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Designs for ramp-constrained day-ahead auctions | IEEE Conference Publication | IEEE Xplore

Designs for ramp-constrained day-ahead auctions


Abstract:

Some electric power markets allow bidders to specify constraints on ramp rates for increasing or decreasing power production. We show in a small example that a bidder cou...Show More

Abstract:

Some electric power markets allow bidders to specify constraints on ramp rates for increasing or decreasing power production. We show in a small example that a bidder could use an overly restrictive constraint to increase profits, and explore the cause by visualizing the feasible region from the linear program corresponding to the power auction. We propose two penalty approaches to discourage bidders from such a tactic: one based on duality theory of linear programming, the other based on social cost differences caused by ramp constraints. We evaluate the two approaches using a simplified scaled model of the California power system, with actual 2001 California demand data.
Date of Conference: 06-09 January 2003
Date Added to IEEE Xplore: 06 February 2003
Print ISBN:0-7695-1874-5
Conference Location: Big Island, HI, USA

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