\pi(k)})$  be the subsequence of  $(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n)$  which contains all elements with non-zero values.

The key observation is as follows. The problem instances  $\mathcal{I}_{\pi(\tau-1)}$  and  $\mathcal{I}_{\pi(\tau)}$  are identical until phase  $\pi(\tau-1) - 1$ . Since the feedback received by ALG until the first time it chooses arm  $A_1$  in phase  $\pi(\tau-1)$  is identical, it follows that  $\alpha_{\pi(\tau-1)} - \alpha_{\pi(\tau)} = 1$ . Therefore,

$$\sum_{i \in [n]} \alpha_i = \sum_{i \in [k]} \alpha_{\pi(i)} = k \cdot \alpha_{\pi(1)} - \frac{k(k-1)}{2}.$$

Noting that  $\alpha_1 \leq B$  and  $k \leq \min(B, n) = B$ , we have:

$$\mathbb{E}[\text{REW}] \leq \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i \in [n]} \alpha_i < B^2/n = B^3/T.$$

Since  $OPT_{DP} = B$  for every problem instance  $\mathcal{I}_{\tau}$ , Eq. (8.12) holds for ALG, and therefore for any other deterministic algorithm. By Yao's lemma, for every randomized algorithm ALG there exists a problem instance  $\mathcal{I}_{\tau}$  such that (8.11) holds.

We now use the same construction to prove Theorem 8.3.

Proof sketch of Theorem 8.3. We prove the Theorem by contradiction. Let  $B \leq \sqrt{T}$ . For contradiction, consider an algorithm ALG for cBwK on a policy set  $\Pi$  such that  $OPT_{FD}(\Pi)/\mathbb{E}[REW(ALG)] < T/B^2$ . We will now use ALG to construct an algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  for the Construction 8.10 such that  $OPT_{DP}/\mathbb{E}[REW(\mathcal{A})] < T/B^2$  for every instance. This contradicts Lemma 8.11.

Consider a policy set  $\Pi$  with |n| policies. Every policy  $\pi \in \Pi$  maps contexts in the range [1, T] to the action set  $\{A_1, A_0\}$ . In particular, a policy  $\pi_{\tau} \in \Pi$  maps contexts that lie in the range  $[B * (\tau - 1) + 1, B * \tau]$  to arm  $A_1$  and all other contexts to  $A_0$ .  $\mathcal{A}$  invokes ALG as a sub-routine with the policy set  $\Pi$ . At each timestep t,  $\mathcal{A}$  gives the context  $x_t = t$  to ALG and plays the arm chosen by ALG.

For an instance  $\mathcal{I}_{\tau}$  in Construction 8.10,  $OPT_{FD}(\Pi)$  is the total reward obtained by choosing the action given by  $\pi_{\tau}$  in all time-steps. The total reward obtained is B, which equals  $OPT_{DP}(\mathcal{I}_{\tau})$ . Therefore,  $OPT_{FD}(\Pi)/\mathbb{E}[REW(ALG)] < T/B^2$  implies we have  $OPT_{DP}/\mathbb{E}[REW(\mathcal{A})] < T/B^2$  for every instance  $\mathcal{I}_{\tau}$ , which is a contradiction.

#### 8.4 Best fixed arm: proof of Theorem 8.1(d)

We use the following construction for the lower-bound.

**Construction 8.12.** There is one resource with budget B, and K arms denoted by  $A_1, A_2, \ldots, A_K$ . Arm  $A_K$  is the 'null arm' that has zero reward and zero consumption. There are K instances in the family. In each instance, the time-steps are divided into T/K equally spaced phases. In instance  $\mathcal{I}_j$ , all arms  $A_{j'}$  where j' > j have 0 reward and 0 consumption in all time-steps. Consider an instance  $\mathcal{I}_j$  for some  $j \in [K-1]$  and an arm  $j' \leq j$ . Arm  $A_{j'}$  has a reward of  $\frac{1}{K^{K-j'}}$  and consumption of 1 in all time-steps in phase j' and has a reward of 0 and consumption of 0 in every other time-step. Thus the rewards and consumption are bounded in the interval [0, 1] for every arm and every time-step in all instances in this family.

