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As easy as ABC: Optimal (A)ccountable (B)yzantine (C)onsensus is easy!



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ABSTRACT

In a non-synchronous system with *n* processes, no t_0 -resilient (deterministic or probabilistic) Byzantine consensus protocol can prevent a disagreement among correct processes if the number of faulty processes is $\geq n - 2t_0$. Therefore, the community defined the *accountable* Byzantine consensus problem: the problem of (*i*) solving Byzantine consensus whenever possible (e.g., when the number of faulty processes does not exceed t_0), and (*ii*) allowing correct processes to obtain proofs of culpability of $n - 2t_0$ faulty processes whenever a disagreement occurs. This paper presents ABC, a simple yet efficient transformation of any non-synchronous t_0 -resilient (deterministic or probabilistic) Byzantine consensus protocol into its accountable counterpart. In the common case (up to t_0 faults), ABC introduces an additive overhead of two communication rounds and $O(n^2)$ exchanged bits. Whenever they disagree, correct processes detect culprits by exchanging $O(n^3)$ messages, which we prove optimal. Lastly, ABC is not limited to Byzantine consensus: ABC provides accountability for other essential distributed problems (e.g., reliable and consistent broadcast).

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1. Introduction

Byzantine consensus [40] is a fundamental problem of distributed computing. It plays a major role in state machine replication (SMR) [1,6,45,52,42,20], particular cryptographic protocols [9, 34], and blockchain systems [3,14,26,33]. In brief, Byzantine consensus enables processes to agree on a common value despite Byzantine (arbitrary) failures. Concretely, the problem is defined among *n* processes, out of which some processes can misbehave in an arbitrary manner (these processes can crash, send different messages to different processes, fail to send some messages, etc.); processes that misbehave are said to be *faulty*, whereas non-faulty processes are said to be *correct*. The following interface is exposed:

• **input** propose(*v*): A process proposes a value *v*; the cardinality of the values processes can be proposed can be arbitrary

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(i.e., we consider multivalue consensus). Each correct process proposes exactly one value.

• **output** decide(v'): A process decides a value v'. Each correct process decides at most one value (i.e., decisions are irrevocable).

The following properties characterize the problem:

- Agreement: No two correct processes decide different values.
- *Validity:* If all correct processes propose the same value v, then no correct process decides a value $v' \neq v$.
- Deterministic termination: Every correct process eventually decides.
- *Probabilistic termination:* Every correct process eventually decides with probability 1.

Definition 1 (*Byzantine consensus protocol*). A protocol is a t_0 *resilient deterministic (resp., probabilistic) Byzantine consensus protocol* if it satisfies agreement, validity and deterministic (resp., probabilistic) termination while tolerating up to t_0 faulty processes.

In this paper, we are particularly interested in *non-synchronous* Byzantine consensus protocols: protocols that operate in an en-

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vironment without (permanent) timely communication. Dwork, Lynch and Stockmeyer proved that non-synchronous Byzantine consensus cannot be solved with n/3 (or more) faulty processes [31]. By adapting their technique, we prove another negative result: the safety of Byzantine consensus can always be compromised in severely corrupted systems. (The following theorem is proven in Appendix A.)

Theorem 1 (Unavoidable disagreement). For any non-synchronous t_0 -resilient (deterministic or probabilistic) Byzantine consensus protocol among n processes, there exists an execution with $t \ge n - 2t_0$ faulty processes in which correct processes disagree (i.e., decide different values).

A direct consequence of Theorem 1 is that no blockchain based on a non-synchronous Byzantine consensus protocol can prevent its divergence if the system is overly corrupted. Real-life consequences of such unlucky scenarios can be substantial. For example, people might lose valuable assets due to a fork created in a blockchain – such an attack is called *double-spending*.

While disagreements (and, thus, double-spending attacks) are unavoidable in severely corrupted systems (by Theorem 1), can we at least *detect* faulty processes which are responsible for disagreements? Such a detection would naturally stimulate processes to behave correctly, thus increasing the security of the entire system. Luckily, Civit et al. [24] answered this question affirmatively by introducing *accountability* to Byzantine consensus protocols. Namely, they defined the accountable Byzantine consensus problem: the problem of (*i*) solving Byzantine consensus whenever possible (e.g., when the number of faulty processes does not exceed some predefined threshold), and (*ii*) allowing correct processes to obtain proofs of culpability of (some) faulty processes whenever a disagreement occurs.

Definition 2 (Accountable Byzantine consensus protocol). A protocol is a t_0 -resilient deterministic (resp., probabilistic) accountable Byzantine consensus protocol if it satisfies the following two properties:

- *Byzantine consensus solvability:* In all executions with up to *t*₀ faults, the protocol solves the Byzantine consensus problem, i.e., it satisfies agreement, validity and deterministic (resp., probabilistic) termination.
- Accountability: If two correct processes decide different values, every correct process eventually irrefutably detects (at least) $n 2t_0$ faulty processes and obtains a proof of culpability of each detected process. A proof of culpability of a process can be independently verified by a third party, and it is impossible to produce such a proof for a correct process.

Informally, a protocol is an accountable Byzantine consensus protocol if (1) it solves the Byzantine consensus problem when the system is not overly corrupted (Byzantine consensus solvability), and (2) it allows each correct process to detect (at least) $n - 2t_0$ culprits whenever a disagreement occurs (accountability). Moreover, detection of culprits in the case of a disagreement implies an attainment of their culpability proofs. Importantly, no proof of culpability of a correct process can ever be obtained. Note that, if there are more than t_0 faulty processes, correct processes might never decide and accountability is not provided in this case. In other words, accountability is guaranteed *only* in the case of a disagreement.

1.1. Contributions

In this paper, we present the following contributions:

1. We introduce a generic and simple transformation – ABC – that maps any non-synchronous t_0 -resilient (deterministic or probabilistic) Byzantine consensus protocol into its accountable counterpart. Additionally, our transformation is *efficient*: in the common case (i.e., in all executions with up to t_0 faulty processes), ABC introduces an additive overhead of (1) two all-to-all communication rounds, and (2) $O(n^2)$ exchanged bits. In the case of a disagreement, correct processes achieve accountability by exchanging $O(n^3)$ "accountability-specific" messages; we refer to this metric as the accountability complexity. Our transformation relies on (1) a public-key infrastructure [43,19], and (2) a threshold signature scheme [49]. \mathcal{ABC} owes its simplicity and efficiency to an observation that the simple composition presented in Algorithm 1 solves the Byzantine consensus problem in a non-synchronous environment. Indeed, if the number of faults does not exceed t_0 , all correct processes eventually decide the same value from Byzantine consensus (line 2). Therefore, all correct processes eventually receive $n - t_0$ matching CONFIRM messages (line 4), and decide (line 5). The critical mechanism illustrated in Algorithm 1 is that faulty processes must send conflicting CONFIRM messages in order to cause a disagreement. Hence, whenever correct processes disagree, an exchange of received CONFIRM messages is sufficient for obtaining accountability.

418	Agorithm 1 Intuition benind <i>ABC</i> transformation.						
1:	function propose(v) do						
2:	$v' \leftarrow bc.propose(v)$	\triangleright bc is any non-synchronous t_0 -resilient Byzantine					
	consensus protocol						
3:	broadcast [CONFIRM, v']						

4: **wait for** [CONFIRM, v'] from $n - t_0$ processes

return v'

5:

- 2. We prove a lower bound on the accountability complexity in a non-synchronous environment: any accountable Byzantine consensus protocol incurs $\Omega(n^3)$ accountability complexity, with $t_0 \in \Omega(n)$. As a consequence, ABC suffices for achieving optimal accountability complexity.
- 3. We show that the applicability of ABC is not limited to Byzantine consensus. Specifically, we define a class of *easily*accountable agreement tasks, and demonstrate that generalized ABC transformation provides accountability for such tasks. Important distributed problems, such as Byzantine reliable and consistent broadcast [13,17], fall into the class of easilyaccountable agreement tasks.

1.2. Related work

The work on accountability in distributed systems was pioneered in [36]: PeerReview, a generic accountability layer for distributed systems, was presented. Importantly, PeerReview does not allow correct processes to irrefutably detect faulty processes in non-synchronous environments: faulty processes might be *suspected forever* (i.e., processes strongly "believe" that the accused process is faulty, but no definitive proof is obtained), yet never conclusively detected. Hence, PeerReview does *not* suffice for accountability in non-synchronous Byzantine consensus. The formal study of Byzantine failures in the context of accountability was initiated by Haeberlen and Kuznetsov [37].

Recently, with the expansion of blockchain systems, the interest in accountable distributed protocols resurfaced once again. Polygraph [23], the first accountable Byzantine consensus protocol, was introduced by Civit et al. The Polygraph protocol is based on the DBFT consensus protocol [26] used in blockchains [27], tolerates up to *n* faulty processes in achieving accountability, and has the communication complexity of $O(n^4)$ in the common case. It is

Table	1
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Overview of the main properties of existing accountable Byzantine consensus protocols.

Base Consensus Protocol	Communication Complexity of the Base Consensus Protocol	Communication Complexity of the Accountable Counterpart in the Common Case	Accountability Threshold	Paper
PBFT	$O(n^4)$	$O(n^4)$	2n/3	Sheng et al. [48]
HotStuff	$O(n^3)$	$O(n^3)$	2n/3	Sheng et al. [48]
Binary DBFT	$O(n^3)$	$O(n^4)$	п	Civit et al. [23]
Multivalue DBFT	$O(n^4)$	$O(n^4)$	п	Civit et al. [23]
Any	X	$X \cdot O(n^2)$ (or $X \cdot O(n)$)	п	Civit et al. [25]
Any	X	X	n	this paper

worth observing that Polygraph worsens the communication complexity of (the binary-value version of) the DBFT base protocol by an O(n) multiplicative factor. Casper [16] is another system designed around the goal of obtaining accountability in blockchains, while Trap [47] combines accountability with game theory to increase the Byzantine fault tolerance of blockchains.

Recently, the possibility of obtaining accountability in protocols based on PBFT [20] was investigated [48]. Specifically, accountable variants of PBFT [20] and HotStuff [53] were presented; however, these protocols allow for accountability only if up to 2n/3 processes are faulty, which implies that their "accountability threshold" is lower than the one of Polygraph. A generic transformation $\tau_{\rm scr}$ of any protocol solving a Byzantine decision task into its accountable equivalent was introduced in [25]. Thus, τ_{scr} suffices for obtaining accountability in any Byzantine consensus protocol. The drawback of the proposed transformation is its cost: τ_{scr} worsens the communication complexity of a Byzantine consensus protocol by a multiplicative factor of $O(n^2)$ (or O(n) in "broadcast-based" protocols¹). The commonality between the discussed prior work is employing sophisticated mechanisms for achieving accountability. Indeed, the prior work achieves accountability with the help of non-trivial modifications applied to the base consensus protocol.

In contrast, we take a fundamentally different approach that allows us to treat the base consensus protocol as a "closed box", thus obtaining simpler and more efficient accountable Byzantine consensus protocols. Table 1 compares accountable Byzantine consensus protocols obtained by ABC with the existing alternatives.

Roadmap We present the necessary preliminaries in § 2. We devote § 3 to our ABC transformation. In § 4, we prove a cubic lower bound on the accountability complexity. We define easily-accountable agreement tasks, and prove the applicability of generalized ABC to such tasks in § 5. We conclude the paper in § 6. Optional appendix includes (1) a proof of Theorem 1 (Appendix A), and (2) a detailed specification of the cryptographic primitives we use (Appendix B).

2. Preliminaries

System model We consider a system $\Psi = \{P_1, ..., P_n\}$ of *n* processes that communicate by exchanging messages through a point-to-point authenticated network. Concretely, a message is a sequence of bits whose semantics is application-specific. The system is *non-synchronous*: there is no known bound that always holds on message delays and relative speed of the processes. Non-synchronous systems include:

• asynchronous systems, where the bound does not exist; and

• partially synchronous systems [31], where the bound holds only after some unknown Global Stabilization Time (GST).

Each process is assigned its *local protocol*. A local protocol of a process defines the steps to be taken during a run of the system. The collection of all local protocols is a *distributed protocol* (or simply a *protocol*).

Some processes might be *faulty*: these processes may arbitrarily deviate from their local protocol (e.g., by crashing, failing to receive or send messages, sending different messages to different processes, performing arbitrary state transitions). That is, this paper considers the Byzantine failure model [40]. If a process is not faulty, the process is *correct*. We assume that the communication is *reliable*: a message sent by a correct process to a correct process is eventually received.

An *execution* is a single run of the system. We denote by t the actual number of faulty processes in an execution.

