Loading [a11y]/accessibility-menu.js
Poisoning attacks to compromise face templates | IEEE Conference Publication | IEEE Xplore

Poisoning attacks to compromise face templates


Abstract:

Adaptive biometric systems update clients' templates during operation to account for natural changes over time (e.g., aging of biometric templates). Recently, it has been...Show More

Abstract:

Adaptive biometric systems update clients' templates during operation to account for natural changes over time (e.g., aging of biometric templates). Recently, it has been shown that this update can be exploited by an attacker to compromise the clients' templates: by presenting a proper sequence of fake biometric traits to the sensor, the attacker may eventually impersonate the targeted clients without any fake trait, and even force the system to deny access to them. This attack has however been shown only for PCA-based face verification, with one template per client, under worstcase assumptions about the attacker's knowledge of the sys-tem. In this paper, we show that it can be successful even in the case of multiple templates per client, for different matchers, and under more realistic scenarios, and validate it by experiments to highlight its practical relevance.
Date of Conference: 04-07 June 2013
Date Added to IEEE Xplore: 30 September 2013
Electronic ISBN:978-1-4799-0310-8
Print ISSN: 2376-4201
Conference Location: Madrid, Spain

References

References is not available for this document.