**Lemma 8.13.** Let  $T \ge 2$ ,  $2 \le B \le T$ ,  $K \ge 3$  be given parameters of the AdversarialBwK problem. We show that there exists a family of instances with d = 1 shared resource such that for every randomized algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  we have  $\frac{OPT_{EA}}{\mathbb{E}[REW(\mathcal{A})]}$  is at least  $\Omega(K)$  on one of these instances.

*Proof.* First note that the best fixed arm in instance  $\mathcal{I}_j$  is to pick arm  $A_j$  which yields a total reward of  $\frac{B}{K^{K-j}}$ .

Consider a randomized algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$ . Observe that in the first j phases, the instances  $\mathcal{I}_{j-1}$  and  $\mathcal{I}_j$  have identical outcome matrices. Thus the expected number of times any arm  $A_k$  for  $k \in [K]$  is chosen in phases  $\{1, 2, \ldots, j\}$  should be the same in both the instances. Let  $\alpha_k$  denote the expected number of times arm k is played by  $\mathcal{A}$  in phase k on instances  $\mathcal{I}_k, \mathcal{I}_{k+1}, \ldots, \mathcal{I}_{K-1}$ <sup>17</sup>. Moreover we have that  $\alpha_1 + \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_{K-1} \leq B$ .

To show the lower-bound we want to minimize the competitive ratio on every instance for all possible values of  $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_{K-1}$ . For ease of notation denote  $r_j := \frac{1}{K^{K-j}}$ . Let  $\alpha_B$  denote the set of values to  $\{\alpha_k\}_{k \in [K-1]}$  such that  $\sum_{k \in [K-1]} \alpha_k \leq B$ . Thus,

$$\frac{\operatorname{OPT}_{\operatorname{FA}}}{\mathbb{E}[\operatorname{REW}(\mathcal{A})]} \ge \min_{\alpha_{\mathcal{B}}} \frac{r_k B}{\sum_{j \in [k]} r_j \alpha_j}.$$
(8.13)

The ratio is minimized when all ratios in Eq. (8.13) are equal. We will show via induction that this yields the following recurrence,

$$\forall k \ge 2 \qquad \alpha_k = \left(1 - \frac{r_{k-1}}{r_k}\right) \alpha_1. \tag{8.14}$$

Combining this with the condition that  $\sum_{k \in [K-1]} \alpha_k \leq B$ , this yields the condition  $\alpha_1 \leq \frac{B}{K - \frac{1}{K}}$ .

Moreover the minimizing value in Eq. (8.13) is  $K - \frac{1}{K}$  which proves Lemma 8.13.

We will now prove the recurrence Eq. (8.14). Consider the base case with k = 2. Equalizing the first two terms in Eq. (8.13) we get

$$\frac{r_1B}{r_1\alpha_1} = \frac{r_2B}{r_1\alpha_1 + r_2\alpha_2}.$$

Re-arranging we obtain that  $\alpha_2 = \left(1 - \frac{r_1}{r_2}\right) \alpha_1$ . We will now prove the inductive case. Let the recurrence be true for all  $1 \le k \le k'$ . Consider the case k = k' + 1. Setting the k' and k' + 1 ratios in Eq. (8.13) equal, we obtain

$$\frac{r_{k'B}}{\sum_{j \in [k']} r_j \alpha_j} = \frac{r_{k'+1}B}{\sum_{j \in [k'+1]} r_j \alpha_j}.$$
(8.15)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>This has to be the same in all instances since the outcome matrix is identical until phase k in all these instances

Moreover from the inductive hypothesis we have  $\alpha_j = \left(1 - \frac{r_{j-1}}{r_j}\right) \alpha_1$  for every  $j \le k'$ . Thus we have

$$\sum_{j \in [k']} r_j \alpha_j = r_{k'} \alpha_1$$
$$\sum_{j \in [k'+1]} r_j \alpha_j = r_{k'} \alpha_1 + r_{k'+1} \alpha_{k'+1}$$

Plugging this back in Eq. (8.15) we get

$$\frac{r_{k'B}}{r_{k'\alpha_1}} = \frac{r_{k'+1}B}{r_{k'\alpha_1} + r_{k'+1}\alpha_{k'+1}}.$$

Rearranging we get  $\alpha_{k'+1} = \left(1 - \frac{r'_k}{r_{k'+1}}\right) \alpha_1$ . This completes the induction.