Best-effort broadcast Throughout the entire paper, we extensively rely on the best-effort broadcast primitive [17]. This primitive exposes the following interface:

- **input** broadcast(*m*): A process broadcasts a message *m*; each correct process can broadcast its messages arbitrarily many times.
- **output** deliver(*s*, *m'*): A process delivers a message *m'* with sender *s*.

The following properties are satisfied:

- *Validity*: If a correct process broadcasts a message *m*, then every correct process eventually delivers *m*.
- *Integrity:* If a correct process delivers a message *m* with sender *s* and *s* is correct, then *s* has previously broadcast *m*.

Best-effort broadcast can easily be implemented in an asynchronous environment assuming a reliable point-to-point network: the sender sends its message to every process. In the rest of the paper, we exclusively rely on the best-effort broadcast primitive for protocol designs. Hence, whenever we say that "a process broadcasts a message", we mean that the process broadcasts the message using the best-effort broadcast primitive.

Cryptographic primitives This paragraph outlines the cryptographic primitives we use throughout the paper. For the completeness, these primitives are formally treated in Appendix B.

We assume a *public-key infrastructure* (PKI): each process is associated with its public/private key pair that is used to sign messages and verify signatures of other processes. Crucially, the following holds:

• If a correct process *P* signs a message *m*, every correct process successfully verifies that *m* was signed by *P*.

¹ The τ_{scr} transformation [25] modifies each protocol by reliably-broadcasting [13, 17] its messages. Therefore, if the original protocol exclusively sends its messages to all processes (i.e., no unicasts are present), τ_{scr} introduces an overhead of an O(n) multiplicative factor.

• If a message *m* is accompanied by a signature of a correct process *P*, then *P* has indeed signed *m*.

A message *m* signed by the PKI private key of a process P_i is denoted by m_{σ_i} .

Additionally, we assume a (k, n)-dual threshold signature scheme [49], where *k* is a parameter of the scheme. In this scheme, each process holds a distinct private key, and there exists a single public key. Each process P_i can use its private key to produce a partial signature of a message m by invoking ShareSign_i(m). Moreover, a partial signature tsignature of a message m produced by process P_i could be verified by ShareVerify_i(m, tsignature) (as is the case for the PKI). Finally, a set $S = \{tsignature_1, tsignature_2, tsignature_3, tsignature_3,$..., *tsignature*_k of partial signatures, where |S| = k and, for each $tsignature_i \in S$, $tsignature_i = ShareSign_i(m)$, could be combined into a single digital signature by invoking Combine(S). A combined digital signature *tcombined* of message *m* could be verified by Verify(m, tcombined); if Verify(m, tcombined) = \top (true), then tcombined was obtained by combining k partial signatures of m. For obtaining the threshold signature scheme, we can either rely on (1) a trusted setup, or (2) a distributed key generation protocol [28,2]. In the latter case, the best known solution [28] incurs $O(n^3)$ (expected) communication cost; in this paper, we assume the cost is amortized (i.e., the threshold signature scheme is setup only once for a sequence of consensus instances).

Crucially, we assume that the PKI private key of a correct process is *never* revealed (irrespectively of the number of faulty processes in the system). Therefore, if a message *m* is signed by the PKI private key of a process P_i and P_i is correct, then the message *m* was certainly sent by P_i . Conversely, if the number of faulty processes exceeds n - k, the threshold private key of a process *can* be revealed, and a partial signature of a correct process might be forged.² In other words, we assume a *computationally-bounded adversary* for which the following holds:

- The adversary cannot forge a PKI signature of a correct process.
- If t ≤ n − k, the adversary cannot forge a partial signature of a correct process.

For the full details, refer to Appendix B.

Why cryptography? As accountability implies a proof of culpability which can be independently verified by a third party, cryptography is irreplaceable in the accountable protocols. Indeed, cryptography is able to provide unforgeable association between any message and its sender. If such association is non-existent, one cannot verify that a proof of culpability is genuine, i.e., not manufactured by a faulty process whose goal is to falsely accuse correct processes.

Proof of culpability In order for correct processes to satisfy accountability (Definition 2), they need to obtain a proof of culpability of each detected process. Let us formally define a proof of culpability of a process.

Definition 3 (*Proof of culpability*). A set Σ_i of messages properly signed by the PKI private key of a process P_i is a *proof of culpability* of P_i if and only if there does not exist an execution such that (1) P_i is correct, and (2) P_i sends all the messages from the Σ_i set.

Intuitively, a proof of culpability of a process is a set of messages which are properly signed (by the PKI private key) such that, if the process is correct, the process could not have sent all of those messages. Therefore, a proof of culpability undeniably proves that the concerned process is faulty (and this proof can be verified by a third party). A proof of culpability includes only messages signed by the PKI private key as the private PKI key of a correct process is *never* revealed (as opposed to the threshold private key of a correct process which might be revealed if the number of faulty processes exceeds n - k; see the paragraph "Cryptographic primitives"). Thus, a proof of culpability of a correct process can never be obtained.

Let us give an example of a proof of culpability. Suppose that a correct process P_i never sends two conflicting PROPOSAL messages in some protocol. Hence, a set $\Sigma_i = \{[\text{PROPOSAL}, v]_{\sigma_i}, [\text{PROPOSAL}, v' \neq v]_{\sigma_i}\}$ is a proof of culpability of P_i as Σ_i demonstrates that P_i has sent two conflicting PROPOSAL messages.

Lastly, if a correct process detects a process P_i and accompanies a proof of culpability Σ_i of P_i to the detection, we say that the process detects P_i using Σ_i .

Communication complexity In this work, as in many in distributed computing [51,4,22], we care about the number of exchanged bits of information. To this end we define a *word*: a word contains a constant number of signatures and values. Each message contains at least a single word.

For deterministic protocols, we are interested in the worst-case communication complexity.

Definition 4 (*Worst-case communication complexity*). The *worst-case communication complexity* of a deterministic protocol is the maximum number of words sent in messages by correct processes across all possible executions. If the protocol operates in the partially synchronous model, the worst-case communication complexity considers only the messages sent after GST.

We underline that Definition 4 only counts words sent *after* GST as it is known that, prior to GST, an unbounded number of words can be exchanged in any deterministic partially synchronous consensus protocol [32,51]. For probabilistic protocols, we are interested in the expected communication complexity.

Definition 5 (*Expected communication complexity*). The *expected communication complexity* of a probabilistic protocol is the maximal expected number of words sent in messages by correct processes across all possible executions, over all possible adversaries.³ If the protocol operates in the partially synchronous model, the expected communication complexity considers only the messages sent after GST.

Accountability complexity The accountability complexity is a novel complexity metric designed for measuring the accountability-specific performance of protocols. We define the accountability complexity since the communication complexity is not a suitable metric for measuring the performance of accountable Byzantine consensus protocols in the degraded case (i.e., when the number of faults exceeds a predefined threshold). For example, Polygraph [24] and accountable variants of PBFT and Hotstuff [48] suffer from the infinite worst-case communication complexity in the degraded case: Byzantine processes force correct processes to constantly execute "one more round", thus constructing an infinite execution where correct processes never decide.

² The fact that the threshold private key of a correct process can be revealed if the system is overly corrupted allows us to not assume a trusted setup in obtaining the threshold signature scheme, i.e., the scheme might be obtained via a distributed key generation protocol (e.g., [2,28]).

³ An adversary defines a probability distribution over executions of the algorithm [39].

In order to define the accountability complexity, we first define the accountability-specific messages.

Definition 6 (*Accountability-specific message*). We denote by \mathcal{P} the set of all "used" culpability proofs across all executions of an accountable Byzantine consensus protocol. Formally:

 $\mathcal{P} = \{a \text{ proof of culpability } \Sigma_i \text{ of } P_i \mid i \}$

there exists an execution in which a correct

process detects P_i using Σ_i }.

A message *m* is an *accountability-specific* message if and only if there exists a proof of culpability $\Sigma \in \mathcal{P}$ such that $m \in \Sigma$.

Intuitively, a message is accountability-specific if it is used (in any execution) by a correct process to detect a faulty process. For example, if a correct process detects a faulty process P_i using Σ_i in some execution, then all messages that belong to Σ_i are accountability-specific messages.

Finally, we are ready to formally define the accountability complexity.

Definition 7 (Accountability complexity). The accountability complexity of an accountable Byzantine consensus protocol is the maximum number of accountability-specific messages sent by correct processes across all executions with at least two correct processes.

Intuitively, the accountability complexity represents the number of messages correct processes exchange with the goal of achieving accountability.

3. *ABC* transformation

This section presents ABC, our transformation that enables any non-synchronous (deterministic or probabilistic) Byzantine consensus protocol to obtain accountability. We first introduce the *accountable confirmer* problem, and give its asynchronous implementation (§ 3.1). Then, we construct our ABC transformation around the accountable confirmer (§ 3.2). Finally, we discuss the applicability and limitations of ABC (§ 3.3).

3.1. Accountable confirmer

The accountable confirmer problem is a distributed problem defined among n processes, out of which some can be faulty (i.e., Byzantine). It exposes the following interface:

- **input** submit(*v*): A process submits a value *v*. Each correct process submits exactly one value.
- output confirm(v'): A process confirms a value v'. Each correct process confirms at most one value.
- output detect(*F*, proof): A process detects processes from the set *F* such that proof contains a proof of culpability of each process included in *F*. Each correct process triggers detect(·, ·) at most once.

A t_0^{ac} -resilient accountable confirmer protocol satisfies the following properties:

• *Terminating convergence:* If (1) the number of faulty processes does not exceed t_0^{ac} , and (2) all correct processes submit the

same value, then that value is eventually confirmed by all correct processes.⁴

- *Validity:* The value confirmed by a correct process was submitted by a correct process.
- Accountability: If two correct processes confirm different values, every correct process eventually irrefutably detects (at least) $n 2t_0^{ac}$ faulty processes and obtains a proof of culpability of each detected process.

We give an asynchronous implementation of the accountable confirmer problem in Algorithm 2. Importantly, our implementation (Algorithm 2) works under *any* computationally-bounded adversary.

Intuition behind Algorithm 2 Consider the following algorithm (described in prose). (1) Once a correct process submits its value, it broadcasts a signed (by the PKI private key) message containing the submitted value. (2) The process waits for $n - t_0^{ac}$ messages containing the same value. (3) Once this happens, the process confirms the value, and broadcasts the received $n - t_0^{ac}$ messages to all processes in the system.

This simple algorithm ensures terminating convergence since, when there are up to t_0^{ac} faults and all correct processes submit the same value, all correct processes eventually receive $n - t_0^{ac}$ messages containing the submitted value; thus, all correct processes confirm the value. As for the accountability property, if two correct processes disagree, every correct process eventually receives two conflicting sets of $n - t_0^{ac}$ messages. Every process whose messages belong to both sets is faulty as no correct process submits multiple values.

Description of Algorithm 2 The actual implementation (Algorithm 2) of a t_0^{ac} -resilient accountable confirmer protocol builds upon the presented intuition. We emphasize that Algorithm 2 implements a t_0^{ac} -resilient accountable confirmer for any $t_0^{ac} \leq \lceil n/3 \rceil - 1$. It takes advantage of a (k, n)-dual threshold signature scheme (see § 2, paragraph "Cryptographic primitives"), where $k = n - t_0^{ac}$, in order to achieve quadratic communication complexity in the common case (i.e., in all executions with up to t_0^{ac} faults). Note that an implementation which completely follows the presented intuition would suffer from a cubic communication complexity in the common case as each correct process would rebroadcast O(n) messages after confirming its value.

Each process initially broadcasts the value it submitted in a SUBMIT message (line 19): the SUBMIT message contains the value and a partial signature of the value. Moreover, the entire message is signed by the PKI private key of the sender. Once a process receives such a SUBMIT message, the process (1) checks whether the message is properly signed (line 7), (2) verifies the partial signature (line 21), and (3) checks whether the received value is equal to its submitted value (line 21). If all checks pass, the process stores the received partial signature (line 23) and the entire message (line 24). Once a process stores partial signatures from (at least) $n - t_0^{ac}$ processes (line 26), the process confirms its submitted value (line 28) and informs other processes about its confirmation by combining the received partial signatures into a light certificate (line 29). The role of threshold signatures in our implementation is to allow every light certificate to contain a single signature (rather than $n - t_0^{ac}$ signatures), thus obtaining a quadratic overall communication complexity if $t \le t_0^{ac}$.

Once a process receives two conflicting light certificates (line 34), the process concludes that correct processes might have con-

⁴ Note that it is *not* guaranteed that any correct process confirms a value if correct processes submit different values (even if the number of faulty processes does not exceed t_{α}^{ac}).

firmed different values. If the process has already confirmed its value, the process broadcasts the set of (at least) $n - t_0^{ac}$ properly signed [SUBMIT, v, *] messages (line 35), where v is the value confirmed (and submitted) by the process; such a set of messages is a *full certificate* for value v. Finally, once a process receives two conflicting full certificates (line 40), the process obtains proof of culpability of (at least) $n - 2t_0^{ac}$ faulty processes (line 48), which ensures accountability. Indeed, each full certificate contains $n - t_0^{ac}$ properly signed messages: every process whose messages belong to the conflicting full certificates is faulty and these messages represent a proof of its misbehavior. (Recall that no faulty process *ever* obtains the PKI private key of a correct process.)

Definitions for Algorithm 2.

- 1) A combined digital signature *tsig* is a *valid light certificate for value* v if and only if Verify(v, tsig) = \top .
- 2) A set S of properly signed [SUBMIT, $v, *]_{\sigma_*}$ messages is a valid full certificate for value v if and only if:
 - a) $|\mathcal{S}| \ge n t_0^{ac}$
 - b) Each message m is sent (i.e., signed) by a distinct process.

3) Let $tsig_{\nu}$ be a valid light certificate for value ν and let $tsig_{\nu'}$ be a valid light certificate for value ν' . $tsig_{\nu}$ conflicts with $tsig_{\nu'}$ if and only if $\nu \neq \nu'$.

4) Let S_v be a valid full certificate for value v and let $S_{v'}$ be a valid full certificate for value v'. S_v conflicts with $S_{v'}$ if and only if $v \neq v'$.

5) Let (m_1, m_2) be a pair of messages properly signed by some process P_i . (m_1, m_2) is a proof of culpability of P_i if and only if:

a) $m_1 = [\text{SUBMIT}, v, share_1]_{\sigma_i}$, and b) $m_2 = [\text{SUBMIT}, v', share_2]_{\sigma_i}$, and c) $v \neq v'$.

Theorem 2. Algorithm 2 is an asynchronous t_0^{ac} -resilient accountable confirmer protocol safe under any computationally-bounded adversary, where $t_0^{ac} \le \lceil n/3 \rceil - 1$, with:

- $O(n^2)$ worst-case communication complexity in the common case (i.e., when $t \le t_0^{ac}$), and
- $O(n^3)$ SUBMIT messages being sent by correct processes.

Proof. We start by proving the terminating convergence and validity properties. If $t \le t_0^{ac}$ and all correct processes submit the same value v, the rule at line 26 eventually triggers at every correct process. Since every correct process confirms only the value it has submitted (line 28), terminating convergence and validity are satisfied by Algorithm 2.

Next, let us prove accountability. Let a correct process P_i confirm a value v and let another correct process P_j confirm a value $v' \neq v$. The rule at line 34 is eventually triggered at each correct process that confirms a value. Once the rule is triggered at P_i and P_j , these processes broadcast their full certificates (line 35). Eventually, the rule at line 40 is triggered at each correct process, which ensures accountability. Indeed, every process whose SUBMIT messages belong to both conflicting full certificates is detected (line 42 - line 46); moreover, such a process is indeed faulty since no correct process submits different values, i.e., no correct process ever sends different SUBMIT messages.

Finally, we prove the claimed complexity:

- If $t \le t_0^{ac}$, the communication complexity of the algorithm is quadratic because (1) light certificates are sent only once and they contain a single threshold signature, and (2) no correct process broadcasts a full certificate as no two conflicting light certificates can be produced.
- Each correct process sends *n* SUBMIT messages at line 19. Moreover, each correct process includes (at most) *n* SUBMIT messages in each FULL-CERTIFICATE message it sends (line 35).

Therefore, each correct process sends (at most) $O(n) + O(n^2) = O(n^2)$ SUBMIT messages, which implies that (at most) $n \cdot O(n^2) = O(n^3)$ SUBMIT messages are sent by all correct processes.

The theorem holds. \Box

3.2. ABC: Byzantine consensus + accountable confirmer = accountable Byzantine consensus

We now present our ABC transformation (Algorithm 3), the main contribution of our work. ABC is built on the observation that any non-synchronous (deterministic or probabilistic) Byzantine consensus protocol paired with the accountable confirmer solves the accountable Byzantine consensus problem. Specifically, we prove that Algorithm 3 solves the accountable Byzantine consensus problem, which implies that ABC indeed enables non-synchronous Byzantine consensus protocols to obtain accountability.

The following theorem proves that the \mathcal{ABC} transformation (Algorithm 3) is correct.

Theorem 3 (Correctness of ABC). Let be a non-synchronous t_0 -resilient deterministic (resp., probabilistic) Byzantine consensus protocol, where $t_0 \leq \lceil n/3 \rceil - 1$. Let abc be a protocol obtained by applying ABC (Algorithm 3) to bc. Then, abc is a non-synchronous t_0 -resilient deterministic (resp., probabilistic) accountable Byzantine consensus protocol which tolerates the same computationally-bounded adversary as bc.

Proof. Consider an execution where $t \le t_0$. Let *bc* be a deterministic (resp., probabilistic) Byzantine consensus protocol. All correct processes eventually decide (resp., decide with probability 1) the same value *v* from Byzantine consensus at line 9 by deterministic (resp., probabilistic) termination and agreement of Byzantine consensus. Moreover, if all correct processes have proposed the same value (line 7), then the proposed value is indeed *v* (ensured by validity of Byzantine consensus). Terminating convergence of accountable confirmer ensures that all correct processes eventually confirm *v* (line 11) and decide from accountable Byzantine consensus (line 12). Hence, Algorithm 3 satisfies deterministic (resp., probabilistic) termination, agreement and validity.

If correct processes disagree (i.e., decide different values at line 12), then these processes have confirmed different values from the accountable confirmer (line 11). Thus, every correct process detects (and obtains proofs of culpability of) $n - 2t_0$ processes at line 13 (by the accountability property of the accountable confirmer). Finally, as Algorithm 2 solves the accountable confirmer problem under any computationally-bounded adversary (by Theorem 2), *abc* is safe under the same computationally-bounded adversary as *bc*. \Box

Theorem 3 shows that Algorithm 3 is an (asynchronous) implementation of an accountable Byzantine consensus protocol. Therefore, any Byzantine consensus protocol can be transformed into an accountable one by "inserting" that protocol into the composition presented by Algorithm 3 (line 5). Importantly, the upper bound on tolerated Byzantine processes for deterministic and probabilistic protocols is $\lceil n/3 \rceil - 1$ [31,12], which implies that the ABC transformation is applicable to Byzantine consensus protocols with every possible resilience. Furthermore, we note that ABC provides maximal resilience against disagreement: if ABC is applied to a t_0 -resilient Byzantine consensus protocol, a disagreement in the resulting protocol cannot occur with less than $n - 2t_0$ faulty processes.

Alge	prithm 2 t_0^{ac} -Resilient Accountable Confirmer: Code for process P_i .	
1:	Implements:	
2:	t_0^{ac} -Resilient Accountable Confirmer, instance ac	
3:	Uses:	
4:	Best-Effort Broadcast [17], instance beb	\triangleright Unreliable broadcast with no guarantees if the sender is faulty
5:	(k, n) -Threshold Signature Scheme, where $k = n - t_0^{ac}$	
6:	Rules:	
7:	1) Any SUBMIT message that is not properly signed is discarded.	
8:	2) Rules at lines 26, 34 and 40 are activated at most once.	
9:	upon event (<i>ac</i> , Init) do	
10:	$value_i \leftarrow \perp$	
11.	$conjinited_i \leftarrow idise$	
13:	$lightCertificate: \leftarrow \emptyset$	
14:	fullCertificate _i $\leftarrow \emptyset$	
15:	$obtainedLightCertificates_i \leftarrow \emptyset$	
16:	$obtainedFullCertificates_i \leftarrow \emptyset$	
17:	upon event $\langle ac, \text{Submit} v \rangle$ do	$\triangleright P_i$ submits a value
18:	$value_i \leftarrow v$	
19:	trigger (<i>beb</i> , Broadcast [SUBMIT, v , ShareSign _i (v)] _{σ_i})	
20:	upon event (<i>beb</i> , Deliver P_j , [SUBMIT, <i>value</i> , <i>share</i>] σ_j) do	
21:	If ShareVerity _j (value, share) = 1 and value = value _i and $P_j \notin from_i$ then from $(from + 1)(P_i)$	
22.	$f(m_i \leftarrow f(m_i) \in \{r_j\}$ lightCertificate: \leftarrow lightCertificate: \sqcup {share}	
24:	fullCertificate: \leftarrow fullCertificate: \cup {[SUBMIT, value, share] $_{\sigma_i}$ }	
25:	end if	
26:	upon $ from_i \ge n - t_0^{ac}$ do	
27:	$confirmed_i \leftarrow true$	
28:	trigger $\langle ac, Confirm value_i \rangle$	$\triangleright P_i$ confirms a value
29:	trigger {beb, Broadcast [LIGHT-CERTIFICATE, value _i , Combine(lightCertificate _i)]}	
30:	upon event (<i>beb</i> , Deliver P_j , [LIGHT-CERTIFICATE, value j, lightCertificate j]) do if lightCartificate is a valid light cortificate for value, then	
31.	In $lightCertificate_j$ is a value light Certificate for value j then obtained ightCertificates, \leftarrow obtained lightCertificates, $ \int [l C u T_{c} C E P T E C A T_{c} C E C C T_{c} C E C T_{c} C E C T_{c} C E C T$.n
33:	end if	11)
34:	upon certificate ₁ , certificate ₂ \in obtainedLightCertificates _i where certificate ₁ conflicts with certificate ₂	
	and $confirmed_i = true do$	
35:	trigger $(beb, Broadcast [FULL-CERTIFICATE, valuei, fullCertificatei])$	
36:	upon event $(beb, Deliver P_j, [FULL-CERTIFICATE, value_j, fullCertificate_j])$ do	
37:	if fullCertificate _j is a valid full certificate for value _j then	
38:	obtained Full Certificates _i \leftarrow obtained Full Certificates _i \cup {full Certificate _j }	
39. 40·	upon certificate, certificate, \in obtained Full Certificates, where certificate, conflicts with certificate, do	
41:	$proof = \emptyset$	
42:	for each process P_i such that P_i 's messages belong to both certificate ₁ and certificate ₂ :	
43:	$m_1 \leftarrow$ the submit message signed by P_i which belongs to certificate ₁	
44:	$m_2 \leftarrow$ the submit message signed by P_i which belongs to certificate ₂	
45:	$\Sigma_i \leftarrow (m_1, m_2)$	
46: 47.	$proof = proof \cup \{\Sigma_i\}$ $E \leftarrow \text{the set of processes detected using proof}$	
48·	trigger (ac Detect F proof)	$\triangleright P_i$ detects faulty processes
\lg	prithm 3 ABC Transformation: Code for process P_i .	
1.	Implements:	
2:	t_0 -Resilient Accountable Byzantine Consensus, instance abc	
3:	Uses:	
4:	> Deterministic or probabilistic Byzantine consensus protocol to be transformed	
5:	t_0 -Resilient Byzantine Consensus, instance bc	

э:	to-Resident Byzantine Consensus, instance bc
6:	t_0 -Resilient Accountable Confirmer implemented by Algorithm 2, instance ac
7:	upon event (abc, Propose proposal) do
8:	trigger $\langle bc, Propose proposal \rangle$
9:	upon event (<i>bc</i> , Decide <i>decision</i>) do
10:	trigger $\langle ac, Submit decision \rangle$
44.	when event (as Orafium Leanformation) de

11: **upon event** $\langle ac, Confirm | confirmation \rangle$ **do**

12: **trigger** $\langle abc, Decide | confirmation \rangle$ 13: **upon event** $\langle ac, Detect | F, proof \rangle$ **do**

14: **trigger** (abc, Detect | F, proof)

Next, we show that \mathcal{ABC} does not worsen the communication complexity in the common case of sup-quadratic Byzantine consensus protocols and induces a cubic accountability complexity.

Theorem 4. Let bc be a t_0 -resilient deterministic (resp., probabilistic) Byzantine consensus protocol, where $t_0 \leq \lceil n/3 \rceil - 1$, with the worstcase (resp., expected) communication complexity cc in the common case (with up to t_0 faults). Let abc be a protocol obtained by applying ABC to bc. Then, abc has the worst-case (resp., expected) communication complexity max(cc, $O(n^2)$) in the common case and $O(n^3)$ accountability complexity.