## 9 Open Questions and Follow-Up Work

We use essentially the same algorithm, LagrangeBwK, to solve both stochastic and adversarial version of bandits with knapsacks. Yet, we use it with different parameter  $T_0$  (randomly guessed in the adversarial version) and a slightly different definition of the outcome matrices.<sup>18</sup> Can we solve both versions with *exactly* the same algorithm? One concrete goal would be to achieve  $O(\log T)$  competitive ratio in the adversarial version, and o(T) regret for the stochastic version in the regime  $\min(B, OPT_{FD}) \ge \Omega(T)$ . A similar "best of both worlds" result has been obtained for bandits without budget/supply constraints: one algorithm that achieves optimal regret rates for both adversarial bandits and stochastic bandits, without knowing which environment it is in (Bubeck and Slivkins, 2012; Seldin and Slivkins, 2014; Auer and Chiang, 2016). Further developments focused on mostly stochastic environments with a small amount of adversarial behavior (Seldin and Slivkins, 2014; Seldin and Lugosi, 2017; Lykouris et al., 2018; Wei and Luo, 2018); similar questions are relevant to BwK as well.

Given our upper and lower bounds, the competitive ratio  $\frac{OPT_{FD}-reg}{\mathbb{E}[REW]}$  can potentially be improved in several regimes. Some concrete questions left open by our paper are as follows:

- obtain *constant* competitive ratio in the regime  $B = \Omega(T)$ .
- obtain *sublinear* dependence of the competitive ratio on d, the number of resources.
- obtain *constant* competitive ratio for problem instances with "large enough" OPT<sub>FD</sub>.
- obtain *optimal* constant competitive ratio when  $OPT_{FD}$  is known up to a constant factor.
- obtain competitive ratio in Theorem 5.1 *uniformly* over  $g_{\min}$  (*i.e.*, for all  $g_{\min}$  simultaneously). Equivalently, obtain competitive ratio  $O(\ln(T/OPT_{FD}))$ .

Several of these questions have been resolved in follow-up work. Kesselheim and Singla (2020) resolve the optimal dependence on d, achieving competitive ratio  $O(\log(d) \log(T))$  via a more careful analysis of LagrangeBwK (among other results), and prove a matching lower bound. Castiglioni et al. (2022) use a version of LagrangeBwK to obtain T/B competitive ratio, which is a mere constant when  $B = \Omega(T)$ . Interestingly, they use fixed parameters  $(B_0, T_0) = (B, T)$ , without the random guessing in Algorithm 2 or the multi-phased "meta-algorithm" in Algorithm 3; moreover, their result holds with high probability. Castiglioni et al. (2022) also analyze the very same algorithm in the stochastic setting, matching our regret bound

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Recall that in the stochastic setting there a 'dummy resource' with strictly positive consumption for all arms, whereas in the adversarial version the null arm must have zero consumption for all resources.

from Theorem 4.4 and therefore achieving a "best of both worlds" result. Their version of LagrangeBwK optimizes the dual vector  $\lambda \in [0, T/B]^d$ , whereas ours optimizes  $\lambda$  over all distributions.

Can one still achieve meaningful regret bounds for Adversarial BwK, without the competitive ratio? One way to interpret our impossibility results is that the fixed-distribution benchmark is just too harsh. It could be productive to define a weaker (and perhaps fairer) benchmark for the algorithm to compete against, so as to achieve competitive ratio of 1 relative to this benchmark. Gaitonde et al. (2022) achieve one such result for the special case of budget-constrained bidding in a repeated auction.

In terms of extensions to "richer" application scenarios, as in Section 7, Castiglioni et al. (2022) spell out two more extensions: to repeated Stackelberg games and to repeated first-price auctions. The main open question is to achieve similar results using a "stochastic" primal algorithm, *i.e.*, a primal algorithm designed (only) for the stochastic version of a particular application scenario.

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## A Standard tools

Our exposition in the body of the paper relies on some tools that are either known or can easily be derived using standard techniques. We state (and sometimes derive) these tools in this appendix.