⊳ Proposal

▷ Decision

▷ Detection

Proof. As the communication complexity of the accountable confirmer is $O(n^2)$ in the common case (by Theorem 2), the

worst-case (resp., expected) communication complexity of *abc* is $\max(cc, O(n^2))$ in the common case. Moreover, as the only accountability-specific messages sent by *abc* are the SUBMIT messages of the accountable confirmer and $O(n^3)$ SUBMIT messages are sent by correct processes (by Theorem 2), the accountability complexity is $O(n^3)$. \Box

Lastly, we remark that ABC does not worsen the communication complexity of any (1) deterministic Byzantine consensus protocol, or (2) (possibly probabilistic) Byzantine consensus protocol safe under a strongly adaptive adversary. Namely, Dolev and Reischuk [29] proved that any deterministic Byzantine consensus protocol incurs a quadratic worst-case communication complexity in the common case. Similarly, Abraham et al. [5] showed that the quadratic lower bound for expected communication complexity holds against an adaptive adversary. However, we underline that ABC worsens the communication complexity of partially synchronous probabilistic Byzantine consensus protocols with subquadratic expected complexity (e.g., [46]).⁵

3.3. Discussion

In this subsection, we discuss ABC's applicability to different variants of the consensus problem, as well as some of ABC's limitations.

ABC's applicability to different variants of Byzantine consensus The (accountable) Byzantine consensus problem (as defined in § 1) specifies the validity property, which ensures that, if all correct processes propose the same value, then only that value could be decided by a correct process. In the literature, this is not the only variant of the validity property; the variant we use is traditionally called *strong validity*. Other most notable variants of the validity property include:

- *Weak Validity:* If all processes are correct and if a correct process decides value *v*, then *v* is proposed by a (correct) process [44,53,15].
- *External Validity:* A value decided by a correct process satisfies a predefined *valid* predicate [18].

Importantly, the correctness of ABC does not depend on a specific variant of the validity property: the "connection" between proposed values and the decided value is preserved by ABC. In other words, an accountable Byzantine consensus protocol which is a product of ABC satisfies the *same* validity property as the original consensus protocol.

Limitations of ABC We now list a few limitations of ABC:

- 1. ABC is not optimized for the best-case scenarios: It is possible to devise Byzantine consensus protocols that exhibit $o(n^2)$ communication in some favorable scenarios. For instance, Hot-Stuff [53] achieves only linear communication if no faulty processes exist and the execution is synchronous from the very beginning. However, this linear communication is lost when ABC is applied to HotStuff as processes "always" exchange the SUBMIT messages, which leads to the inevitable $O(n^2)$ communication cost.
- 2. ABC (more precisely, our implementation of the accountable confirmer) uses threshold signatures [41] to obtain $O(n^2)$ communication complexity in the common case. As we have

already mentioned in § 2, we do not need to assume a trusted setup to obtain a threshold signature scheme: an asynchronous distributed key generation (ADKG) protocol [2], executed on top of a PKI setup, provides a threshold signature scheme. Importantly, we are not aware of an ADKG protocol whose communication complexity is quadratic. Therefore, ABC introduces a quadratic overhead only if (1) a trusted setup is assumed, or (2) the communication cost of an ADKG protocol is amortized. An alternative is to use compressed Σ protocols [8], which allow us to obtain a *transparent* threshold signature scheme (without trusted setup) with a logarithmic overhead per threshold signature: communication overhead of ABC would be $O(n^2 \cdot \log(n))$.

In practice, it is worth considering multi-signatures [30,10] instead of the aforementioned threshold signatures. Multi-signatures have an accompanying bit-mask of *n* bits. In summary, if κ denotes the size of a signature (usually, $\kappa = 256$), the communication overhead of *ABC* would be:

- $O(\kappa \cdot n^2 + n^3)$ in the case of multi-signatures;
- $O(\kappa \cdot n^2)$ in the case of threshold signatures (assuming a trusted setup or a cost-amortized ADKG); and
- $O(\kappa \cdot n^2 \cdot \log(n))$ in the case of compressed Σ -protocols.

A formal treatment of all of the aforementioned cryptographic primitives is available in Appendix B.

4. Lower bound on accountability complexity

In this section, we prove that any non-synchronous t_0 -resilient accountable Byzantine consensus protocol incurs cubic accountability complexity (when $t_0 \in \Omega(n)$). Throughout the entire subsection, we fix any non-synchronous t_0 -resilient (deterministic or probabilistic) accountable Byzantine consensus protocol *abc*. Without loss of generality, we assume that $n = 3t_0 + 1$.

We prove the lower bound by showing that the accountability complexity of *abc* is $\Omega(n^3)$. Specifically, we prove that there exists an execution \mathcal{E} such that correct processes send $\Omega(n^3)$ accountability-specific messages in \mathcal{E} .

Execution Λ First, we construct a specific (finite) execution Λ . We fix three disjoint groups of processes: (1) group $A = \{a_1, a_2, ..., a_{t_0}\}$, where $|A| = t_0$, (2) group $B = \{b_1, b_2, ..., b_{t_0}, b_{t_0+1}\}$, where $|B| = t_0 + 1 = n - 2t_0$, and (3) group $C = \{c_1, c_2, ..., c_{t_0}\}$, where $|C| = t_0$. Throughout the entire subsection, we rely on the aforementioned groups.

Since *abc* solves Byzantine consensus if there are up to t_0 faults, the following two infinite executions exist:

- 1. e_1 : All processes from the group *C* are faulty, and these processes are silent throughout the entire execution (i.e., they send no messages). Moreover, all processes from the $A \cup B$ set propose the same value *v*. Since there are t_0 faulty processes (as $|C| = t_0$), *abc* ensures that all processes from the $A \cup B$ set eventually decide the same value *v* (by Byzantine consensus solvability of *abc*) by some global time t_1 .
- 2. e_2 : All processes from the group *A* are faulty, and these processes are silent throughout the entire execution. Moreover, all processes from the $B \cup C$ set propose the same value $v' \neq v$. As there are t_0 faulty processes (since $|A| = t_0$), *abc* ensures that all processes from the $B \cup C$ set eventually decide the value $v' \neq v$ by some global time t_2 .

The existence of the executions e_1 and e_2 allows us to devise another infinite execution e, where:

• Processes from the group *A* and processes from the group *C* are correct, whereas processes from the group *B* are faulty.

⁵ We emphasize that [46] assumes a static adversary, thus allowing itself to circumvent the quadratic lower bound [5].



Fig. 1. Intuition behind the execution e_a .

Moreover, all processes from the group *A* propose *v*, and all processes from the group *C* propose $v' \neq v$.

- The processes from the group *B* behave towards the processes from the group *A* as in execution e_1 , and the processes from the group *B* behave towards the processes from the group *C* as in e_2 . Moreover, if an event ϵ (e.g., reception of a message, sending of a message, local computation) occurs at global time t_{ϵ} in e_1 or e_2 , then ϵ occurs at the same time t_{ϵ} in execution e.
- All messages between processes from the group *A* and the group *C* are delayed until after time $T_0 = \max(t_1, t_2)$.

Importantly, execution e is indistinguishable from execution e_1 to processes from the group A, which implies that all processes from the group A decide value v by time t_1 . Similarly, all processes from the group C decide value $v' \neq v$ by time t_2 . Thus, correct processes disagree in e.

We denote by Λ the prefix of execution *e* until time $T_0 = \max(t_1, t_2)$.⁶ Note that the following holds for Λ :

- All processes from the group A decide v in Λ .
- All processes from the group *C* decide $v' \neq v$ in Λ .
- No message is exchanged between any two processes $(a \in A, c \in C)$.

The first intermediate result we prove is that no correct process $p \in A \cup C$ can obtain a proof of culpability of any process from the messages it received in Λ . Informally, the reason is that all processes seem correct in the eyes of a correct process; recall that the groups A and C do not communicate with each other in Λ .

Lemma 1. Consider a process $p \in A \cup C$. Given the messages p receives in Λ , p is unable to construct a proof of culpability of any process.

Proof. Without loss of generality, let $p \in A$. Recall that Λ is indistinguishable from e_1 until time T_0 to p. Assume that, by the means of contradiction, p obtains a proof of culpability of some process from the messages received in Λ .

We now construct an infinite execution e_1^* by relying on e_1 :

- 1. All processes are correct in e_1^* .
- 2. All messages sent by the processes from the group *C* to any process from the groups *A* or *B* are delayed until after time T_0 .
- 3. The execution e_1^* unfolds in the exact same way as e_1 until time T_0 .

Due to the construction of e_1^* , p cannot distinguish e_1^* (until time T_0) from Λ . Thus, p obtains a proof of culpability of some process in e_1^* . However, this is impossible as all processes are correct. \Box

Intuition Now that we have designed the finite execution Λ , we can present the intuition behind the construction of \mathcal{E} . Let us fix any process $a \in A$.

First, note that there exists a continuation e_a^1 of Λ in which (1) only a and $c_1 \in C$ are correct, and (2) these two processes do not receive messages from any other process after T_0 . Importantly, all processes in $A \setminus \{a\}$ are silent after T_0 ; note that their behavior is correct, except that sent messages which are not received by T_0 are omitted (this will play an important role in the conclusion of the proof intuition). As Lemma 1 proves, c_1 is unable to build any proof of culpability given the messages it has received in Λ . As accountability must be satisfied in e_a^1 , a must help c_1 in obtaining (at least) $t_0 + 1$ proofs of culpability. Therefore, a must send (at least) $t_0 + 1 = \Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to c_1 . Let T_1 denote the time by which a sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to c_1 .

However, if *a* receives a message from $c_2 \in C$ after T_1 , *a* must help c_2 in satisfying accountability. Indeed, *a* cannot rely on c_1 helping c_2 as c_1 might be faulty. Thus, *a* needs to send $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to c_2 . Following the same logic, we construct a finite execution e_a in which *a* sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to *each* process $c \in C$; hence, *a* sends $\Omega(n^2)$ accountability-specific messages in e_a . We denote by T_a the time by which *a* sends $\Omega(n^2)$ messages in e_a . Fig. 1 gives a visual depiction of the intuition behind the design of e_a .

At this point, for every process $a \in A$, we have an execution e_a in which (1) a sends $\Omega(n^2)$ accountability-specific messages, and (2) all other processes from the group A are silent. Therefore, we can "merge" all of these executions into \mathcal{E} in the following manner:

- 1. Only processes from the group *A* are correct. All other processes (i.e., $B \cup C$) are faulty.
- Message between processes from the group *A* which are not received by *T*₀ (i.e., in Λ) are delayed until after max(*T*_{a1}, *T*_{a2}, ..., *T*_{at0}).
- 3. Each process $c \in C$ behaves towards each process $a \in A$ as it does in e_a .

As no process $a \in A$ can distinguish \mathcal{E} from e_a until T_a , a sends $\Omega(n^2)$ messages in \mathcal{E} . Thus, $\Omega(n^3)$ accountability-specific messages are sent in \mathcal{E} , which suffices for proving the lower bound.

Construction of \mathcal{E} (*part* 1): In the first part of the construction, we build an execution e_a in which (1) only a fixed process $a \in A$ is correct, and (2) a sends (at least) $t_0 + 1 \in \Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to *each* process from the group C. Thus, a sends a

 $^{^{6}\,}$ Recall that e is an infinite execution. On the other hand, Λ is a finite execution.

€ a	 decides v obtains no proof of culpability 	 receives messages only from c₁ (and itself) sends Ω(n) accountability-specific messages to c₁ by T₁
\bigcirc_{c_1}	 decides v' obtains no proof of culpability 	 receives messages only from a (and itself) achieves accountability
	 behaves correctly, except that some messages are omitted 	• silent
	• behaves correctly, except that some messages are omitted	• silent
:		
	• behaves correctly, except that some messages are omitted	• silent
l other	behaves correctly, except that some messages are omitted	• silent
	π_a^1	

Fig. 2. Execution e_a^1 .

quadratic number of accountability-specific messages in e_a . As constructing e_a is non-trivial, we construct e_a incrementally (through a sequence of steps).

Step 1: Construction of an infinite execution e_a^1 in which *a* sends $\overline{\Omega(n)}$ accountability-specific messages to c_1 .

We construct e_a^1 by relying on the previously described execution Λ . Specifically, we construct e_a^1 as follows:

- 1. Only processes a and c_1 are correct.
- 2. We construct the prefix π_a^1 of e_a^1 until time T_0 in the following way:
 - (a) Let π_a^1 be Λ .
 - (b) For every message *m* such that (1) *m* is sent by a process s in π_a^1 with $s \neq a$ and $s \neq c_1$, and (2) *m* is not received in π_a^1 (i.e., Λ), the sending event of *m* is removed from π_a^1 . In other words, each message which is sent by a process other than *a* and c_1 and not received by T_0 is removed from π_a^1 . This step ensures that processes can only receive messages from *a* and c_1 after T_0 .
- 3. Each process $p \in \Psi \setminus \{a, c_1\}$ is silent after time T_0 , i.e., it does not send any message after time T_0 .

Fig. 2 depicts the devised execution e_a^1 .

Let us analyze e_a^1 (the summary of the analysis can be seen in Fig. 2):

- No process receives any message from a process *s* after time *T*₀, where *s* ≠ *a* and *s* ≠ *c*₁ (step 2b). In other words, if any process receives a message after time *T*₀, then the message was sent either by *a* or *c*₁.
- Until time T_0 , e_a^1 is indistinguishable from Λ to both a and c_1 (step 2a and step 2b). Thus, a decides v in e_a^1 , whereas c decides $v' \neq v$ in e_a^1 . Moreover, c_1 does not obtain any proof of culpability until time T_0 in e_a^1 (due to Lemma 1).
- For every process $q \in (A \cup C) \setminus \{a, c_1\}$, q does not behave correctly until time T_0 solely because it omits some messages (step 2b).

Finally, we prove that *a* sends (at least) $t_0 + 1 \in \Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages in e_a^1 . Intuitively, *a* does so to ensure that

 c_1 is able to obtain a proof of culpability of $t_0 + 1 = n - 2t_0$ processes in e_a^1 (to satisfy accountability).

Lemma 2. Process a sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to c_1 in e_a^1 .

Proof. Given the messages c_1 receives until time T_0 in e_a^1 , c_1 is not able to construct a proof of culpability of any process (by Lemma 1). However, as *abc* satisfies accountability, c_1 eventually obtains proofs of culpability of $t_0 + 1$ processes. Hence, c_1 obtains the proofs after time T_0 . As c_1 only receives messages from *a* (and itself) after time T_0 , c_1 must have incorporated (at least) $t_0 + 1$ messages sent by *a* into the obtained proofs of culpabilities; thus, all of these messages are accountability-specific. Therefore, *a* sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to c_1 in e_a^1 . \Box

We denote by T_1 the first time such that (1) $T_1 > T_0$, and (2) a sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to c_1 by time T_1 in e_a^1 .

Step 2: Construction of an infinite execution e_a^2 in which *a* sends $\overline{\Omega(n)}$ accountability-specific messages to both c_1 and c_2 .

This step of the construction is purely demonstrative. Namely, we show how to construct e_a^2 by relying on e_a^1 . In the next step of the construction, we will generalize the construction from e_a^i (in which *a* sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to each process in $\{a_1, ..., a_i\}$) to e_a^{i+1} (in which *a* sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to each process in service of the each process in $\{a_1, ..., a_i, a_{i+1}\}$.

We construct e_a^2 in the following way:

- 1. Only processes a and c_2 are correct.
- 2. We construct the prefix π_a^2 of e_a^2 until time T_1 in the following manner:
 - (a) Let π_a^2 be the prefix of e_a^1 until time T_1 .
 - (b) We correct the behavior of c_2 until time T_0 by inserting all the messages omitted in e_a^1 (i.e., c_2 behaves exactly as it behaves in Λ). After time T_0 , the behavior of c_2 is correct (as c_2 is correct in e_a^2).
 - (c) For every message m sent by c_1 in π_a^2 such that (1) m is sent to a process r with $r \neq a$ and $r \neq c_1$, and (2) m is not received by time T_0 , the sending event of m is removed from π_a^2 . In other words, only a (and c_1) receive messages from c_1 after T_0 .
 - (d) For every message *m* sent by c_1 in π_a^2 such that (1) *m* is sent to *a*, and (2) *m* is not received by time T_1 , the sending event of *m* is removed from π_a^2 . This step of the construction ensures that *a* only receives messages from c_1 until time T_1 ; after T_1 , *a* receives no messages from c_1 .
- 3. Process c_2 does not receive any message from any other process between times T_0 and T_1 .
- 4. Each process $p \in \Psi \setminus \{a, c_2\}$ is silent after time T_1 , i.e., it does not send any message after time T_1 . Recall that processes in $\Psi \setminus \{a, c_1, c_2\}$ are silent after time T_0 (due to the construction of e_a^1).

Fig. 3 depicts e_a^2 .

The following holds for e_a^2 (summarized in Fig. 3):

- After T_0 , only *a* and c_1 receive messages from c_1 (step 2c). Moreover, even *a* stops receiving messages from c_1 after time T_1 (step 2d).
- After time T_0 , c_2 only receives messages from a and itself (step 2c). Furthermore, between T_0 and T_1 , c_2 only receives messages from itself (step 3).
- Until time T_0 , e_a^2 is indistinguishable from Λ to both a and c_2 (step 2a). Thus, a decides v, whereas c_2 decides $v' \neq v$.

		7	0	Т	1	Т	2
\bigcirc_a	•	decides v obtains no proof of culpability	•	receives messages only from c_1 (and itself) sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to c_1 by T_1	•	receives messages only from c_2 (and itself) sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to c_2 by T_2	
	•	behaves correctly, except that some messages are omitted	•	behaves correctly, except that some messages are omitted	•	silent	
\bigcirc_{c_2}	:	decides v' obtains no proof of culpability	•	receives messages only from itself	•	receives messages only from a (and itself) achieves accountability	
	•	behaves correctly, except that some messages are omitted	•	silent	•	silent	
:							
	•	behaves correctly, except that some messages are omitted	•	silent	•	silent	
all other processes	•	behaves correctly, except that some messages are omitted	•	silent	•	silent	
L		-2					i
		π_{a}					

Fig. 3. Execution e_a^2 . All modifications introduced to e_a^1 (in order to obtain e_a^2) are noted in red.

For every process *q* ∈ (*A* ∪ *C*) \ {*a*, *c*₁, *c*₂}, *q* does not behave correctly until time *T*₀ solely because it omits some messages.

We conclude this step of the construction of e_a by proving that a sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages both to c_1 and c_2 in e_a^2 .

Lemma 3. Process a sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages both to c_1 and c_2 in e_a^2 .

Proof. First, *a* sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to c_1 in e_a^2 as (1) e_a^2 is indistinguishable from e_a^1 to *a* until time T_1 (due to the construction of e_a^2), and (2) *a* sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages by T_1 in e_a^1 (by Lemma 2). Hence, it is left to prove that *a* sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to c_2 in e_a^2 , as well.

As already noted, *a* and *c*₂ disagree in e_a^2 . Since *abc* satisfies accountability, *c*₂ eventually obtains proofs of culpability of (at least) $t_0 + 1$ processes. Moreover, due to Lemma 1, given the messages c_2 receives until time T_0 , c_2 is unable to form a proof of culpability of any process. Therefore, c_2 obtains the culpability proofs after T_0 . Given that c_2 only receives messages from *a* (and itself) after T_0 , c_2 must have "used" $\Omega(n)$ messages received from *a* to form the culpability proofs (in order to satisfy accountability). Thus, *a* indeed sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to c_2 in e_a^2 , which concludes the proof. \Box

We denote by T_2 the first time such that (1) $T_2 > T_1$, and (2) a sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to c_2 by time T_2 in e_a^2 . Note that a sends $\Omega(n)$ messages to both c_1 and c_2 by T_2 in e_a^2 as $T_2 > T_1$.

<u>Step 3:</u> Construction of an infinite execution e_a^{i+1} in which *a* sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to each process in $\{c_1, c_2, ..., c_i, c_{i+1}\}$, where $i \in [1, t_0 - 1]$.

We construct e_a^{i+1} from e_a^i . In order to do so, we describe the execution e_a^i :

- *Property 1:* Only processes *a* and c_i are correct in e_a^i .
- *Property 2:* Until time T_0 , e_a^i is indistinguishable from Λ to both a and c_i .

	Т	Ç0 7	$T_1 T_2 $	T_{i-1} T_i
	decides <i>v</i> no proof of culpability	 only <i>a</i> and <i>c</i>₁ Ω(<i>n</i>) to <i>c</i>₁ 	• only a and c_2 • $\Omega(n)$ to c_2	 only <i>a</i> and <i>c_i</i> Ω(<i>n</i>) to <i>c_i</i>
$\widetilde{\underbrace{\cdots}}_{c_1}$.	omitted messages	• make <i>a</i> send messages	• silent	• silent
$\widetilde{\underbrace{c_2}}$.	omitted messages	 omitted messages 	• make <i>a</i> send messages	• silent
$\widetilde{\underset{c_{i-1}}{\cdots}}$.	omitted messages	 omitted messages 	 omitted messages 	• silent
\bigotimes_{c_i} :	decides v' no proof of culpability	 only c_i 	 only c_i 	 only a and c_i accountability
$\overleftarrow{c_{i+1}}$.	omitted messages	• silent	• silent	• silent
all other processes	omitted messages	• silent	• silent	• silent

Fig. 4. A summary of the execution e_a^i .

- Property 3: For every process $c \in \{c_{i+1}, c_{i+2}, ..., c_{t_0}\}$, c behaves correctly in e_a^i until time T_0 except that some messages are omitted.
- Property 4: For every process $f \in \Psi \setminus \{a, c_1, c_2, ..., c_{i-1}, c_i\}$, no process receives any message from f after T_0 .
- *Property 5:* For every process $c \in \{c_1, c_2, ..., c_{i-1}\}$, only processes *a* and *c* receive any message from *c* after T_0 .
- *Property* 6: There exists a time $T_i > T_0$ such that *a* has sent $\Omega(n)$ messages to each process $c \in \{c_1, c_2, ..., c_{i-1}, c_i\}$.
- *Property* 7: For every $j \in [1, i 1]$, there exists a time T_j such that, if a process *a* receives a message from c_j after T_0 , the reception happens between T_{j-1} and T_j ($T_j > T_{j-1}$).
- *Property 8:* Process c_i does not receive any message from another process between T_0 and T_{i-1} .
- *Property* 9: If process *a* receives a message from c_i after T_0 , the reception happens after T_{i-1} .

The execution e_a^i is summarized in Fig. 4. Observe that e_a^1 and e_a^2 satisfy the aforementioned properties.

Now, we construct e_a^{i+1} from e_a^i in the same way we constructed e_a^2 from e_a^1 :

	7	0 7	[1	$T_2 \dots T_{i-1}$	T_i	T_{i+1}
	decides v no proof of culpability	 only <i>a</i> and <i>c</i>₁ Ω(<i>n</i>) to <i>c</i>₁ 	• only a and c • $\Omega(n)$ to c_2	$\begin{array}{c} \bullet \text{only } a \text{ and } \\ \bullet \Omega(n) \text{ to } \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{ccc} \operatorname{nd} c_i & \bullet & \operatorname{only} a \text{ a} \\ c_i & \bullet & \Omega(n) \text{ to} \end{array}$	nd c _{i+1} c _{i+1}
$\overline{\mathfrak{i}}_{c_1}$.	omitted messages	• make <i>a</i> send messages	• silent	• silent	• silent	
$\widetilde{\underset{c_2}{\mathfrak{o}_2}}$.	omitted messages	 omitted messages 	• make <i>a</i> send messages	• silent	• silent	
:						
$\widetilde{\underset{c_{i-1}}{\circ}}$.	omitted messages	 omitted messages 	 omitted messages 	• silent	• silent	
$\widetilde{\underbrace{c_i}}$.	omitted messages	 omitted messages 	 omitted messages 	• make a send messa	• silent	
$\bigcup_{c_{i+1}}$:	decides v' no proof of culpability	• only c_{i+1}	 only <i>c</i>_{<i>i</i>+1} 	• only c_{i+}	• only <i>a</i> and • accounta	nd c _{i+1} ibility
all other	omitted messages	• silent	• silent	• silent	• silent	
P.000000						
L		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				

Fig. 5. Execution e_a^{i+1} . All modifications introduced to e_a^i (in order to obtain e_a^{i+1}) are noted in red.