#### A.1 Concentration Inequalities

**Lemma A.1** (Azuma-Hoeffding inequality). Let  $Y_1, Y_2, \ldots, Y_T$  be a martingale difference sequence (i.e.,  $\mathbb{E}[Y_t | Y_1, Y_2, \ldots, Y_{t-1}] = 0$ ). Suppose  $|Y_t| \leq c$  for all  $t \in \{1, 2, \ldots, T\}$ . Let  $R_{0,\delta}(T) := \sqrt{2Tc^2 \ln(1/\delta)}$ . Then for every  $\delta > 0$ ,

$$\Pr\left[\sum_{t\in[T]} Y_t > R_{0,\delta}(T)\right] \le \delta.$$

**Lemma A.2** (Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds). Let  $X_1, X_2, ..., X_T$  be a sequence of independent random variables such that  $|X_t| \le c$  for all  $t \in \{1, 2, ..., T\}$ . Let  $Z_t := \mathbb{E}[X_t]$ . Then for every  $\delta > 0$ ,

$$\Pr\left[\left|\sum_{t\in[T]} X_t - Z_t\right| > 3\sqrt{\left(\sum_{t\in[T]} Z_t\right)c^2\ln(1/\delta)}\right] \le \delta.$$

#### A.2 Lagrangians: proof of Lemma 4.2

Assume one of the resources is the dummy resource, and one of the arms is the null arm. Consider the linear program  $LP_{M,B,T}$ , for some outcome matrix M. Let  $\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_{M,B,T}$  denote the Lagrange function.

**Lemma A.3** (Lemma 4.2, restated). Suppose  $(X^*, \lambda^*)$  is a mixed Nash equilibrium for the Lagrangian game. Then  $X^*$  is an optimal solution for the linear program (4.1). Moreover, the minimax value of the Lagrangian game equals the LP value:  $\mathcal{L}(X^*, \lambda^*) = OPT_{LP}$ .

In what follows we prove Lemma A.3. Writing out the definition of the mixed Nash equilibrium,

$$\mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{X}^*,\boldsymbol{\lambda}) \geq \mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{X}^*,\boldsymbol{\lambda}^*) \geq \mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{X},\boldsymbol{\lambda}^*) \qquad \forall \boldsymbol{X} \in \Delta_K, \boldsymbol{\lambda} \in \Delta_d.$$
(A.1)

For brevity, denote  $r(\mathbf{X}^*) = \sum_{a \in [K]} \mathbf{X}^*(a) r(a)$  and  $c_i(\mathbf{X}^*) = \sum_{a \in [K]} \mathbf{X}^*(a) c_i(a)$ . We first state and prove the complementary slackness condition for the Nash equilibrium.

**Claim A.4.** For every resource  $i \in [d]$  we have,

(a)  $1 - \frac{T}{B}c_i(\mathbf{X}^*) \ge 0$ , (b)  $\lambda_i^* > 0 \implies 1 - \frac{T}{B}c_i(\mathbf{X}^*) = 0$ .

*Proof.* Part (a). For contradiction, consider resource *i* that minimizes the left-hand side in (a), and assume that the said left-hand side is strictly negative. We have two cases: either  $\lambda_i^* < 1$  or  $\lambda_i^* = 1$ . When  $\lambda_i^* < 1$ , consider another distribution  $\tilde{\lambda} \in \Delta_d$  such that  $\tilde{\lambda}_i = 1$  and  $\tilde{\lambda}_{i'} = 0$  for every  $i' \neq i$ . Note that we have,  $\mathcal{L}(X^*, \tilde{\lambda}) < \mathcal{L}(X^*, \lambda^*)$ . This contradicts the first inequality in (A.1).

Consider the second case, when  $\lambda_i^* = 1$ . Then  $\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{X}^*, \mathbf{\lambda}^*) = r(\mathbf{X}^*) + 1 - \frac{T}{B}c_i(\mathbf{X}^*)$ . Consider any arm  $a \in [K]$  such that  $X^*(a) \neq 0$ . Let  $\tilde{\mathbf{X}} \in \Delta_K$  be another distribution such that  $\tilde{X}(a) := 0$  and  $\tilde{X}(\text{null}) := X^*(\text{null}) + X^*(a)$  and  $\tilde{X}(a') = X^*(a')$  for every  $a' \notin \{a, \text{null}\}$ . Note that  $\tilde{X}(\text{null}) \leq 1$ . Since  $(\mathbf{X}^*, \mathbf{\lambda}^*)$  is a Nash equilibrium, we have that  $\mathcal{L}(\tilde{\mathbf{X}}, \mathbf{\lambda}^*) \leq \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{X}^*, \mathbf{\lambda}^*)$ . This implies that  $-X^*(a)r(a) + X^*(a)\frac{T}{B}c_i(a) \leq 0$ . Re-arranging we obtain,  $\frac{T}{B}c_i(a) \leq r(a) \leq 1$ . Thus, we have  $1 - \frac{T}{B}c_i(a) \geq 0$ . Since this holds for every  $a \in [K]$  with  $X^*(a) \neq 0$ , we obtain a contradiction:

$$1 - \frac{T}{B}c_i(\mathbf{X}^*) = \sum_{a \in [K]} X^*(a) \left(1 - \frac{T}{B}c_i(a)\right) \ge 0.$$

**Part (b).** For contradiction, assume the statement is false for some resource *i*. Then, by part (a),  $\lambda_i^* > 0$  and  $1 - \frac{T}{B}c_i(\mathbf{X}^*) > 0$ , and consequently  $\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{X}^*, \boldsymbol{\lambda}^*) > r(\mathbf{X}^*)$ . Now, consider distribution  $\tilde{\boldsymbol{\lambda}}$  which puts probability 1 on the dummy resource. We then have  $\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{X}^*, \tilde{\boldsymbol{\lambda}}) = r(\mathbf{X}^*) < \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{X}^*, \boldsymbol{\lambda}^*)$ , contradicting the first inequality in Eq. (A.1).

Let X be some feasible solution for the linear program (4.1). Plugging the feasibility constraints into the definition of the Lagrangian function,  $\mathcal{L}(\tilde{X}, \lambda^*) \ge r(\tilde{X})$ . Claim A.4(a) implies that  $X^*$  is a feasible solution to the linear program (4.1). Claim A.4(b) implies that  $\mathcal{L}(X^*, \lambda^*) = r(X^*)$ . Thus,

$$r(\mathbf{X}^*) = \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{X}^*, \mathbf{\lambda}^*) \ge \mathcal{L}(\tilde{\mathbf{X}}, \mathbf{\lambda}^*) \ge r(\tilde{\mathbf{X}}).$$

So,  $X^*$  is an optimal solution to the LP. In particular,  $OPT_{LP} = r(X^*) = \mathcal{L}(X^*, \lambda^*)$ .

#### A.3 The stopped LP for Adversarial BwK: proof of Eq. (5.4)

The proof is similar to prior work Badanidiyuru et al. (2018); Devanur et al. (2011). Denote  $\mathcal{D}_{\tau}$  to be the set of all distributions over the arms such that for every  $\boldsymbol{p} \in \mathcal{D}_{\tau}$  we have the following: for every  $i \in [d]$  we have  $\sum_{t \in [\tau]} \boldsymbol{p} \cdot \boldsymbol{c}_{t,i} \leq B$ . In other words,  $\mathcal{D}_{\tau}$  denotes the set of distributions whose expected stopping time is at least  $\tau$ . Thus it immediately follows that  $OPT_{LP}(\tau) \geq \max_{\boldsymbol{p} \in \mathcal{D}_{\tau}} \sum_{t \in [\tau]} \boldsymbol{p} \cdot \boldsymbol{r}_t$  since for any given  $\boldsymbol{p} \in \mathcal{D}_{\tau}$  it is feasible to  $LP(\tau)$ . Thus  $OPT_{LP}(\tau)$  is at least the value of any feasible solution  $\boldsymbol{p} \in \mathcal{D}_{\tau}$ . Note that for every fixed distribution  $\boldsymbol{p} \in \Delta_K$ , there exists a  $\tau$  such that either  $\boldsymbol{p} \in \mathcal{D}_{\tau}$  and  $\boldsymbol{p} \notin \mathcal{D}_{\tau+1}$  or  $\boldsymbol{p} \in \mathcal{D}_T$ . Moreover the total expected reward we can obtain using  $\boldsymbol{p}$  is  $\sum_{t \in [\tau]} \boldsymbol{p} \cdot \boldsymbol{r}_t$ . Thus  $\max_{1 \leq \tau \leq T} OPT_{LP}(\tau) \geq OPT_{FD}$ .