- 1. Only processes a and c_{i+1} are correct.
- 2. We construct the prefix π_a^{i+1} of e_a^{i+1} until time T_i in the following manner:
 - (a) Let π_a^{i+1} be the prefix of e_a^i until time T_i .
 - (b) We correct the behavior of c_{i+1} until time T_0 by inserting all the messages omitted in e_a^i (i.e., c_{i+1} behaves exactly as it behaves in Λ). After time T_0 , the behavior of c_{i+1} is correct (as c_{i+1} is correct in e_a^{i+1}).
 - (c) For every message m sent by c_i in π_a^i such that (1) m is sent to a process r with $r \neq a$ and $r \neq c_i$, and (2) m is not received by time T_0 , the sending event of m is removed from π_a^i . In other words, only a (and c_i) receive messages from c_i after T_0 .
 - (d) For every message *m* sent by c_i in π_a^i such that (1) *m* is sent to *a*, and (2) *m* is not received by time T_i , the sending event of *m* is removed from π_a^i . This step of the construction ensures that *a* only receives messages from c_i until time T_i ; after T_i , *a* receives no messages from c_i .
- 3. Process c_{i+1} does not receive any message from any other process between times T_0 and T_i .
- 4. Each process $p \in \Psi \setminus \{a, c_{i+1}\}$ is silent after time T_i , i.e., it does not send any message after time T_1 . Recall that processes in $\Psi \setminus \{a, c_1, c_2, ..., c_{i-1}, c_i, c_{i+1}\}$ are silent after time T_0 (due to the property 4 of e_a^i).

Fig. 5 depicts e_a^{i+1} .

First, let us prove that all nine introduced properties are preserved for e_a^{i+1} :

- Property 1: Only processes *a* and c_{i+1} are correct by construction of e_a^{i+1} .
- Property 2: For c_{i+1} , this property is satisfied due to the construction of e_a^{i+1} (step 2b). For *a*, the property is satisfied as (1) *a* cannot distinguish e_a^{i+1} from e_a^i until time $T_i > T_0$, and (2) *a* cannot distinguish e_a^i from Λ until time T_0 .
- Property 3: This property is satisfied as it is satisfied for e_a^i .
- Property 4: This property is satisfied as it is satisfied for e_a^i .
- *Property* 5: For every process $c \in \{c_1, c_2, ..., c_{i-1}\}$, the property is satisfied as it is satisfied for e_a^i . For c_i , the property holds due to the construction of e_a^{i+1} (step 2c).
- Property 6: We prove the property by proving Lemma 4.
- *Property* 7: For every process $c \in \{c_1, c_2, ..., c_{i-1}\}$, the property holds as it holds for e_a^i . For c_i , if *a* receives a message from c_i

after T_0 , that happens after T_{i-1} (as e_a^{i+1} is indistinguishable from e_a^i until $T_i > T_{i-1}$ to a and a receives messages from c_i only after T_{i-1} due to the property 9 of e_a^i). Moreover, areceives no messages from c_i after time T_i due to the construction of e_a^{i+1} (step 2d).

- *Property 8:* This property is ensured due to the step 3 of the construction.
- *Property* 9: The property is ensured by construction. Namely, *a* cannot distinguish e_a^{i+1} from e_a^i until time T_i and *a* does not receive any message from c_{i+1} in e_a^i (as the property 4 holds for e_a^i).

Finally, let us prove that *a* sends $\Omega(n)$ messages to each process $c \in \{c_1, c_2, ..., c_i, c_{i+1}\}$ in e_a^{i+1} ; the following lemma ensures that the property 6 is satisfied for e_a^{i+1} .

Lemma 4. Process a sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to each process $c \in \{c_1, c_2, ..., c_i, c_{i+1}\}$ in e_a^{i+1} .

Proof. First, *a* sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to each process in the $\{c_1, c_2, ..., c_{i-1}, c_i\}$ set in e_a^{i+1} as (1) e_a^{i+1} is indistinguishable to *a* from e_a^i until time T_i (due to the construction of e_a^{i+1}), and (2) *a* sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to each process in $\{c_1, c_2, ..., c_i\}$ by T_i in e_a^i (by the property 6 of e_a^i). Hence, it is left to prove that *a* sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to c_{i+1} in e_a^{i+1} , as well.

Processes *a* and c_{i+1} disagree in e_a^{i+1} . Since *abc* satisfies accountability, c_{i+1} eventually obtains proofs of culpability of (at least) $t_0 + 1$ processes. Moreover, due to Lemma 1, given the messages c_{i+1} receives until time T_0 , c_{i+1} is unable to form a proof of culpability of any process. Therefore, c_{i+1} obtains the culpability proofs after T_0 . Given that c_{i+1} only receives messages from *a* (and itself) after T_0 (due to the properties 4 and 5 of e_a^{i+1}), c_{i+1} must have "used" $\Omega(n)$ messages received from *a* to form the culpability proofs (to satisfy accountability). Thus, *a* indeed sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to c_{i+1} in e_a^{i+1} , as well. \Box

We denote by T_{i+1} the first time such that (1) $T_{i+1} > T_i$, and (2) *a* sends $\Omega(n)$ accountability-specific messages to c_{i+1} by time T_{i+1} in e_a^{i+1} . Note that *a* sends $\Omega(n)$ messages to each process in the $\{c_1, ..., c_i, c_{i+1}\}$ set by T_{i+1} .

<u>Step 4:</u> Construction of a finite execution e_a in which (1) a sends $\overline{\Omega(n^2)}$ accountability-specific messages, and (2) a is the only correct process.

We construct e_a in the following manner:

1. Only process *a* is correct in e_a .

- 2. We build the prefix π_a of e_a until time T_{t_0} in the following manner, where T_{t_0} is the time specified explicitly in the construction of $e_a^{t_0}$ (constructed by the generic transformation introduced in the previous step):
 - (a) Let π_a be the prefix of $e_a^{t_0}$ until time T_{t_0} .
 - (b) For every message *m* sent by c_{t_0} in π_a such that (1) *m* is sent to a process *r* with $r \neq a$ and $r \neq c_{t_0}$, and (2) *m* is not received by time T_0 , the sending event of *m* is removed from π_a . In other words, only *a* (and c_{t_0}) receive messages from c_{t_0} after T_0 .
 - (c) For every message *m* sent by c_{t_0} in π_a such that (1) *m* is sent to *a*, and (2) *m* is not received by time T_{t_0} , the sending event of *m* is removed from π_a . This step of the construction ensures that *a* only receives messages from c_{t_0} until time T_{t_0} ; after T_{t_0} , *a* receives no messages from c_{t_0} .
- 3. Each process $p \in \Psi \setminus \{a\}$ is silent after time T_i , i.e., it does not send any message after time T_{t_0} . Recall that processes in $\Psi \setminus \{a, c_1, c_2, ..., c_{t_0}\}$ are silent after time T_0 .

Since *a* cannot distinguish $e_a^{t_0}$ from e_a until time T_{t_0} , *a* sends $\Omega(n^2)$ accountability-specific messages in e_a . Lastly, we associate e_a with $T_a = T_{t_0}$.

Construction of \mathcal{E} (part 2): The first part of the proof was devoted to constructing e_a , an execution in which a fixed correct process $a \in A$ sends a quadratic number of accountability-specific messages. The second part "merges" all of these executions in order to obtain an execution with a cubic number of sent accountability-specific messages.

Theorem 5. The accountability complexity of abc, where abc is a t_0 -resilient (deterministic or probabilistic) accountable Byzantine consensus protocol and $t_0 \in \Omega(n)$, is $\Omega(n^3)$.

Proof. We prove the theorem by constructing an execution \mathcal{E} with a cubic number of accountability-specific messages. Recall that, for each process $a \in A$, time $T_a > T_0$ is associated with e_a ; a sends $\Omega(n^2)$ accountability-specific messages by T_a in e_a .

We construct \mathcal{E} in the following manner. First, we "merge" executions e_a until time T_0 , for every $a \in A$. More formally, we build a prefix ρ of \mathcal{E} until time T_0 using the following construction:

- 1. Let ρ be the prefix of e_{a_1} until time T_0 , where $a_1 \in A$.
- 2. For every process $a \in A \setminus \{a_1\}$:
 - (a) If there exists a message *m* sent by a process $p \in \Psi$ in the prefix of e_a until time T_0 such that *m* is not sent in ρ , add *m* to be sent in ρ at the exact same time as in e_a .

Intuitively, we create ρ as the "union" of the prefixes of e_a until time T_0 , for every $a \in A$. Observe that all processes from the group A are correct in ρ .

After time T_0 , we do the following:

- 1. Processes from the *C* set behave towards a process *a* as they do in e_a , for every $a \in A$.
- 2. Processes from the group *B* are silent, i.e., they do not send any messages.

3. Messages between processes from the group *A* that are not received by time T_0 are delayed until after time $T^* = \max(T_{a_1}, T_{a_2}, ..., T_{a_{t_0}})$.

Given that no process $a \in A$ distinguishes \mathcal{E} from e_a until time $T^* > T_a$, each process $a \in A$ sends a quadratic number of accountability-complexity messages in \mathcal{E} . Since $|A| = t_0 \in \Omega(n)$, the overall accountability complexity of execution \mathcal{E} is $\Omega(n^3)$, which concludes the proof. \Box

5. Generalized *ABC* transformation

We have shown that ABC enables Byzantine consensus protocols to obtain accountability. This section generalizes our ABCtransformation and defines its applicability. Namely, we specify a class of distributed computing problems named *easily-accountable agreement tasks*, and we prove that generalized ABC enables accountability in such tasks.

We introduce agreement tasks in § 5.1. Then, we define the class of easily-accountable agreement tasks (§ 5.2), and prove the correctness of generalized ABC transformation applied to such agreement tasks (§ 5.3).

5.1. Agreement tasks

Agreement tasks represent an abstraction of distributed inputoutput problems performed in a Byzantine environment. Specifically, each process has its *input value*. We assume that " \perp " denotes the special input value of a process that specifies that the input value is non-existent. A process may eventually halt; if a process halts, it produces its *output value*. The " \perp " output value of a process means that the process has not yet halted (and produced its output value). We denote by I_i (resp., O_i) the input (resp., output) value of process P_i . We note that some processes might never halt if permitted by the definition of an agreement task. We provide the formal explanation in the rest of the subsection.

An agreement task A is parametrized with the upper bound t_A on number of faulty processes that are tolerated. In other words, the specification of an agreement task assumes that no more than t_A processes are faulty in any execution.

Any agreement task could be defined as a relation between input and output values of processes. Since we assume that processes might fail, we only care about input and output values of correct processes. Hence, an agreement task could be defined as a relation between input and output values of *correct* processes.

An *input configuration* of an agreement task \mathcal{A} is $v_I = \{(P_i, I_i) \text{ with } P_i \text{ is correct}\}$, where $|v_I| \ge n - t_{\mathcal{A}}$: an input configuration consists of input values of all correct processes. Similarly, an *output configuration* of an agreement task is $v_0 = \{(P_i, O_i) \text{ with } P_i \text{ is correct}\}$, where $|v_0| \ge n - t_{\mathcal{A}}$: it contains output values of correct processes. We denote by $\theta(v_0) = |\{O_i | (P_i, O_i) \in v_0 \land O_i \neq \bot\}|$ the number of distinct non- \bot values in the v_0 output configuration.

Finally, we define an agreement task A as tuple (I, O, Δ, t_A) , where:

- \mathcal{I} denotes the set of all input configurations of \mathcal{A} .
- \mathcal{O} denotes the set of all output configurations of \mathcal{A} such that $\theta(v_0) \leq 1$, for every $v_0 \in \mathcal{O}$.
- $\Delta : \mathcal{I} \to 2^{\mathcal{O}}$, where $\nu_0 \in \Delta(\nu_I)$ if and only if the output configuration $\nu_0 \in \mathcal{O}$ is valid given the input configuration $\nu_I \in \mathcal{I}$.
- $t_A \leq \lceil n/3 \rceil 1$ denotes the maximum number of faulty processes the task assumes.

As seen from the definition, correct processes that halt always output the same value in agreement tasks. Moreover, we define agreement tasks to tolerate less than n/3 faults. Without loss of

generality, we assume that $\Delta(v_l) \neq \emptyset$, for every input configuration $v_l \in \mathcal{I}$. Moreover, for every $v_0 \in \mathcal{O}$, there exists $v_l \in \mathcal{I}$ such that $v_0 \in \Delta(v_l)$.

We note that some problems that are traditionally considered as "agreement" problems do not fall into our classification of agreement tasks. For instance, Byzantine lattice agreement [50] or *k*-set agreement [21] is *not* agreement tasks per our definition since the number of distinct non- \perp values that can be outputted is greater than 1.

Solutions The following definitions specify solutions of agreement tasks.

Definition 8 (Solution of an agreement task). A protocol $\Pi_{\mathcal{A}}$ deterministically (resp., probabilistically) solves an agreement task $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{I}, \mathcal{O}, \Delta, t_{\mathcal{A}})$ if and only if, in every execution with up to $t_{\mathcal{A}}$ faults, there exists (resp., exists with probability 1) an unknown time T_D such that $v_0 \in \Delta(v_l)$, where $v_l \in \mathcal{I}$ denotes the input configuration that consists of input values of all correct processes and $v_0 \in \mathcal{O}$ denotes the output configuration that (1) consists of output values (potentially \perp) of all correct processes, and (2) no correct process P_i with $O_i = \perp$ updates its output value after T_D .