#### A.4 Regret minimization in games: proof of Lemma 3.1

Let us revisit adversarial online learning, as per Figure 1. Denote the benchmark in Eq. (3.2) as

$$OPT_{AOL}(T) := \max_{a \in A} \sum_{t \in [T]} f_t(a).$$

Recall that  $[b_{\min}, b_{\max}]$  is the payoff range, and denote  $\sigma = b_{\max} - b_{\min}$ .

**Lemma A.5.** Suppose an algorithm for adversarial online learning satisfies (3.2) for some  $\delta > 0$ . Then

$$\Pr\left[\forall \tau \in [T] \ OPT_{AOL}(\tau) \ - \ \sum_{t \in [\tau]} \boldsymbol{f}_t \cdot \boldsymbol{p}_t \le \sigma \cdot \left(R_{\delta/T}(T) + \sqrt{2T\log(T/\delta)}\right)\right] \ge 1 - 2\delta.$$
(A.2)

*Proof.* Let us use the stronger regret bound (3.3) implied by (3.2). Note that

$$\mathbb{E}[f_t(a_t) \mid a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_{t-1}] = \boldsymbol{f}_t \cdot \boldsymbol{p}_t.$$

Applying the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality for each  $\tau \in [T]$ , and taking a union bound, we have

$$\Pr\left[ \forall \tau \in [T] \quad \sum_{t \in [\tau]} f_t(a_t) - \sum_{t \in [\tau]} f_t \cdot p_t \le \sigma \cdot \sqrt{2T \log(T/\delta)} \right] \ge 1 - \delta.$$
(A.3)

Taking a union bound over Eq. (A.3) and Eq. (3.3) and adding the equations we get Eq. (A.2).  $\Box$ 

Remark A.6. For Hedge algorithm, regret bound Eq. (A.2) is already proved in Freund and Schapire (1997).

Let  $W = \sqrt{2T \log(T/\delta)}$  denote the term from Lemma A.5 in what follows.

We now prove Lemma 3.1, similar to the proof in Freund and Schapire (1996) for the deterministic game. Recall that we take averages up to some fixed round  $\tau \in [T]$ . We prove that the following two inequalities hold, each with probability at least  $1 - \delta$ .

$$\frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t \in [\tau]} \boldsymbol{p}_{t,1}^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{G}_t \, \boldsymbol{p}_{t,2} \ge v^* - \sigma \cdot \frac{R_{1,\delta/T}(T) + 2W}{\tau}. \tag{A.4}$$

$$\frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t \in [\tau]} \boldsymbol{p}_{t,1}^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{G}_t \, \boldsymbol{p}_{t,2} \leq \overline{\boldsymbol{p}}_1^{\mathrm{T}} \, \boldsymbol{G} \, \boldsymbol{p}_2 + \sigma \cdot \frac{R_{2,\,\delta/T}(T) + 2W}{\tau} \qquad \qquad \forall \boldsymbol{p}_2 \in \Delta_{A_2}. \tag{A.5}$$

Eq. (3.5) in Lemma 3.1 follows by adding Eq. (A.4) and Eq. (A.5).

First we prove Eq. (A.4). Following the set of inequalities in Section 2.5 of Freund and Schapire (1996) we have,

$$\frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t \in [\tau]} \boldsymbol{p}_{t,1}^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{G}_{t} \boldsymbol{p}_{t,2} \geq whp \ \frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t \in [\tau]} \boldsymbol{p}_{1}^{*\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{G}_{t} \boldsymbol{p}_{t,2} - \sigma \cdot \frac{R_{1,\delta/T}(T) + W}{\tau} \qquad \text{From Lemma A.5}$$

$$\geq whp \ \frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t \in [\tau]} \boldsymbol{p}_{1}^{*\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{G} \boldsymbol{p}_{t,2} - \sigma \cdot \frac{R_{1,\delta/T}(T) + 2W}{\tau} \qquad \text{From Lemma A.1}$$

$$= \max_{\boldsymbol{p}_{1} \in \Delta_{A_{1}}} \frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t \in [\tau]} \boldsymbol{p}_{1}^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{G} \boldsymbol{p}_{t,2} - \sigma \cdot \frac{R_{1,\delta/T}(T) + 2W}{\tau} \qquad \text{From Definition of } \boldsymbol{p}_{1}^{*}.$$

$$= \max_{\boldsymbol{p}_{1} \in \Delta_{A_{1}}} \boldsymbol{p}_{1}^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{G} \boldsymbol{\overline{p}}_{2} - \sigma \cdot \frac{R_{1,\delta/T}(T) + 2W}{\tau} \qquad \text{From Definition of } \boldsymbol{\overline{p}}_{2}.$$

$$\geq \min_{\boldsymbol{p}_{2} \in \Delta_{A_{2}}} \max_{\boldsymbol{p}_{1} \in \Delta_{A_{1}}} \boldsymbol{p}_{1}^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{G} \boldsymbol{p}_{2} - \sigma \cdot \frac{R_{1,\delta/T}(T) + 2W}{\tau}$$

Here  $\leq_{whp}$  denotes statements that hold with probability at least  $1 - \delta$ . Now let us prove (A.5). Fix distribution  $p_2 \in \Delta_{A_2}$ . Then:

$$\frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t \in [\tau]} \boldsymbol{p}_{t,1}^{\mathrm{T}} \boldsymbol{G}_{t} \, \boldsymbol{p}_{t,2} \leq_{whp} \frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t \in [\tau]} \boldsymbol{p}_{t,1}^{\mathrm{T}} \, \boldsymbol{G}_{t} \, \boldsymbol{p}_{2} + \sigma \cdot \frac{R_{2,\,\delta/T}(T) + W}{\tau} \qquad \text{From Lemma A.5}$$

$$\leq_{whp} \frac{1}{\tau} \sum_{t \in [\tau]} \boldsymbol{p}_{t,1}^{\mathrm{T}} \, \boldsymbol{G} \, \boldsymbol{p}_{2} + \sigma \cdot \frac{R_{2,\,\delta/T}(T) + 2W}{\tau} \qquad \text{From Lemma A.1}$$

$$= \overline{\boldsymbol{p}_{1}}^{\mathrm{T}} \, \boldsymbol{G} \, \boldsymbol{p}_{2} + \sigma \cdot \frac{R_{2,\,\delta/T}(T) + 2W}{\tau} \qquad \text{From Definition of } \overline{\boldsymbol{p}_{1}}.$$

Taking a union bound over all the four high-probability inequalities, we get the lemma.

# **B** Table of notation

Notation	Usage
OPT <sub>FD</sub>	Optimal value of the fixed distribution over arms in hindsight.
OPT <sub>DP</sub>	Optimal dynamic policy in hindsight.
REW	Total (random) reward obtained by the algorithm
M	Outcome matrix; rewards and consumption for every arm; <i>o</i> used to represent a row.
$\overline{M}_{ au}$	Average of outcome matrices after $\tau$ time-steps.
$\overline{M}_{ au}^{ ext{ips}}$	Average of outcome matrices estimated using IPS estimates after $\tau$ time-steps.
G	Payoff matrix in the Lagrangian game
$R_{j,\delta}( au)$	Regret of $ALG_j$ with probability at least $1 - \delta$ after $\tau$ rounds
$R_{0,\delta}(\tau)$ or $R_0(\tau)$	Confidence term in the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality.
$U_j(T \mid T_0)$	Regret of $ALG_j$ after T rounds given the parameter $T_0$ (this affects scaling of regret).
$\mathcal{L}(.)$	Lagrange function
$T_0$	Parameter used in the Lagrangian. $T_0 = T$ in Stochastic BwK and $T_0 = \hat{g}$ in Adversarial BwK.
$B_0$	Scaled budget. $B_0 = \frac{B}{\text{ratio}}$ in Adversarial BwK (high-probability). Otherwise $B_0 = B$ .
$\widehat{g}, g_{\max}, g_{\min}$	Guess, maximum and minimum range of this guess respectively in Adversarial BwK.
κ	Multiplicative factor with which guess is increased.
$OPT_{LP}^{[ au]}$	Best objective of the $\tau$ stopped LPs ( <i>i.e.</i> , stopped at times 1, 2,, $\tau$ ).
$\square \mathbb{LP}_{\overline{\boldsymbol{M}}_{\tau},B,\tau}$	Linear program corresponding to the average outcome matrix $\overline{M}_{\tau}$ .
$\bigcirc \texttt{OPT}_{\texttt{LP}}(\overline{\boldsymbol{M}}_{\tau},B,\tau)$	Optimal value of $LP_{\overline{M}_{\tau},B,\tau}$ .

For reference, let us summarize the important notation used across sections.