Lastly, we define accountable solutions of agreement tasks.

Definition 9 (Accountable solution of an agreement task). A protocol $\Pi_{\mathcal{A}}^{Acc}$ deterministically (resp., probabilistically) solves an agreement task $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{I}, \mathcal{O}, \Delta, t_{\mathcal{A}})$ with accountability if and only if the following holds:

- *A-Solvability:* $\Pi_{\mathcal{A}}^{Acc}$ deterministically (resp., probabilistically) solves \mathcal{A} .
- Accountability: If two correct processes output different values, then every correct process eventually detects (at least) $n 2t_A$ faulty processes and obtains a proof of culpability of each detected process.

5.2. Easily-accountable agreement tasks

Fix an agreement task $A = (I, O, \Delta, t_A)$. We say that A is an *easily-accountable agreement task* if and only if one of the following conditions is satisfied:

- 1. "All-or-None-Decidability": There does not exist $v_0 \in \mathcal{O}$ such that $(P_i, O_i \neq \bot) \in v_0$ and $(P_i, O_i = \bot) \in v_0$; or
- 2. "*Partial-Decidability*": For every $v_I \in \mathcal{I}$ such that there exists $v_0 \in \Delta(v_I)$, where $(P_i, O_i = v \neq \bot) \in v_0$ and $(P_j, O_j = \bot) \in v_0$, the following holds:

for every
$$c \in \mathbb{P}(\{P_i | (P_i, I_i) \in v_I\}), \exists v'_0 \in \Delta(v_I)$$
, where
 $\forall P_i \in c : (P_i, O_i = v) \in v'_0$ and
 $\forall P_j \in \{P_k | (P_k, I_k) \in v_I\}$
 $\setminus c : (P_j, O_j = \bot) \in v'_0$.

"All-or-None-Decidability" characterizes all the problems in which either every process halts or none does. For instance, Byzantine consensus [40] and Byzantine reliable broadcast [17] satisfy "All-or-None-Decidability".

On the other hand, some agreement tasks permit that some processes halt, whereas others do not. We say that these tasks satisfy "Partial-Decidability" if and only if it is allowed for *any* subset of correct processes to halt (and output a value). Note that "Partial-Decidability" covers the case where no correct process ever halts. Byzantine consistent broadcast [17] is the only agreement task we are aware of that satisfies "Partial-Decidability" (in the case of a Byzantine sender). However, the significance of Byzantine consistent broadcast (e.g., for implementing cryptocurrencies [35]) motivated us to consider the "Partial-Decidability" property.

5.3. Correctness of generalized ABC transformation

We now prove the correctness of our generalized ABC transformation (Algorithm 4). First, we show that Algorithm 4 solves an easily-accountable agreement task A if A satisfies "All-or-None-Decidability".

Lemma 5. Let $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{I}, \mathcal{O}, \Delta, t_{\mathcal{A}})$ be an easily-accountable agreement task that satisfies "All-or-None-Decidability". Algorithm 4 deterministically (resp., probabilistically) solves \mathcal{A} if $\Pi_{\mathcal{A}}$ (line 5) deterministically (resp., probabilistically) solves \mathcal{A} .

Proof. If no correct process ever outputs a value at line 9, then no correct process confirms any value from accountable confirmer (because no correct process submits any value to accountable confirmer at line 10). Hence, no correct process produces any output at line 12, which concludes the proof in this scenario.

Otherwise, each correct process eventually outputs a value at line 9. Moreover, all correct processes output the exact same value v (since A is an agreement task). Therefore, all correct processes submit the same value v to accountable confirmer (line 10). By terminating convergence of accountable confirmer, all correct processes eventually confirm value v (line 11) and output it (line 12). Once this happens, the agreement task A is solved, which concludes the lemma. \Box

Now, we prove that Algorithm 4 solves an easily-accountable agreement task A if A satisfies "Partial-Decidability".

Lemma 6. Let $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{I}, \mathcal{O}, \Delta, t_{\mathcal{A}})$ be an easily-accountable agreement task that satisfies "Partial-Decidability". Algorithm 4 deterministically (resp., probabilistically) solves \mathcal{A} if $\Pi_{\mathcal{A}}$ (line 5) deterministically (resp., probabilistically) solves \mathcal{A} .

Proof. Let v_l denote a specific input configuration of A. We consider two cases:

- If no or all correct processes output a value at line 9, the proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 5.
- Otherwise, there exists a correct process that outputs a value v at line 9 and another correct process that does not output any value at line 9. Since A is an agreement task, any correct process that outputs a value at line 9 outputs the value v. Moreover, any correct process that outputs a value at line 12 outputs the value v (ensured by validity of accountable confirmer). Finally, once the system stabilizes at time T_D (the system stabilizes at time T_D if and only if no correct process P_i with $O_i = \bot$ updates its output value after T_D), the fact that any subset of correct processes could halt and that all halted processes output v implies that Algorithm 4 solves A.

The lemma holds. \Box

Finally, we are ready to prove that Algorithm 4 solves A with accountability, where A is an easily-accountable agreement task, which means that generalized ABC is correct.

Theorem 6. Let $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{I}, \mathcal{O}, \Delta, t_{\mathcal{A}})$ be an easily-accountable agreement task. Algorithm 4 deterministically (resp., probabilistically) solves \mathcal{A} with accountability if $\Pi_{\mathcal{A}}$ (line 5) deterministically (resp., probabilistically) solves \mathcal{A} .

Algorithm 4 Generalized ABC Transformation - Code For Process P_i .				
1: Implements:				
2: Agreement Task A With Accountability, instance $a - A$				
3: Uses:				
4: > Protocol to be transformed				
5: Protocol that (deterministically or probabilistically) solves agreement task A , instance Π_A				
6: t_A -Resilient Accountable Confirmer, where t_A is the resilience of A , instance ac				
7: upon event $\langle a - A$, Input $ input\rangle$ do	⊳ Input			
8: trigger $\langle \Pi_{\mathcal{A}}, \text{Input} input \rangle$				
9: upon event $\langle \Pi_{\mathcal{A}}, Output output \rangle$ do				
10: trigger $\langle ac, \text{Submit} output \rangle$				
11: upon event (ac, Confirm confirmation) do				
12: trigger $(a - A, \text{Output} \text{confirmation})$	⊳ Output			
13: upon event (ac, Detect F, proof) do				
14: trigger $\langle a - A, Detect F, proof \rangle$	▷ Detection			

Proof. Algorithm 4 satisfies A-solvability by Lemmas 5 and 6. Finally, Algorithm 4 ensures accountability since the accountable confirmer ensures detection of (at least) $n - 2t_A$ faulty processes whenever a disagreement occurs. \Box

6. Concluding remarks

We presented ABC, a generic and simple transformation that allows non-synchronous (deterministic or probabilistic) Byzantine consensus protocols to obtain accountability. Besides its simplicity, ABC is efficient: it introduces an additive overhead of only two all-to-all communication rounds and $O(n^2)$ exchanged bits of information in the common case. Furthermore, we show that ABC can easily be generalized to other agreement problems (e.g., Byzantine reliable broadcast, Byzantine consistent broadcast). Future work includes (1) designing similarly simple and efficient transformation, like Byzantine lattice and *k*-set agreement problems, and (2) circumventing the cubic accountability complexity bound using randomization techniques.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Data availability

No data was used for the research described in the article.

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Appendix A. Formal proof of Theorem 1

Theorem 1 (Unavoidable disagreement; restated). For any non-synchronous t_0 -resilient (deterministic or probabilistic) Byzantine consensus protocol among n processes, there exists an execution with $t \ge n - 2t_0$ faulty processes in which correct processes disagree (i.e., decide different values).

Proof. As we need to have at least two correct processes (in order for a disagreement to occur), $t \le n - 2$. Let *B* denote the group of faulty processes; $|B| = t \ge n - 2t_0$. We denote by *A* a group of any $\lceil \frac{n-t}{2} \rceil$ correct processes and by *C* the group of "other" $\lfloor \frac{n-t}{2} \rfloor$ correct processes. Note that (1) $A \cap C = \emptyset$, (2) $A \ne \emptyset$ (as $n - t \ge 2$), and (3) $C \ne \emptyset$ (as $n - t \ge 2$).

Consider the following two executions:

- Execution e_1 : In this execution, processes in $A \cup B$ are correct, whereas processes in *C* are faulty and silent (i.e., they do not send any messages). All correct processes propose the same value *v*. The number of faulty processes in e_1 is $|C| = \lfloor \frac{n-t}{2} \rfloor \le t_0$. Due to the fact that the Byzantine consensus protocol is t_0 -resilient and the number of faulty processes is $\le t_0$, all correct processes decide *v* by some time T_1 .
- Execution e_2 : In this execution, processes in $B \cup C$ are correct, whereas processes in A are faulty and silent. All correct processes propose the same value v'. The number of faulty processes in e_1 is $|A| \le t_0$. Hence, all correct processes decide v' by some time T_2 .

Now, we build an execution e_3 :

- 1. Processes in $A \cup C$ are correct, whereas processes in B are faulty.
- 2. Processes in A propose v, whereas processes in C propose v'.
- 3. Processes in *B* behave (1) towards processes in *A* as in e_1 , and (2) towards processes in *C* as in e_2 . Moreover, all messages between groups *A* and *C* are delayed until after max(T_1 , T_2).

Until time T_1 , processes in A cannot distinguish e_3 from e_1 ; thus, processes in A decide v in e_3 . Similarly, until time T_2 , processes in C cannot distinguish e_3 from e_2 ; thus, processes in C decide v' in e_3 . Therefore, a disagreement occurs in e_3 , and there are $n - 2t_0 \le t \le n - 2$ faulty processes in e_3 , which concludes the proof. \Box

Appendix B. Cryptographic primitives: formal overview

This subsection recalls the formal definitions of the cryptographic schemes we rely upon for constructing ABC.

A family of real numbers $(x_k)_{k\in\mathbb{N}} \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathbb{N}}$ is said to belong to poly(k) if there exists $c \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $x_k = O(k^c)$. A family of real numbers $(x_k)_{k\in\mathbb{N}} \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathbb{N}}$ is said to be *negligible*, denoted by $(x_k)_{k\in\mathbb{N}} \in neg(k)$, if for every $c \in \mathbb{N}$, $x_k = o(\frac{1}{k^c})$. A probabilistic Turing Machine is *k*-bounded for some $k \in \mathbb{N}$ if (1) it can be described with *k* bits, assuming a standard bit-string representation, and (2) it halts after *k* transitions.

The cryptographic schemes and their properties are defined with respect to a security parameter $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}$. A (local) protocol is said to be *efficient* if its complexity belongs to $poly(\kappa)$. A real number x (which, traditionally, describes a probability) is said to be *negligible* if it is parametrized with the security parameter κ and $x \in neg(\kappa)$. An adversary is said to be *polynomially-bounded* if it is parametrized with the security parameter κ and is $poly(\kappa)$ bounded. A property of a cryptographic scheme is said to *hold* if it cannot be violated by a polynomially-bounded adversary with more than a negligible probability. Throughout the section, we denote by $\mathsf{String} \triangleq \{0,\,1\}^*$ the set of all strings.

B.1. Digital signatures

A *digital signature scheme* is a tuple of efficient local protocols (Gen, Sign, Verify), with:

- Gen: a probabilistic algorithm that takes the security number κ as the input, and randomly selects a pair (sk_i, pk_i) composed of a secret (i.e., private) key sk_i and a public (i.e., verification) key pk_i; the bit-representations of sk_i and pk_i are of size of (at most) κ bits.
- Sign(m, sk_i): a (potentially probabilistic) algorithm that takes (1) a string $m \in$ String, and (2) a private key sk_i as the input. The algorithm outputs a signature σ_i whose bit-representation has a size of (at most) κ bits.
- Verify(m, pk_j, σ_j): a (potentially probabilistic) algorithm that takes (1) a string $m \in$ String, (2) the public key pk_j of a process P_j , and (3) a signature σ_j as the input. The algorithm outputs \top (true) or \bot (false) depending on whether σ_j is deemed as a valid signature.

The following properties hold:

- Correctness: If $(sk_i, pk_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\kappa)$, then $\text{Verify}(m, pk_i, \text{Sign}(m, sk_i))$ returns \top .
- Unforgeability: If Verify (m, pk_j, σ_j) returns \top , then (1) $\sigma_j \leftarrow \text{Sign}(m, sk_j)$ has been executed by P_j , or (2) P_j is faulty.

This scheme is formalized by the functionality \mathcal{F}_{SIG} in the universally composable (UC) framework [19].

B.2. Public key infrastructure (PKI)

An *ideal public key infrastructure* is a tuple (Keys, Sign, Verify), where Keys = $((SK = (sk_1, ..., sk_n), PK = (pk_1, ..., pk_n))$, with:

- PK: a vector of public (i.e., verification) keys stored by every correct process; each public key *pk_j* is associated with the process *P_j*.
- SK: a vector of secret (i.e., private) keys such that, for every correct process *P_i*, *P_i* stores its secret key *sk_i* which corresponds to its public key *pk_i*; *sk_i* is hidden from the adversary (i.e., the unforgeability property of digital signatures is satisfied; Appendix B.1).
- Sign (m, sk_i) : a (potentially probabilistic) algorithm that takes (1) a string $m \in$ String, and (2) a private key sk_i as the input. The algorithm outputs a signature σ_i .
- Verify (m, pk_j, σ_j) : a deterministic algorithm that takes (1) a string $m \in$ String, (2) the public key pk_j of a process P_j , and (3) a signature σ_j as the input. The algorithm outputs \top or \bot depending on whether σ_j is deemed as a valid signature.

The following properties hold:

- Correctness: For every i ∈ [1, n], Verify(m, pk_i, Sign(m, sk_i)) returns ⊤.
- Unforgeability: If Verify (m, pk_j, σ_j) returns \top , then (1) $\sigma_j \leftarrow \text{Sign}(m, sk_j)$ has been executed by P_j , or (2) P_j is faulty.

In our paper, we assume an established PKI, i.e., we are not concerned with how such an infrastructure is obtained. We emphasize that the definition above does not state how a verifier learns the public (i.e., verification) key of another process. The associated ideal functionality, formalized by \mathcal{F}_{CA} in the UC model [19], corresponds to a "rudimentary certification authority that registers party identities together with public values provided by the registered party". Traditionally, this functionality is emulated in the following manner: a process publicly announces its public key using the Byzantine reliable broadcast primitive [13,17]. However, without additional assumptions, the resiliency of Byzantine reliable broadcast is bounded by n/3 (without previously established PKI), even in the synchronous setting [40], making it impossible for implementation in overly corrupted systems.

Assuming that each party can solve cryptographic puzzles only at a bounded rate, it is possible to (1) implement a setup phase to establish an ideal PKI assuming a (potentially very large) bound Δ on message delays [38,7], and then (2) run asynchronous protocols on top of the established ideal PKI (in the main phase), without facing the dilemma between safety and efficiency due to the choice of Δ . (A small Δ would threat the safety, while a large Δ would increase the latency.)

B.3. Threshold signature scheme

A non-interactive (k, n)-dual threshold signature scheme is a tuple of efficient local protocols (Keys, ShareSign, ShareVerify, Verify, Combine), where Keys = (PK, SK = $(sk_1, ..., sk_n)$, VK = $(vk_1, ..., vk_n)$), with:

- PK: a public key store by correct process.
- VK: a vector of verification keys stored by every correct process.
- SK: a vector of private key shares such that, for every correct process *P_i*, *P_i* stores its private key share *sk_i*; *sk_i* is hidden from the adversary.
- ShareSign(m, sk_i): a (potentially probabilistic) algorithm that takes (1) a string $m \in$ String, and (2) a private key share sk_i as the input. The algorithm outputs a partial signature σ_i^P of (at most) κ bits.
- ShareVerify (m, vk_j, σ_j^P) : a deterministic algorithm that takes (1) a string $m \in$ String, (2) the verification key vk_j of a process P_j , and (3) a partial signature σ_j^P as the input. The algorithm outputs \top or \bot depending on whether σ_j^P is deemed as a valid partial signature.
- Combine(m, {σ_i}_{i∈S∧S⊂[1,n]∧|S|=k}): an algorithm that takes (1) a string m ∈ String, and (2) a subset S of size |S| = k of partial signatures {σ_i}_{i∈S}. The algorithm outputs a threshold signature σ^T.
- Verify(m, PK, σ^T): a deterministic algorithm that takes (1) a string $m \in$ String, (2) the public key PK, and (3) a threshold signature σ^T . The algorithm outputs \top or \bot depending on whether σ^T is deemed as a valid threshold signature.

The following properties hold:

- Correctness of partial signatures: For every $i \in [1, n]$, ShareVerify $(m, vk_i, \text{ShareSign}(m, sk_i))$ returns \top .
- Unforgeability of partial signatures: If ShareVerify(m, vk_j, σ^P_j) returns ⊤, then (1) σ^P_j ← ShareSign(m, sk_j) has been executed by P_j, or (2) P_j is faulty.
- Correctness of threshold signatures: Verify(m, PK, Combine({ShareSign(m, sk_j)}_{j∈J∧J⊂[1,n]∧|J|=k})) returns ⊤.
- Unforgeability of threshold signatures: If Verify(m, PK, σ^T) returns \top , then there exists a set J, |J| = k, of partial signatures such that, for each $\sigma_j^P \in J$, (1) $\sigma_j^P \leftarrow$ ShareSign(m, sk_j) has been executed by P_j , or (2) P_j is faulty.

Importantly, there exist dual threshold signature schemes with threshold signatures having κ bits (e.g., [49]). Note that, without a trusted setup, a (k, n)-dual threshold signature scheme can be obtained via a distributed key generation (DKG) protocol (e.g., [2]) if the number of faulty processes does not exceed n - k. Otherwise, no guarantees exist. For example, if the number of faults exceeds n - k, we can have an imperfect threshold signature scheme in which the aforementioned properties would not hold (e.g., faulty processes could forge the private key shares of correct processes and use them to sign statements on their behalf).

B.4. Threshold signature scheme in a transparent setup (via Σ -compressed protocols)

A transparent non-interactive (k, n)-dual threshold signature scheme is a scheme whose specification is extremely similar to the specification presented in Appendix B.3. The only difference is that a transparent scheme does not include a common public key, which implies that a trusted setup nor a DKG protocol is necessary. Hence, obtaining a transparent scheme is strictly easier (in terms of necessary assumptions) than obtaining a non-transparent scheme (Appendix B.3). For the completeness, the full specification is given below.

A transparent non-interactive (k, n)-dual threshold signature scheme is tuple of efficient local protocols (Keys, ShareSign, ShareVerify, Verify, Aggregate), where Keys = $(SK = (sk_1, ..., sk_n), VK = (vk_1, ..., vk_n))$, with:

- VK: a vector of verification keys stored by every correct process.
- SK: a vector of private key shares such that, for every correct process P_i , P_i stores its private key share sk_i ; sk_i is hidden from the adversary.
- ShareSign(*m*, *sk*_i): a (potentially probabilistic) algorithm that takes (1) a string $m \in$ String, and (2) a private key share *sk*_i as the input. The algorithm outputs a signature share σ_i^S of (at most) κ bits.
- ShareVerify (m, vk_j, σ_j^S) : a deterministic algorithm that takes (1) a string $m \in$ String, (2) the verification key vk_j of a process P_j , and (3) a signature share σ_j^S as the input. The algorithm outputs \top or \bot depending on whether σ_j^S is deemed as a valid signature.
- Aggregate(m, {σ_i}_{i∈S∧S⊂[1,n]∧|S|=k}): an algorithm that takes (1) a string m ∈ String, and (2) a subset S of size |S| = k of signature shares {σ_i}_{i∈S}. The algorithm outputs an aggregate signature σ^A.
- Verify(m, σ^A): a deterministic algorithm that takes (1) a string $m \in$ String, and (2) an aggregate signature σ^A . The algorithm outputs \top or \bot depending on whether σ^A is deemed as a valid aggregate signature.

The following properties hold:

- Correctness of signature shares: For every i∈[1, n], ShareVerify(m, vk_i, ShareSign(m, sk_i)) returns ⊤.
- Unforgeability of signature shares: If ShareVerify (m, vk_j, σ_j^S) returns \top , then (1) $\sigma_j^S \leftarrow$ ShareSign (m, sk_j) has been executed by P_j , or (2) P_j is faulty.
- Correctness of aggregate signatures: Verify $(m, Aggregate({ShareSign}(m, sk_j))_{j \in J \land J \subset [1,n] \land |J|=k})$ returns \top .
- Unforgeability of aggregate signatures: If $\operatorname{Verify}(m, \sigma^A)$ returns \top , then there exists a set J, |J| = k, of share signatures such that, for each $\sigma_j^S \in J$, (1) $\sigma_j^S \leftarrow \operatorname{ShareSign}(m, sk_j)$ has been executed by P_j , or (2) P_j is faulty.

Importantly, there exist transparent threshold signature schemes such that the aggregate signatures have a size of $O(\kappa \log(n))$ bits (e.g., [8]). Thus, proving that a group of a linear number of processes signed a certain message requires $O(\kappa \log(n))$ bits to be transmitted rather than $O(\kappa)$ bits for the non-transparent threshold signature schemes (Appendix B.3).

B.5. Aggregate signatures

A non-interactive n-aggregate signature scheme is a tuple of efficient (local) protocols (Keys, ShareSign, ShareVerify, Verify, Aggregate), where Keys = $(SK = (sk_1, ..., sk_n), VK = (vk_1, ..., vk_n))$, with:

- VK: a vector of verification keys stored by every correct process.
- SK: a vector of private key shares such that, for every correct process P_i , P_i stores its private key share sk_i ; sk_i is hidden from the adversary.
- ShareSign(m, sk_i): a (potentially probabilistic) algorithm that takes (1) a string $m \in$ String, and (2) a private key share sk_i as the input. The algorithm outputs a signature share σ_i^S of (at most) κ bits.
- ShareVerify (m, vk_j, σ_j^S) : a deterministic algorithm that takes (1) a string $m \in$ String, (2) the verification key vk_j of a process P_j , and (3) a signature share σ_j^S as the input. The algorithm outputs \top or \bot depending on whether σ_j^S is deemed as a valid signature.
- Aggregate(m, $\{\sigma_i\}_{i \in S \land S \subseteq [1,n]}$): an algorithm that takes (1) a string $m \in$ String, and (2) a subset *S* of any size of signature shares $\{\sigma_i\}_{i \in S}$. The algorithm outputs an aggregate signature σ^A .
- Verify (m, σ^A, B) : a deterministic algorithm that takes (1) a string $m \in$ String, (2) an aggregate signature σ^A , and (3) a bit bask $B \in \{0, 1\}^n$. The algorithm outputs \top or \bot depending on whether σ^A is deemed as a valid aggregate signature with reference to B.

The following properties hold:

- Correctness of signature shares: For every $i \in [1, n]$, ShareVerify $(m, vk_i, \text{ShareSign}(m, sk_i))$ returns \top .
- Unforgeability of signature shares: If ShareVerify (m, vk_j, σ_j^S) returns \top , then (1) $\sigma_j^S \leftarrow$ ShareSign (m, sk_j) has been executed by P_j , or (2) P_j is faulty.
- Correctness of aggregate signatures: Consider any string $m \in$ String and any bit-mask $B \in \{0, 1\}^n$. The following holds: Verify $(m, \text{Aggregate}(\{\text{ShareSign}(m, sk_j)\}_{B[j]=1}), B)$ returns \top .
- Unforgeability of aggregate signatures: If Verify (m, σ^A, B) returns \top , then, for every $j \in [1, n]$ such that B[j] = 1, (1) $\sigma_j^S \leftarrow$ ShareSign (m, sk_j) has been executed by P_j , or (2) P_j is faulty.

There exist transparent aggregate signature schemes such that the aggregate signatures have a size of $O(\kappa)$ bits (e.g., [11]). The interface of an aggregate signature scheme is similar to the interface of the non-transparent threshold signature schemes (Appendix B.3). We emphasize two differences:

• (Complexity) An aggregate signature σ^A has to be associated with a bit-mask *B* of *n* bits (representing the subset of signers). Indeed, this bit-mask is an argument of the associated Verify protocol. Thus, proving that a group of a linear number of processes have signed a certain message requires $O(\kappa + n)$ bits to be transmitted instead of $O(\kappa)$ bits for the non-transparent threshold signature schemes (Appendix B.3).

• (Transparency) This scheme requires weaker assumptions for the setup (the same ones as the transparent threshold signature schemes defined in Appendix B.4). Indeed, the secret keys can be generated independently, and the correct processes have to agree on the associated verification keys (exactly as in a PKI).

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